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ABSTRACT 
Unlike many studies that assess the impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs), this thesis 
is a study of the negotiated outcomes in FTAs between the United States (U.S.) and Chile, and 
the European Union (EU) and Chile. Existing negotiation literature pertains to multilateral trade 
talks, dispute settlements or bilateral one good trade agreements. Studies regarding the 
negotiation process and other factors influencing outcomes in comprehensive FTAs are rare. In 
order to address this gap in the literature, this thesis is an analysis of how and why the FTA 
between Chile and the U.S. differs from the FTA between Chile and the EU, in particular with 
regards to sensitive agricultural goods. As the two agreements were negotiated and implemented 
within similar time frames, and thus a similar political and economic environment within Chile, 
it is possible to use the theory-testing method of difference case study approach. This framework 
helps to test the validity of one leading theory of economic negotiations posited by Odell. 
Moreover, any shortcomings in the applicability of Odell’s theory to these specific negotiations 
can be ascertained using this methodology. Odell’s theory postulates that negotiated outcomes 
are a result of market conditions, domestic politics, and negotiator beliefs and strategies. In 
addition to causality in FTA negotiations, the case study will ascertain how the U.S. and the EU 
differed in their approaches to negotiating free trade. Conclusions drawn from this study include 
that there are varying degrees of sensitivity in agriculture which result in special and specific 
negotiated outcomes. Furthermore, the U.S. and the EU differ in their approaches to free trade 
which inevitably affects negotiated outcomes. Overall, Odell’s theory is a competent basis for 
understanding these FTA negotiated outcomes. Additional theoretical understanding of the 
impact of the institutional considerations in the negotiation process and existing domestic 
policies could however add to the comprehensiveness of this theory.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, this study describes how the negotiated 
outcomes of the Chile/United States (U.S.) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) compare to the 
Chile/European Union (EU) FTA, particularly with regards to agricultural goods. Second, the 
study attempts to explain the reasons for the differences in the negotiated outcomes of these two 
FTAs by way of a method of difference case study, focusing particularly on explanatory 
variables deemed relevant by economic negotiation theory (ENT).  
1.2 Objectives 
The first objective of this study is to compare the outcomes in the U.S./Chile FTA and the 
EU/Chile FTA. This objective involves comparing the institutional structures, economic 
instruments utilized and exclusions in each agreement. The institutional structures include 
differences in how the agreements deal with sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), 
intellectual property (IP) and geographical indicators (GI), as well as other technical barriers to 
trade (TBT). Economic instruments mainly refer to the market access sections of the agreements 
including specific information regarding tariff schedules and non-tariff barriers which impact 
market access. Exclusions range from those products which have partial but not complete 
liberalization to those products which have no additional market access. 
While market access negotiations typically involve more than just agricultural goods, this 
study will focus on the agricultural goods which can be identified as “sensitive”. According to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), countries may designate a certain amount of products as 
“sensitive” based on criteria regarding food security, livelihood security and rural development 
(World Trade Organization 2006). These sensitive products are able to maintain greater 
protection as they are considered to be exceptional and therefore do not have to adhere to 
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existing WTO rules regarding market access. A similar characterization appears in FTAs. In 
general, grains, oils, sugar, meat and dairy are considered sensitive throughout the world as many 
countries provide domestic support for these crops for reasons of food security and rural 
livelihood. This support can be in terms of direct or indirect subsidies as well as border 
protection such as tariffs and other border barriers. Annex 2 goes into greater detail regarding 
why agriculture is sensitive and the way it is treated in accordance with the sensitive quality of 
the sector. The three countries2 included in this study have a few additional goods which are 
considered sensitive due to the comparative competitiveness between the FTA partners in the 
studied areas. As such, the list of sensitive goods in this study includes wheat, sugar, dairy, 
poultry, wine, and fish. Studying these products provides insight into how sensitivities impact 
negotiations and how outcomes may reflect the degree of sensitivity of a sector. 
The second objective is to determine reasons for the differences in the two agreements. In 
previous studies, researchers have suggested that outcomes in negotiations are a result of power 
differentials. A more recent body of research, which is referred to as Economic Negotiation 
Theory (ENT), suggests that the outcomes have less to do with power relations and more to do 
with the negotiator and domestic political and economic conditions (see Evans, Jacobson and 
Putnam (1993), Milner (1997) and Odell (2003)). Using the framework provided by Odell in his 
book Negotiating the World Economy, this research attempts to test the relevance of this theory 
of economic negotiations and determine if differences in three proposed causal variables, market 
conditions, negotiator beliefs and strategies, and domestic politics, can be used to explain 
                                                 
2
 Although the European Union is not a country, it is easier to refer to it as such for comparative 
purposes. Appendix 1 lists all of the current member states, the 15 who were member states at 
the time of negotiations and those member states which belong to the Eurozone. 
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variation in the outcomes or if the outcomes are more of a result of something else. Furthermore, 
this research contributes to the current theoretical literature by providing specific case evidence.  
1.3 Rationale for this Research 
ENT research has focused on negotiations at the multilateral level, in dispute settlement 
and one good trade treaties. To the best of my knowledge, no study has analyzed the negotiations 
or outcomes of a comprehensive FTA, much less compared two comprehensive FTAs. However, 
this would prove a useful exercise as it can help to 1) add to existing literature regarding 
complex trade negotiations with multiple goods considered, 2) determine what makes particular 
products or industries sensitive and how this differs from country to country and 3) identify more 
concise explanatory variables in FTA outcomes.  
1.3.1 Rationale for the Qualitative Case Study 
For a method of difference case study, it is important to be able to control for as much as 
possible so that differences in the cases can be attributed to a determined causal variable with 
more certainty. This study is appropriate for such a method because economic, political and 
strategic variables in Chile may be controlled as the agreements were negotiated at the same time 
with Chile and as such, considerable variability in the cases can be attributed to actions or 
environments that originate in the U.S. or the EU. Indeed, the EU began their negotiations with 
Chile on November 24, 1999 and reached an agreement on April 26, 2002. The U.S. began 
negotiating their FTA on November 29, 2000 and concluded negotiations on December 11, 2002 
(Organization of American States 2011).  
The rationale for comparing the U.S. and the EU in FTAs is that they are both entities 
that have sought out trade agreements with smaller countries and have promoted liberalization at 
global and bilateral levels. During his term as president, George W. Bush instigated an official 
policy of “competitive liberalism”, which involved entering into various trade agreements in 
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order to strengthen partnerships, create two-way trade preferences which were previously one 
way due to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) granted to developing countries, and to 
push along liberalization progress at the multilateral level (GAO 2007). The Chilean agreement 
was one such agreement negotiated and implemented during this time. The EU did not have a 
similar stance; however, as the U.S. was pursuing 17 FTAs with 47 countries within a 5 year 
period (2002-2007) within the framework of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)3, the EU and 
other countries/economic entities had to act in order to avoid trade diversion costs 
(Andriamananjara 2003). Regardless of the reasons the U.S. and the EU have entered into FTAs, 
it is interesting to compare the approaches both sides take, the pressures each side is confronted 
with, and what the outcomes of FTAs are given different environments and strategies of both 
entities. 
1.3.2 Rationale for Focusing on Agriculture 
At the multilateral level in the Doha Round, much of the delay in trade negotiations has 
been a result of sensitivities in agriculture (Elliot 2006). Indeed, according to economist K. A. 
Elliott with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, agriculture is “the sector with the 
highest remaining barriers in rich countries and…tariffs on agricultural products entering high-
income countries are roughly five times higher than the average for merchandise overall” (Elliot 
2006). At the global level, little progress has been made in the Doha Development Round since 
the agricultural “modalities framework” was presented in 2008, largely due to disagreements 
between developing and developed countries over agriculture (Schnepf and Hanrahan 2010). 
Annex 2 documents more closely the struggles in multilateral negotiations over agriculture. The 
past and current difficulties in addressing agriculture in trade negotiations is indicative of the 
                                                 
3
 This framework allows for greater ease in negotiating and implementing FTAs in the U.S. 
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need to study agriculture in FTAs, especially from the perspective of the high-income countries 
negotiating with developing countries.  
Agriculture was also an important issue in the two trade agreements considered in this 
study. The U.S. and the EU both subsidize agriculture fairly heavily whereas Chile has an open 
market approach that is oriented towards the export of primary products. In terms of total trade 
and total trade value, copper is the principal export from Chile. They are also competitive in 
agro-food production. Indeed, of the top ten Chilean exports: wood, fish, animal and vegetable 
oils, fats and waxes, wine and grapes are all important in terms of value and volume (United 
Nations 2009). Although at the time of the FTA negotiations Chilean exports to the U.S. and the 
EU were quite small in terms of total trade for each entity, the potential that Chile presented in 
agricultural and natural resource-based products made it more of a contentious issue. Moreover, 
Chile has growing seasons that are complementary to the U.S. and the EU as it is located in the 
southern hemisphere; however, the use of refrigeration and the growing potential of processed 
foods could present competition to domestic production in the U.S. and the EU and vice versa for 
Chile.  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
Chapters one through three provide a foundation for the study of FTA negotiations. The 
first chapter is a presentation of the objectives of the study as well as a brief introduction to the 
topic and motivations for this study. Chapter two presents the methodologies in greater depth for 
approaching this type of research. It includes a brief literature review on methods used in 
previous studies as well as benefits of using one methodological approach over another. The 
third chapter provides the theoretical background for the frameworks used in economic 
negotiation literature.  
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Chapter four provides specific details of the outcomes of the FTAs by way of an initial 
descriptive case study. The outcomes are the independent variables and are discussed in terms of 
tariff rates, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), tariff reduction schemes, exclusions and safeguards as well 
as other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and political arrangements. After the descriptive case study, 
analytical comparative case studies of selected agricultural goods specifically address the role 
that the tested independent variables had in the negotiated outcomes. It will also address the 
relative outcomes to determine which side was most successful in meeting their objectives for 
each area.  
The final two chapters make an assessment of Odell’s theory and provide conclusions, 
limitations and potential implications of the study. Chapter five specifically addresses causality 
as shown by the cross case comparisons both between the US and the EU and between selected 
sensitive products in each agreement. The perceived reasons for negotiated outcomes as 
evaluated by the case studies are compared with Odell’s theory to determine: 1) the completeness 
of Odell’s theory and 2) additional theoretical insights drawn from the case studies which are not 
included in Odell’s theory. Chapter six summarizes the findings of the research and provides 
implications for the future including the need for greater research in the area of trade 
negotiations and the creation of a comprehensive theory for understanding FTA negotiated 
outcomes.  
Annexes 1 and 2 provide the contextual background for the study of these two FTAs. 
Annex 1 begins by discussing the economic and political environment leading up to the 
negotiations as well as the development path of Chile and the economic and political orientation 
of the U.S. and the EU with regards to trade. The concept of liberalization and the pressures in 
FTA negotiations on all parties is discussed, and provides valuable background for the case 
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studies. Annex 2 provides a discussion of negotiation pressures in agriculture in particular and 
relates these pressures to the three countries included in this study.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Qualitative versus Quantitative Research Methods 
When conducting research, it is important to choose appropriate research methods 
tailored to the study and objectives. The desired outcome of the research in particular is 
important in determining which method one should use. Statistical methods provide information 
regarding how much a change in one independent variable contributes to a change in the 
dependent variable whereas case study methods help to identify “causal mechanisms that connect 
causes and effects” (Falleti 2006). As such, if one wants to know how much impact one variable 
has on an outcome, then statistical methods would be better; however, if someone wants to know 
what causes an outcome, then one may be more inclined to use qualitative methods. Indeed, in 
trade theory, quantitative methods such as gravity, general equilibrium and partial equilibrium 
models have been heavily used in describing both the flow of goods as well as the impacts of 
trade policy outcomes. Quantitative methods have also been used in diplomacy and negotiation 
literature, although case studies and other qualitative methods have been much more prevalent 
(Ripsman and Blanchard 2006). 
In addition to knowing what one wants to learn from a study, it is important to know the 
strengths and weaknesses of whichever method is chosen. This awareness will allow the 
researcher to overcome possible issues associated with using one method over another or simply 
allow the researcher to account for them at some point in the research. When dealing with 
quantitative assessments, there is a risk of interpreting the results incorrectly or over-simplifying 
a result. In the case of qualitative assessments, the opposite may be true as there is a risk of 
identifying too many causal variables to be understandable or helpful in a real-life situation. 
Simply knowing these potential problems can help a researcher deal with them or avoid them.  
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2.2 Methods used in diplomacy literature 
In diplomacy literature, there are essentially three main frameworks used for studying 
economic negotiations: systemic or international, domestic and mixed. Each of these frameworks 
has used a variety of methods or approaches to test and create theories. Although the theoretical 
axioms are discussed in more detail in chapter three, it is important at this point to describe the 
basic facets of each framework as well as the scientific approaches used and their 
appropriateness based on their goals. The first and second approaches, the international and 
domestic approaches, will not be the focus of this thesis as ENT is a mixed framework and 
therefore has components of the first two approaches. Each of the first two approaches provides a 
basis for the ENT framework however and as such, it is important to understand these 
frameworks. 
Systemic or international theories hypothesize that outcomes are a result mainly of the 
relative power of nations and other internationally oriented explanations. This theory lends itself 
to “large-N” statistical studies as they focus on correlations of democracy and peace or relative 
size as an indicator of relative outcomes. As the focus of these studies is at the macro-level, it is 
acceptable to use statistical analysis as the study has fewer hypothetical variables as well as a 
larger population; however, this is not to say that qualitative case studies would not be a useful 
framework for studies from this paradigm. Like other proponents of the case study methodology, 
Ripsman and Blanchard hold that case studies can be much better at determining causality, 
although they admit that because of the limited number of cases, it is “at a strong comparative 
disadvantage to quantitative analysis in finding correlations and making inferences beyond the 
cases” (Ripsman and Blanchard 2006, 3). Because of the complementariness of the two 
approaches, they propose that researchers take advantage of a combined approach.  
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The second framework of domestic theories in this literature is one wherein the 
negotiator and domestic pressures are all that matter in a given negotiation. This could be in 
terms of negotiator behavior vis-a-vis its domestic institutions, such as the culture or norms, as 
well as the degree to which the public interacts with the negotiators regarding an issue. This 
body of work uses a variety of approaches. These approaches include game theory, case studies, 
and institutional frameworks of analysis (Kremenyuk, Sjostedt and Zartman 2000).  
The game theory approach within the domestic theory of economic negotiations discusses 
negotiated outcomes in terms of Pareto-efficiency which relates inherently to the use of value-
claiming versus value-creating negotiation strategies. The social optimum, otherwise known as 
the point that is Pareto efficient, is likely the result of value-creation, whereas a Nash 
Equilibrium is likely the result of value-claiming behavior, and is the point at which neither side 
has an incentive to deviate (Neugeborn 2000). Others look at concession strategies in terms of 
game theory classifying the interacting strategies in terms of games such as “Chicken Dilemma 
Game” or “Prisoners Dilemma Game” which can give clues as to what extent the likely 
outcomes are based on the Pareto outcome or Nash equilibrium (Neugeborn 2000).  
Other methods in domestic theory include the analysis of efficiency in negotiated 
outcomes as well as theoretical predictions regarding efficient outcomes in the future and 
recommendations for future negotiations. For example, Metcalfe suggests that “two negotiators 
who have reached an initial agreement should renegotiate in order to reach the efficient frontier” 
(Metcalfe 2000, 34). The limitations of such approaches are that they do not determine causality 
but rather help to define outcomes and predict future outcomes in terms of the efficiency frontier 
and theoretic game outcomes. 
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Qualitative methods are also commonly used in the domestic framework but mostly when 
studying how negotiation strategies come about and affect a given negotiation. For example, 
Elms uses case studies to examine U.S. negotiations with Japan and Korea over automobiles to 
demonstrate how industry groups shape negotiations in terms of the positions the governments 
take and the strategies they use in order to reach their objectives which not only provides 
valuable information about the positions they take but also how it affects their relative outcome 
(Elms 2006). In an article over bargaining within the EU, case studies are also used to determine 
how the domestic situations as well as the special EU institutional structure will affect the 
bargaining strategies and process in economic negotiations (Conceicao-Heldt 2006). Other more 
institutionally-oriented approaches detail how culture or the market affects negotiations and 
pinpoint these institutional structures as the unit of analysis as it relates to outcomes (Brett et al. 
1998 or Blount 2000 for example). 
A more recent approach, and the body of work within which this thesis is situated, is a 
mixed approach wherein macro-level variables are seen as important as is the negotiator and 
domestic negotiating environment. Odell uses a mixed-method approach to determine how 
economic indicators such as import penetration as well as political indicators such as relative 
power affect the propensity to enter into conflict in economic negotiations as well as the outcome 
of these economic negotiations (Odell 1985). Much of the work in this area has been conducted 
by using case studies that rely on process tracing, the method of difference and other case study 
methods. In a book from which much of this study is oriented, Odell uses various case studies to 
prove his points of causality in negotiations in Negotiating the World Economy. The Institute for 
International Economics (2006) also utilized case studies to illustrate their points regarding U.S. 
trade negotiation outcomes in their two volume book series: Case Studies in U.S. Trade 
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Negotiation. Similarly, Kremenyuk and his colleagues (2000) use case studies to link economic 
and negotiation theory in a seminal piece on the topic: International Economic Negotiation: 
Models versus Reality. Although case studies have been used to test theories in this framework, 
case studies regarding bilateral trade negotiations are rare and are perhaps non-existent for 
comprehensive FTAs. 
Much of the research within this mixed framework is centered on how different 
conditions affect one’s negotiating position and the strategies and tactics that are therefore used. 
What sets this apart from the previous literature, however, is that it includes theoretical 
contributions from the systemic framework by insisting that relative power does play an 
important role in how countries are able to negotiate. For example, in their working paper 
discussing the EU budget negotiations, Dur and Mateo developed a typology of negotiation 
tactics and, using “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA) analysis and process 
tracing case study methods, they were able to relate bargaining power to the tactics used in 
negotiations (Dur and Mateo 2008). Similarly, Odell argues that interaction with international 
institutions and other supra-domestic forces may have an impact on the favorable outcomes from 
Latin American countries in trade negotiations using across-case comparison (Odell 2001).  
2.3 Case Study Methods 
Within the qualitative approach, there are various methods which can be used to make an 
assessment, whether this is to test a theory, develop a theory, to categorize an occurrence or 
multiple occurrences or to make a meaningful comparison. One method to accomplishing these 
various purposes is a case study although there are actually many different types of case studies. 
Indeed, even in the area of single case studies, one may conduct a descriptive case study, a case 
study which gives a preliminary illustration of a theory, a disciplined interpretive case study 
which applies a theory to a new project, a hypothesis-generating case study, a least or most likely 
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case study, or a deviant case study which is used to disprove a theory or process (Odell 2001). A 
single case study simply denotes that one is studying one situation, occurrence, or outcome to 
test theory or describe something of interest to readers. Alternatively, the method of difference or 
agreement, which is sometimes called Mill’s Methods because the design was created by John 
Stuart Mill, uses two well-matched cases in order to compare the cases to accomplish case study 
goals (Bennett and George 1997). As in deciding between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, it is important to use the same criteria in deciding which type of case study to conduct: 
what is the purpose of your study, what do you want to find out and what are the limitations and 
strengths of each approach? 
Case studies may be classified in different ways than those described above. For 
example, Lin describes three main types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory and 
descriptive; however, case studies are generally used to delve into the details of an event, 
process, or situation, no matter the purpose (Tellis 1997). The purpose of a case study determines 
how it should be approached. Nevertheless, in any case study, it is an important first step to 
define your research question and pick your case, in other words, to design your case study. 
After the designing stage, one should conduct the case study, thereafter analyzing the evidence 
and determine the conclusions (Tellis 1997). If the purpose is to generate theory, after 
conducting the case study, the researcher may then develop hypotheses, relate these hypotheses 
to the literature and then reach closure (Eisenhardt 1989, 533).  
No matter the purpose, one of the most important aspects of the case study is to 
determine the unit of analysis; this will determine how a case study is approached and where the 
focus will be. This unit of analysis can be a system of action such as how different sides use 
information that they have to negotiate. It could also be a set of people including their actions in 
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a particular process or on another relevant unit within the case which can help to understand 
what is being examined. The specification of the unit of analysis will help to determine not only 
the level of analysis but also where the focus of the study will be so that data can be accumulated 
for this area and level. This data collection will not be the end of the research. In case studies it is 
important to engage in a process called triangulation in order to insure the internal validity of the 
study. Triangulation involves cross-referencing different data sources, different theories, and 
methodologies as well as checking ones results with other researchers (Tellis 1997). While this is 
important in other research methods, it is essential in case studies in order to ensure validity 
when no correlation coefficients or other statistically validating tests are given. Furthermore, 
triangulation ensures that the researcher is certain about their conclusions.  
2.4 The Case Study at Hand 
One’s case study must be tailored to the desired outcome of the study and also the 
shortcomings must be well-understood before undergoing the research. Because this thesis 
research has multiple objectives, it makes the most sense to use multiple research methods. 
Indeed, in order to answer the research question: how do the U.S./Chile and EU/Chile FTA 
agreements differ, a descriptive case study must be undertaken. The design of this case study 
simply entails listing various differences between the two agreements in terms of the agreements 
as a whole. Furthermore, several questions are asked of each agreement which will allow for a 
more meaningful comparison of the two agreements: 
• Which sections are included? (Cooperation, SPS, investment, market access, etc.) 
• How many tariff schedules exist?  
• How are different goods “bundled”? 
• What is the phase-out period for each good? Is it back loaded? 
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• How many products or product types are excluded? 
• What percentage of goods is immediately liberalized? 
To determine why the two agreements differ, it is much more fruitful to undertake a 
method of difference approach wherein the differences in specific product outcomes between the 
two agreements may be attributed to differences between the environments of the U.S. and the 
EU at the time of the negotiations. In this case, the questions asked about each of the selected 
products in each agreement are focused on the three theoretical causal factors—market 
conditions, negotiator beliefs/strategies and domestic politics and institutions. Additionally, to 
check for causality outside of Odell’s framework, other questions are asked based on issues 
identified in the literature as important to negotiated outcomes. 
Market Conditions: 
• What were the market conditions for each good? (Production, consumption, import, 
export, etc.) 
• What were the market alternatives for each good? (i.e. was there an alternate market that 
could be entered) 
• For each good, were the producers export-oriented or import-competing? 
• Was there domestic potential to become more of an exporter for a particular good? 
• What was the level of domestic protection for each good? 
• What were previous tariff levels for the sensitive agricultural goods? 
Domestic Politics and Institutions: 
• Were the constituents in favor of an agreement? 
• To what extent did dissidents let themselves be heard or to what extent were dissidents 
fears considered? 
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• How much did producers work together with each government and other organizations? 
• Which coalitions were formed (both domestically and internationally)? 
• What was the relationship between important constituents or groups and the negotiators? 
Negotiator beliefs/strategies: 
• What was the overall strategy in the negotiations? 
• In order to implement the overall strategy, what tactics were used? 
• In the strategic spectrum, were the negotiations more towards value claiming or value 
creating (offensive or defensive)? 
• What did each side know about the position of the negotiating partner and how did this 
knowledge affect the negotiator’s actions? 
• How aware were the negotiators of the other side’s relative market conditions or of the 
domestic political situation? 
• How much discretion did the negotiator have independent of higher authority? 
Miscellaneous: 
• Can any of these questions be answered differently from the Chilean perspective with 
regards to each agreement?  
• What non-domestic challenges presented themselves in the negotiations, particularly 
other bilateral relations? 
• To what degree were pre-negotiations limiting on the actual negotiations? 
• Were linkages to other agreements and relations made? 
• Was there evidence that relative power influenced the negotiations?  
All of these questions are answered to help better understand our unit of analysis, namely, 
the negotiated outcome. The method of difference approach would suggest that differences in the 
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outcomes are a result of differences in the causal factors, hence the importance of answering 
each question for the U.S. and the EU agreement individually and then comparing the two 
answers. If the answers to the questions asked differ, but the outcome is the same for each 
agreement, then it would not make sense that the topic in question had anything to do with the 
outcome. On the other hand, if the answers differ and the outcomes differ, it may be true that the 
difference is due to the differences in the situations which can be revealed by answering the 
above questions.  
The method of difference case study is not enough to fully assign causal validity and as 
such, a more in-depth process-tracing case study must be conducted for each good. This research 
method is essentially just a “method of within-case analysis to evaluate causal processes” which 
“attempts to uncover the micro foundations of individual behavior that connect hypothetical 
cases and outcomes and to reduce the difficulties associated with unobserved contextual 
variables” (Falleti 2006, 1). Process-tracing is used in chapter 4 to assess how individual 
behavior was affected by hypothetical causes and the degree to which these causes affected 
negotiated outcomes versus other possible explanations. The use of process tracing combined 
with the method of difference approach helps to establish the validity of the results.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEADING THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS IN ECONOMIC 
NEGOTIATIONS 
3.1 Brief Introduction to Negotiation Theory 
 There are various frameworks and viewpoints with which to study economic 
negotiations. The main contribution overtime has been to combine economic and political 
science approaches in the study of international economic negotiations as they are both viewed 
as relevant to analysis. Indeed, studies such as those conducted by Odell (2001) and the Institute 
for International Economics (Devereaux, Lawrence and Watkins 2006) show that negotiations 
are not solely the product of economic theory and its associated recommendations. Neoclassical 
economics insists that in the absence of market distortions and transaction costs, free trade is 
welfare maximizing as it allows countries to move to their areas of comparative advantages 
leading to lower costs of production and lower prices for the consumers. The problem with this 
of course is that international markets are distorted and transaction costs do exist, and as such, 
“in the international trade arena, where no supervening authority exists to enforce agreements 
and imperfect market conditions are likely to prevail, the scope for negotiation is especially 
significant” (Neugeborn 2000, 308). Economic negotiation studies must therefore not only 
include the viewpoint of economic theory, but they must also consider negotiation theory. This 
combined approach is referred to throughout this thesis as Economic Negotiation Theory (ENT). 
This chapter goes into greater detail about what exactly is included in ENT in terms of guiding 
theoretical axioms, the dominant theoretical contributions from various schools of thought in 
negotiation theory, tools used for studying economic negotiations in the context of this 
theoretical framework, and lastly there will be a discussion regarding Odell’s contribution to 
ENT as it is the foundation for much of the theoretical testing undertaken in this thesis.  
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3.1.1 Basic Axioms in the Theoretical Framework 
 Because the focus of this thesis will relate to ENT, it is important to first identify the 
axioms which will be the basis of a greater theoretical framework used throughout the analysis. 
Essentially, there are five main axioms pulled from economic theory and negotiation theory 
which will guide the analysis. These axioms are provided from the theoretical literature and can 
be seen as the basic truths or assumptions from which further theoretical insights can be inferred 
or drawn upon.  
 The first axiom is pulled from economic, and more specifically, trade theory. This axiom 
holds that trade liberalization on the part of everyone is better from an economic net welfare 
perspective. This axiom is among the most important in economic literature as the mere 
existence of this truth precipitates the need for further work on the part of nations to ensure 
movement towards this welfare enhancing state of being—i.e. the proliferation of free trade 
agreements whether on the multilateral, bilateral, or corporate level4. Essentially, this axiom 
holds that free trade is net welfare maximizing as it allows countries to capitalize on their areas 
of comparative advantage. Should trade be completely free among nations, specialization will 
take place moving production to areas where the relative costs are lower. This would allow for 
the most efficient producers to survive and get the most income for their work due to their lower 
relative costs and their ability to capitalize on increasing economies of size and scale. 
Furthermore, consumers benefit because they are able to obtain goods at the cheapest price 
because of lower costs of production on the part of the producers (Neugeborn 2000). 
 The main problem with this assumption is that there are often other forces which keep 
completely free trade from being a possibility, which leads to the second axiom. This axiom 
                                                 
4Corporate level trade agreements generally refer to trade agreements between multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and countries all over the world. 
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basically states that the pursuit of complete trade liberalization may not necessarily be in the best 
interest of a politician or government because in order for trade liberalization to be welfare 
enhancing, all parties must drop trade barriers and domestic protection at the same time. If all 
parties do not drop trade barriers, then the one liberalizing trade will find it more difficult to 
compete with the protected sector. Nevertheless, domestic political concerns may prolong the 
need for protection, such as sensitive or new domestic industries, food security concerns, rural 
development concerns, or other issues discussed in more detail in annex 2. In their book 
regarding international economic negotiation, Kremenyuk and Sjöstedt insist that this is where 
the overlap really occurs between economic and political theories. Furthermore, this overlap 
“produces a highly specific type of integrative decision making where actors in the process seek 
two sets of different, though not always contradictory, goals: to maximize their direct profit from 
an economic deal and, in parallel, to coordinate it with national power interests that may either 
gain or lose from that profit” (Kremenyuk and Sjöstedt 2000, 343). While this axiom may seem 
at first contradictory to the first axiom, this is not the case; indeed, both considerations influence 
actors and outcomes within a given negotiation. 
 The third generally accepted principle within this theoretical framework has its basis in 
both economic and negotiation theory: a negotiator will decide upon and execute the strategy that 
they think is best to achieve their party’s particular goals vis-a-vis its expectations of how the 
other team will react—in other words, the negotiator will behave rationally. The concept of 
rationality or bounded rationality is a very important assumption in the political economy realm; 
without this assumption, it would be impossible to determine why someone acted as they did or 
how they could possibly act in the future. Moreover, a government would not trust the economy 
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or political position of their nation to someone who acts irrationally (Kremenyuk, Sjöstedt and 
Zartman, 2000, Ch. 1).  
 The next two axioms deal with the outcome of negotiations. The fourth axiom states that 
people will always negotiate an outcome that is better than a non-outcome. This is apparent 
because if they did not negotiate something better than a non-agreement, then they would not 
accept that negotiated outcome. This insinuates of course that the BATNA is reasonably well 
known by the parties. Similarly, the fifth axiom holds that everything is reciprocal. If one side is 
demanding concessions in one area, then the other side must also get concessions in that area or 
they may trade that concession in a different but preferably equivalent area. Simply put, “since 
the parties consider themselves equal and look for an equal outcome, they expect process 
equality or a requirement for such equality, in other words, that concessions be reciprocated” 
(Kremenyuk, Sjöstedt and Zartman, 2000, 22). This goes back to the rationality assumption of 
course: a negotiator would not allow someone a concession without also getting a concession for 
themselves.  
 These five axioms will remain as guiding principles throughout the study. They will help 
to develop further assumptions and will also be the basis of many current theoretical assertions 
within ENT, even if they are not specifically mentioned again. In any discussion of actors and 
their actions, it will always be the case that the actors are assumed to act rationally. In economic 
discussions, it is the basic premise that free trade is welfare maximizing with the added premise 
that this may not be pursued due to other pressures. Reciprocity and the BATNA will be 
discussed throughout and are considered to be very important concepts in ENT. 
3.1.2 A Brief Assessment of Existing Theories 
 As mentioned in chapter 2, negotiation theories can be categorized into three main 
frameworks or paradigms: the systemic or international framework, the domestic approach, and a 
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mixed approach which pulls theory from the first two frameworks in its analyses. While all three 
approaches have some differences in their theoretical contributions, the largest difference 
between the three frameworks is the unit of analysis. Within the systemic framework, the unit of 
analysis is typically macro variables which affect outcomes: economic and political power being 
the main theoretical propositions but also such things as economic and systemic 
interdependence, etc. The domestic approach typically looks to domestic institutions and actors 
with particular attention paid to negotiators for causality. The last framework combines the two 
approaches and looks at macro variables, institutions including the negotiation process, as well 
as actors as the units of analysis.  
 The main contribution of the systemic framework is often referred to as “the structural 
explanation” wherein the relative position of each party at the outset of the negotiation, as well 
as their ability to use this power, is the main factor leading to outcomes (Zartman 1987). This 
assertion is made by Sjöstedt where he insists that his case studies prove that power is 
continually shown to be an important determinant of the outcome (Sjöstedt 2000). Nevertheless, 
there are also times when it is found to be a less important indicator for outcomes. Indeed, Odell 
contends that for weaker states “gains and losses vary with how they negotiate, as well as with 
the power imbalance, and paradoxically small size even confers a few advantages” (Odell 2010, 
545). His thesis is not that power has nothing to do with outcomes but simply that it is possible to 
achieve more balanced outcomes even when negotiating from weakness.  
 In terms of the contributions from the domestic arena, the main contributions deal with 
how various factors affect negotiations and the negotiators themselves. Particularly important is 
the negotiating behavior, or moves, used by negotiators. While there are different terms used, it 
is generally accepted that there are two strategic poles within negotiation: a situation wherein the 
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negotiator tries to claim as much value as possible, and a situation wherein a negotiator attempts 
to create as much value as possible. Sometimes this is referred to as a distributive strategy versus 
an integrative strategy, respectively, but most agree that negotiations usually involve some 
mixture of the two approaches. The degree to which one strategy is used over another has been 
studied in fairly great detail. One source contends that “the extent to which value can be created 
and claimed in trade negotiations is strongly influenced by how the issue agenda is constructed” 
(Devereaux, Lawrence and Watkins 2006, 22). More comprehensive agendas provide greater 
opportunity for value creation than do narrower ones. This theoretical insight continues to be 
important in the study of negotiations and will be included in the analytical component of this 
thesis. 
 Indeed, there are a great deal of things which have been theorized to affect negotiator 
behavior aside from the agenda and the negotiation process. One, posited from the domestic 
framework, is the degree to which a negotiator must answer back to higher level politicians or 
constituents. Helen Milner, Peter Evans and Robert Putnam, among others, insist that there is a 
two level game wherein negotiators have to bargain both at the internal level with constituents 
and their own governments, as well as externally with other nations. Because of this so-called 
“two-level game”, negotiators are somewhat constrained in the actions that they are able to take 
in negotiations. They cannot make a deal which will not be accepted domestically, nor can they 
often get everything that their constituencies desire due to constraints on the other negotiator’s 
side domestically. These pressures are theorized to lead to certain behaviors on the part of the 
negotiators. Negotiators may expect groups from each side to work together, they may try to 
create linkages on issues or agreements, they may use trades from one area to another to appease 
their most sensitive sectors, or they may negotiate largely in secret (Evans, Jacobson and 
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Putnam1993). Regardless of what actions are taken, this is presented by the domestic approach to 
be an important determinant of the outcome. 
 The mixed approach views economic negotiations from the perspective of the negotiation 
table like the domestic approach, but it also considers that more than just domestic politics and 
negotiation strategies affect the negotiated outcomes. For example, Odell insists that “when the 
market in question is structured by multilateral producers who have stakes invested in the target 
country, the credibility of threats by their home government and hence its gains from offensive 
claiming will be lower on average” (Odell 2000, 184). This takes into account the other 
country’s situation as it relates to one’s own country’s negotiation strategy. This theoretical 
framework, referred to as ENT, while deeply seated in the domestic diplomacy literature, 
provides a more comprehensive view of negotiations that can be tested and critically appraised 
and can include theoretical contributions to the domestic and international approaches in the 
study of negotiations.  
3.2 Theoretical Tools in ENT 
 As indicated in previous sections, ENT is very diverse in terms of its theoretical 
propositions. Most analysts use a similar “tool kit” however when studying ENT. These tools 
help analysts to focus on different aspects of a negotiation in order to understand not only the 
outcomes but also what may have led to those outcomes. Two of the tools are largely helpful in 
visualizing the negotiation situation: the possibility frontier and a negotiation process model. The 
other two tools are fundamental in understanding the positions of the negotiators and why they 
acted as they did: BATNA and strategic analysis.  
3.2.1 The Possibility Frontier 
 The possibility frontier is a familiar concept in economics and when referring to the 
“production possibility frontier” it is generally accepted that any output on the frontier uses the 
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factors of production efficiently. Similarly, in ENT, a negotiated outcome which is on the 
frontier is assumed to be an efficient outcome between two bargaining powers. Efficiency for 
this frontier simply indicates that both sides were able to bargain effectively to achieve their 
desired objective given what was possible to achieve. An agreement, be it efficient or not, always 
occurs in the area under the curve or touching the curve which is known as the zone of 
agreement shown by figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: The Negotiation Possibility Frontier 
 
Modified from: Odell, John S., Negotiating the World Economy, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2000 
 
The origin of the graphic is the resistance point with which both sides work from in order 
to create and claim as much value as possible. The two axes represent the most preferable 
outcome for each party: the vertical axis refers to a set of ideal outcomes for negotiator A, 
whereas the horizontal axis refers to a set of ideal outcomes for negotiator B. In a negotiation 
between A and B, anywhere on the curve is efficient and indeed, point 4 is just one of many 
possible optimal outcomes. Points 1, 2 and 3 are better than no agreement at all because they are 
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all beyond the origin; however, these agreements could all be more efficient, meaning that each 
side could have achieved more of what they wanted in the negotiations. Also interesting about 
these three points is that a certain amount of value can be given to each of the points. Point 1 for 
example, is more in favor of what negotiator A was hoping for whereas point 3 is more in favor 
of negotiator B. Point 2 could arguably be equally beneficial for both negotiators, but could be 
much more efficient if both sides worked to create value and get to point 4. Point 5 is not 
possible to reach for the two parties because of negotiation restraints or limits (Odell 2000, Ch. 
2).  
In terms of analysis, it is often hard to know what is “on the frontier” because access to 
information is often incomplete, a negotiator may not fully indicate their objective or an 
analyst’s imagination may be limited in terms of what was or is possible. Indeed, much of the 
difference between point 2 and point 4 must be made through innovation on the part of both 
parties. This is where the value creation part of negotiation really comes into play. The 
difference between what each side in an agreement is leaning towards (point 1 versus point 3 for 
example) is the value claiming aspect of negotiations wherein the parties are simply dividing an 
already available ‘pie’ (Devereaux, Lawrence and Watkins 2006, Ch. 2). As in economic study, 
this theoretical visualization tool is of course all relative. The efficient frontier is made up of the 
“best” already negotiated agreements. The only way one would be able to tell if something is 
inefficient is to have an example of something that is indeed more efficient to compare it to such 
as a negotiated outcome for a particular good which met both negotiators’ objectives better than 
the good under question. Because this tool allows for comparison, it is a very useful tool for a 
comparative study. Not only can two FTAs be compared but also each outcome for each good 
can be compared.   
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3.2.2 Negotiation Process Model 
 Another fairly useful visualization tool in negotiation analysis is a negotiation process 
model. While most analysts in ENT and domestic negotiation theory look at the process in some 
way or form, a useful graphic for understanding this theoretical tool is presented by the Institute 
for International Economics (figure 3.2). Like the model described above by ENT and domestic 
negotiation theory, everything ultimately affects the negotiators strategies which then affect the 
outcomes. While this model does not tell the whole story, it is a useful tool for visualizing how 
the structure of negotiations affects the negotiated outcomes. An understanding of the 
negotiation process, the constraints and opportunities as well as the interactions can be very 
useful both in understanding the negotiation process as well as identifying possible causal 
factors. 
Figure 3.2: The “Structure-Strategy-Process-Outcomes Model” 
 
Source: Devereaux, et al., Case Studies in U.S. Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1: Making the Rules, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, September 2006, p. 19 
 
3.2.3 Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 
 The BATNA is one of the most important parts of ENT and indeed an essential tool for 
understanding negotiations. The reason that two parties enter into a negotiation is because there 
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is a potential to create something better than what is currently the status quo. Understanding what 
the status quo entails is the starting point of negotiations themselves. Odell insists that someone’s 
BATNA essentially is much of their bargaining power in negotiations (Odell 2000). On the 
negotiation frontier, it can be thought of as the resistance point which is represented by the origin 
since accepting an outcome that is the same as the BATNA is the same as having no negotiated 
outcome at all. This BATNA can be thought of from many different aspects as well: economic 
BATNA, political BATNA, security BATNA, among others. Furthermore, it is also a relative 
concept and can be compared as long as the researcher understands the relative value of the 
BATNA for each side. Sometimes comparing the BATNA can be somewhat subjective, but if the 
BATNAs are understood from both sides and from multiple angles including the perceptions 
each side has of the other side’s BATNA in relation to their own, it will be easier to understand 
why a negotiator acted as they did or used a strategy that they used. Additionally, this BATNA 
can be derived from economic data, interviews, news reports, and other sources as much of this 
information is available to all sides and often apparent in negotiations although sometimes it is 
beneficial to not expose one’s true BATNA to the other side (Odell 2000). 
3.2.4 Strategies and Tactics in Negotiations 
 In ENT literature, most of the causal variables relate to how they affect the negotiation 
strategy and tactics. As such, it is important to know what a strategy is and what that entails. 
Odell sums up the definition of strategy by describing it as a “set of behaviors that are observable 
at least in principle and associated with a plan to achieve some objective through bargaining” 
(Odell 2002, 40). The sets of behaviors that he mentions are more commonly referred to as 
tactics or the “moves” that each player makes. Various theorists agree that there are two main 
types of strategies: distributive or value claiming and integrative or value-creating. Distributive 
and integrative strategies each have a set of associated tactics. Dur and Mateo assert that hard 
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tactics, or those that are seen as more distributive, are only credible for powerful actors (Dur and 
Mateo 2008), whereas Odell argues that distributive tactics can be used by less powerful states if 
they have a much better alternative to a negotiated agreement than does the powerful state (Odell 
2002). Table 3.1 summarizes the tactics that both have determined for the two polar strategies as 
presented by Dur, Mateo and Odell. 
Table 3.1: Distributive versus Integrative Tactics 
Hard/Distributive Tactics Soft/Integrative Tactics 
Strong, public commitment of not giving in Signaling flexibility 
High opening demand Using conciliatory statements 
Firmness rather than flexibility Praising the other side 
Criticize the other side Seeking partners for compromise 
Creation of a defensive coalition Side payments 
Using a threat (can be a threat of veto) Promote goals outside of scope of 
current negotiations Failure to cite the other sides well-being 
Concealing information about true priorities Open desire to make both sides 
better off Slow or delayed concessions 
Manipulating others beliefs Invite others to share their opinions 
Worsening others alternatives while 
improving one’s own alternatives 
Not ruling out concessions for the 
either side 
Tactical retreat Treat all partial agreements as 
provisional until issues are settled Offensive or defensive claiming 
Sources: Odell, J. S., Creating Data on International Negotiation Strategies, Alternatives and 
Outcomes, International Negotiation, 7: 39-52, 2002 and Dur, A. and G. Mateo, Bargaining 
Power and Negotiation Tactics: Negotiations on the E.U.’s Financial Perspective, 2007-2013. 
 
Most negotiators do not simply stick to an integrative or distributive strategy. Odell 
actually visualizes these two polar strategies on a spectrum. In his view, “the actual strategy 
spectrum ranges from pure value claiming, to claiming diluted by minor integrative moves, to a 
balanced mix, to mostly value-creative tactics diluted by mild claiming moves” (Odell 2000, 35). 
Furthermore, a negotiator may begin a negotiation on the integrative side of the spectrum and 
then move towards the distributive side as the talks progress. Likewise, there can be a continual 
mixing of strategies. Furthermore, there are tactics that may be used in any strategy such as issue 
30 
 
linkage. Whether tactics claim or create value depend greatly on how they are used. One thing to 
note is that Odell argues that integrative strategies typically involve three main phases. Initially, 
the two groups get together to explore the problem at hand followed with a joint search for 
potential solutions. The last phase includes working together to determine the best solution 
among alternatives (Odell 2002). 
As mentioned in the definition of strategy by Odell, much of what determines a player’s 
strategy are the overall objectives that they face for the negotiations. These objectives can be 
economic, relational, or domestic political (Odell 2000, 25). Furthermore, the importance of each 
area will differ. In an economic negotiation, economics and domestic politics may be the only 
relevant objectives. Likewise, in authoritarian regimes, domestic politics may not matter at all 
but the relative impact on certain supporters of the regime may be more important. The next 
section of this thesis will go into more detail about what Odell theorizes to affect strategies and 
tactics in negotiations and thus outcomes. 
3.3 Odell’s Theory in More Detail 
 While various researchers have given various reasons for negotiators using alternative 
strategies and tactics and have posited multiple factors to be related directly to the outcomes, 
Odell’s theory is one of the more concise and testable theories put forward on the topic. His 
theory has been developed over several years using a very diverse set of case studies and case 
study methods in order to identify causal factors for outcomes in economic negotiations. Indeed, 
his research suggests that market conditions, negotiator beliefs and domestic politics influence 
strategies and outcomes in economic negotiations. He lays out more specifically how these 
independent variables affect strategies and tactics in negotiations and thus outcomes as observed 
in his case studies: 
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Market conditions:  
• A worse relevant market alternative translates to a lower resistance point leading to softer 
claiming tactics and thus smaller gains. 
• Threats made must be credible; countries have to be aware of the situation in their own as 
well as the other country. Threats that are not credible can worsen a party’s position. 
Negotiator beliefs: 
• Negotiators choose their strategies based on how they believe the other negotiator will 
respond to and exploit a given strategy. 
• “If negotiators are subject, like the rest of us, to cognitive judgment biases, then gains and 
losses from a strategy will vary directly with the extent to which the negotiator uses 
tactics designed to compensate for his own biases”(Odell 2000, 184). 
Domestic politics and institutions: 
• Constituents must be in general agreement or understanding with whatever the 
negotiators try to do otherwise the negotiators lose credibility. 
• “As constituents in a target country raise the political cost of compliance for their 
government, gains from the offensive claiming strategy will diminish” (Odell 2000, 184). 
• If the constituents are on board, it will be easier to ratify an agreement but some 
discretion can be useful. 
Of course, these are not the only aspects of the independent variables that affect the 
negotiating strategy or the outcomes. Indeed, others (including other works by Odell) have 
posited several things within these categories as well; for example, that a better economic 
condition to begin with will mean less need for a negotiated agreement, and thus value-creation 
strategies from the other party would be more productive (Odell 2002). The main theoretical 
32 
 
contribution—that market conditions, negotiator beliefs and domestic politics affect the 
negotiating strategy—can be tested by the use of process tracing to look at what did affect 
negotiator behavior and thus outcomes. If the causal factors lie outside the scope of Odell’s 
hypothetical independent variables, then it may be necessary to propose other causal factors. 
Furthermore, the process tracing process will allow improved specification of Odell’s theoretical 
proposition as it can include specific case examples of what impact a specific market condition 
for example had on the negotiator and negotiated outcome.  
Any theory has a variety of strengths and limitations. A strength of Odell’s theory is that 
the hypothetical independent variables are quite clear. Market conditions can be clearly 
understood by economic indicators: relative production and commerce volumes and values, trade 
surpluses and shortages, industry concentration, the labor/capital ratio and the share of sectoral 
employment to total employment. Negotiator beliefs mainly deal with what the negotiator 
understands or believes about his or her BATNA, the other player’s BATNA and which strategy 
they should use in order to maximize their side’s gains. The Chilean negotiators for example 
knew that they would benefit most from negotiating agriculture along with market access. 
However, the U.S. ensured that it was negotiated separately as the U.S. perceived some benefit 
of negotiating it separately (U.S. Interview). Lastly, the domestic/political variable can include 
such things as the propensity of a producer or consumer group to lobby government, the amount 
of involvement these groups are allowed in negotiations, the “macro” variables such as 
unemployment as well as the jobs gained or lost by a certain sector due to trade. Other factors 
likely having an influence in this area are the attitudes of constituents towards free trade at the 
time of negotiations and the amount of freedom the executive has to negotiate trade agreements. 
For instance, the presence of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) or some other political mandate 
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making negotiating FTAs more sanctioned can be essential in negotiations (GAO 2007). If these 
variables are known, inference on their impact on negotiations and outcomes can be performed.  
Conversely, often the theory is not specific enough to answer the question of how a 
causal factor affects a negotiator and thus the outcome. While there have been a few specific 
examples of how market conditions, negotiator beliefs and domestic politics influence negotiator 
behavior and outcomes, these propositions are far from complete and unlikely to be the case 
every time. Case examples have shown that negotiators have used value-claiming tactics when 
they should have used value-creating tactics (Conceicao-Heldt 2006). Odell might suggest that 
this occurrence is due to negotiator bias, but as a researcher, it is often hard to know what the 
negotiator believes and what biases he or she may have. Because of the subjective nature of the 
negotiator belief category, it will be more difficult to pin down the degree to which this affects 
outcomes. 
3.4 Theory Conclusions 
 In sum, much of the theoretical contributions in economic and negotiation theory will 
help guide the case study analysis for this thesis. The theoretical axioms and theoretical 
propositions will provide a basic structure to study the negotiated FTAs at hand. More 
importantly, theoretical testing will be done on the hypothetical independent variables presented 
by Odell in ENT: market conditions, negotiator beliefs, and domestic politics. For the most part, 
there are ways to measure these independent variables although there is some difficulty in 
measuring negotiator beliefs.    
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES OF THE U.S./CHILE AND EU/CHILE FTAS 
 This chapter will provide two interrelated case studies regarding the U.S./Chile and 
EU/Chile FTAs: a descriptive case study determining how the two agreements are different and a 
structured, focused comparative case study to test Odell’s Economic Negotiation Theory 
regarding why the two agreements are different for selected sensitive agricultural products. The 
“universe” of this case study concerns the negotiated market access outcomes within which the 
tariff schedules, exclusions, and institutional arrangements are the dependent variables. The unit 
of analysis for the comparative study is the negotiated outcomes for each of the selected 
products. The independent variables to be tested include market conditions, domestic politics, 
and negotiator beliefs. The independent variables will be constant for Chile as the same market 
conditions, negotiators and domestic politics existed for both agreements although negotiators in 
Chile clearly had to change their approach when faced with a different approach for each good 
and agreement. Each comparative case study involves answering a set of questions for each FTA 
regarding the market conditions, political setting and negotiator behaviors for each product. 
Differences in relative outcomes will then be discussed for each product.  
4.1 The Descriptive Case Study 
 Throughout this descriptive case study, questions are posed and answered for each 
agreement followed by an assessment of how they differ. This part of the study must be 
undertaken before causality can be determined. The assessment includes information on what 
exactly is included in each of the FTAs in terms of an overview as well as how the market access 
component differs for each agreement.  
4.1.1 Sections in FTAs 
 The U.S. agreement is very much oriented towards market access for goods whereas the 
EU agreement provides much more scope for cooperation in areas other than market access. 
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Aside from chapters 18 and 19 (labor and environment respectively) in the US agreement, the 
chapters generally refer to traditional trade issues including national treatment, rules of origin 
(ROO), sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), trade in 
services, intellectual property (IP) and dispute settlement (table 4.1)5. Moreover, the U.S. 
agreement only calls for additional cooperation in the areas of labor and the environment. 
  
                                                 
5All contents of the table are derived from the texts of the agreement which can be found at 
sice.oas.org 
36 
 
Table 4.1: U.S./Chile and EU/Chile FTA Sections 
Chapter United States Part/Title European Union 
1 Initial provisions Part I General and  institutional 
provisions 
2 General definitions Title I Nature and scope of the agreement 
3 National treatment and market 
access for goods 
Title II Institutional framework 
4 Rules of origin and origin 
procedures 
Part II Political dialogue 
5 Customs administration Part III Cooperation 
6 Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures 
Title I Economic cooperation 
7 Technical barriers to trade Title II Science, technology and 
information society 
8 Trade remedies Title III Culture, education and audio-
visual 
9 Government procurement Title IV State reform and public 
administration 
10 Investment Title V Social cooperation 
11 Cross-border trade in services Title VI Other cooperation areas 
12 Financial services Title VII General provisions 
13 Telecommunications Part IV Trade and trade-related matters 
14 Temporary entry for business 
persons 
Title I General provisions 
15 Electronic commerce Title II Free movement of goods 
16 Competition policy, designated 
monopolies, and state 
enterprises 
Title III Trade in services and 
establishment 
17 Intellectual property rights Title IV Government procurement 
18 Labor Title V Current payments and capital 
movements 
19 Environment Title VI Intellectual property rights 
20 Transparency Title VII Competition 
21 Administration of the 
agreement 
Title 
VIII 
Dispute settlement 
22 Dispute settlement Title IX Transparency 
23 Exceptions Title X Specific tasks in trade matters of 
the bodies established under this 
agreement 
24 Final provisions Title XI Exceptions in the area of trade 
    Part V Final provisions 
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The U.S./Chile agreement also includes a special agricultural safeguard clause that is 
triggered by price rather than volume. Agricultural safeguards are mechanisms to deal with a 
surge of imports after lowering tariffs; the U.S. and Chile saw a surge of imports to be less of a 
problem than lower priced imports however and so instated a safeguard such that a party may 
impose an additional duty for goods that enter the partner’s territory at a level below a set target 
price in the FTA agricultural safeguards list. The import price is determined by the CIF import 
price of the goods entering Chile and on the basis of the FOB import price for goods entering the 
U.S.6 The trigger prices reflect a historic import value for the products and may be updated 
periodically by mutual agreement. Any additional duties charged will not be allowed to go above 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates. 
The EU/Chile agreement is generally more political in nature. It includes a political 
dialogue that includes objectives such as further development and defense of democratic values, 
respect for human rights, etc. Moreover, the agreement includes an entire section (Part III) on 
cooperation with seven titles dealing with economic, scientific, cultural, social and governmental 
cooperation. In terms of the trade related matters (Part IV), there are titles for customs duties, 
industrial products, fishery products, as well as agricultural and processed products. The 
EU/Chile FTA also includes additional agreements on trade in wines and spirits and annexes 
regarding trade in spirits drinks and aromatized drinks. These “special” agreements lay the 
foundation for protection of geographical indicators and intellectual property for trade of wines 
and spirits. One of the possible reasons for the political nature of the agreement is the EU’s 
emphasis on political partnership with developing countries combined with the fact that Chile 
and the EU already had an association agreement going into the FTA.  
                                                 
6
 CIF means Cost, Insurance and Freight and FOB means Free On Board. Both are terms to describe the price plus 
some costs. 
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 The safeguard mechanism for the EU/Chile FTA is contained in two parts. The first part 
is a safeguard and shortage clause which is a common safeguard clause that results in simply re-
affirming both parties’ commitment to the multilateral framework for safeguards provided by the 
WTO. The second part is a special safeguard clause for agricultural products which is referred to 
as the emergency clause that allows for a halt in imports in the case of a surge of imports or 
otherwise “harmful” trading activity (Rudloff and Simons 2004).  
An important component for both agreements was mutual recognition of standards and 
SPS measures. The U.S./Chile agreement included a mutual agreement on grading standards for 
beef, which negotiators indicated was a very big issue in agricultural trade between Chile and the 
U.S. (U.S. Interview). Annex 3.17 in the U.S./Chile FTA specifically lays out standards for 
grading beef in the U.S. and Chile, and requires that there be mutual recognition of the grading 
standards between the two countries. Moreover, trade of beef between the two entities should 
carry labels indicative of the equivalent grading standard in the importing country. Similarly, the 
EU/Chile agreement includes a separate agreement on SPS measures for agricultural products 
and animal welfare, which both reaffirms the two parties’ commitment to WTO rules concerning 
SPS matters and extends it by calling for a committee to work on transparency and trade issues 
that may arise due to SPS import requirements. Moreover, the EU agreement includes a 
safeguard clause regarding SPS measures wherein “domestic measures” may be taken “to control 
any cause likely to constitute a serious hazard to human, animal and plant health” (EU FTA, 
Annex 4, article 14).  
Both agreements include typical trade issues: SPS, TBT, IP, ROO, trade in goods and 
services, dispute settlement and escape clauses. Aside from the typical issues addressed in FTAs, 
both agreements also include institutional arrangements that were important to each side. The 
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U.S. was able to harmonize standards specifically for beef and to implement a more useful 
safeguard mechanism, meanwhile the EU was able to institutionalize GI recognition for wines 
and spirits while strengthening their political partnership with Chile through shared 
commitments and other institutional reforms. 
4.1.2 Market Liberalization Results 
 The previous section has shown that the two agreements have various similarities and 
differences in terms of the general components of each FTA; likewise, there are various 
similarities and differences with regards to how each country approaches the issue of market 
access and how liberalization actually occurs within the framework of the FTA. Comparatively, 
the U.S./Chile FTA has longer phase out periods for its most protected products than the EU; 
however 100% of products become free at the end of that time period, whereas the EU maintains 
exclusions resulting in less than 100% free trade (table 4.2). Chile eliminates fewer tariffs 
immediately compared to the U.S. in the U.S./Chile agreement, but more than the EU in that 
agreement. TRQs are used for fewer product categories but more tariff lines in the EU than in the 
U.S., and more of these TRQs never expire, meaning that complete liberalization may never be 
reached for these products. Chile declared more TRQs in the EU agreement, although its use of 
TRQs is minimal compared to either of its trading partners.  
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Table 4.2: Market Liberalization Results of the U.S./Chile and EU/Chile FTAs 
Chilean Free Trade Agreements 
  U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
# of staging categories for tariff elimination  7 5 6 4 
Longest phase-out period (years) 12 10 12 10 
# of product categories affected by TRQs 20 17 4 5 
Tariff lines affected by TRQs 217 285 10 33 
% of tariff lines immediately liberalized 93 74 89 91 
% of tariff lines that eventually become free 100* 93 100* 96 
*Sugar is de-facto excluded, since both have a net-exporter clause. 
 
Sources: Annexes 1 and 2 of the EU/Chile FTA and Annex 3 of the U.S./Chile FTA, accessed 
from sice.oas.org   
 
The Chile/U.S. FTA has more staging categories for tariff reduction than does the 
EU/Chile FTA (table 4.2) although two of the staging categories allow for duty free imports 
upon implementation of the free trade agreement: category F allows goods that were previously 
free to continue to be free and category A eliminates all existing duties for over 60% of the tariff 
lines (see Appendix 2 for a complete list of the tariff elimination schedules). Alternatively, there 
are two tariff elimination staging categories which reach free trade by year 12: category E 
eliminates tariffs in 12 equal stages whereas schedule G is very back-loaded with no 
liberalization occurring until after the 5th year. The EU agreement does not feature any back-
loading in tariff reduction whereas there are 5 schedules utilized by Chile, the U.S. or both that 
are back-loaded. 
Both agreements also feature seasonal tariff schedules for fruits. The U.S. has seasonal 
schedules for avocados depending on if the date is between January 1st and September 30th 
versus much greater quantities from October 1st through December 31st. This is undoubtedly due 
to spring variety avocado’s (mainly Hass) constituting the majority of production in California; 
additionally, these spring varieties face fierce competition from Mexican avocado imports. The 
EU negotiated alternate schedules for different fruits from Chile with as many as 8 different 
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tariff schedules for some pear varieties depending on the season. Other fruits such as citrus fruits 
have different schedules for the wintertime and the rest of the year. These time-dependent 
schedules make perfect sense considering that Chile has an opposite growing season from both 
the U.S. and the EU. Furthermore, the U.S. and EU negotiators both faced the pressure of 
wanting commerce during their lesser growing seasons versus protecting domestic fruit 
producers during their own seasons.   
There were listings of a few additional products which were treated differently in each of 
the agreements. In the U.S. tariff elimination annex, peanuts and cotton have special treatment 
wherein the duties are removed evenly over 12 years. Additionally, there are seven different 
tariff reduction schedules for different varieties of wine. Moreover, there is a clause in the U.S. 
agreement wherein the U.S. allows preferential duty rates for imports of other agricultural goods 
so long as the value of imports do not exceed 50% of total imports for that particular tariff line or 
exceed a value of $110 million. If the value of imports does exceed these limits, the duty levels 
are subject to a tariff elimination reduction schedule of 4 years removed in four equal stages. If 
goods that are given free access to the U.S. exceed these limits, then they will have duties 
imposed upon them that are eliminated in 8 years in equal increments. The U.S. also has TRQs 
for non-agricultural goods such as tires, rubber, copper, and hotel or restaurant chinaware 
although they are not included in any of the analysis of this thesis. For Chile, there are also 
special provisions for wheat, wheat flour and vegetable oils in its agreement with the U.S. that 
eliminates the price bands and requires that the customs duty may not be above MFN. It also has 
a special provision for sugar wherein Chile will allow preferential access to U.S. sugar if they 
have a trade surplus in sugar and vice versa. 
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In the EU agreement, there are special classifications for some goods that indicate special 
duty reduction and generally grant exceptions for sensitive products (Appendix 3). Goods 
classified as “R” have a tariff concession of 50% of the basic customs duty. Those labeled “EP” 
have liberalization of the ad-valorem duty only maintaining the specific duty that is linked to the 
entry price. “SP” also signifies that liberalization only applies to the ad-valorem duty with 
maintenance of the specific duty which is used for many milk and sugar products. Little to no 
liberalization exists for those goods designated “PN” as these products are protected by the 
community. This group includes some GI goods like cheese which are specific to a particular 
region/location or production practice.  
The two agreements differ greatly in terms of market liberalization. The EU/Chile FTA 
actually has several exclusions in agriculture: poultry, beef, pork, dairy, cereals, fish, wines and 
spirits (those covered by GI’s), olive oil, sugar and sugar products, cocoa products and other 
special products such as vinegar, beans and mushrooms. The U.S./Chile FTA does not contain 
any exclusions although sugar is somewhat excluded for both countries because of the net-export 
clause included in the FTA which requires that each country to be a net exporter in order to 
obtain preferential treatment, a condition unlikely to be met by the U.S. or Chile. In the EU/Chile 
FTA, Chile excludes many of its agricultural products including wheat, some meats, oils, dairy 
and some fish. 
4.1.3 TRQ Comparison 
TRQs were significant components of the market access outcomes in the U.S. and EU 
FTAs with Chile. The actual market access outcomes of these TRQs depend on whether the 
quota is likely to be met by the trading partner. If the quota is not met, then the market access 
outcome of a TRQ is free trade; otherwise, rents occur as a country exports its goods at quota or 
at the over-quota rates (Herrmann, Kramb and Monnich 2001). Consequently, it is important to 
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understand if the quota was binding at the time of the negotiations and after implementation in 
order to understand the actual market access outcomes. Moreover, it is important to understand 
the degree to which over-quota duties are reduced over time; i.e. whether the over-quota duty 
reduction occurs evenly or if they are reduced in a back-loaded manner.  Furthermore, as TRQs 
are used as a form of protection for many sensitive agricultural goods, the actual time period to 
free trade is a significant market access outcome. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 look at these aspects of the 
agricultural TRQs included in both agreements in order to gather a comparative understanding of 
the actual market access outcome. 
Table 4.3: Summary of Agricultural TRQ Outcomes in the U.S./Chile FTA 
  
  
Time 
period 
(years) 
Over-quota 
duty 
reduction 
Quota 
binding in 
2001? 
Quota 
binding in 
2003? 
# of tariff 
lines 
affected 
U.S./Chile FTA Agricultural TRQs with regards to imports from Chile into the U.S. 
  
Beef 4 even no no 6 
  
Cheese 12 back-loaded no no 52 
  
Milk powder 12 back-loaded no no 8 
  
Butter 12 back-loaded no no 9 
  
Condensed milk 12 back-loaded no yes 4 
  
Other dairy products 12 back-loaded no no 46 
  
Sugar 12 even yes no 47 
  
Tobacco 12 even no no 7 
  
Avocados1 12 back-loaded no yes 1 
  
Processed artichokes2 12 even no no 1 
  
Poultry 10 back-loaded yes3 yes3 4 
U.S./Chile FTA Agricultural TRQs with regards to imports from the U.S. into Chile 
  
Beef 4 even no no 6 
  
Chicken and turkey 10 back-loaded yes4 yes 27 
1
 two seasonal quotas; the sum of exported avocados in 2003 was over the combined quota 
allowance however 
2
 the quota quantity remains the same for 12 years 
3
 the initial quota for poultry was 0 so any imports were over-quota 
 
Sources: Annexes 1 and 2 of the EU/Chile FTA and Annex 3 of the U.S./Chile FTA, accessed 
from sice.oas.org and trade data accessed from uncomtrade.org  
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Table 4.4: Summary of Agricultural TRQ Outcomes in the EU/Chile FTA 
  
  
Time 
period 
(years) 
Over-
quota duty 
reduction 
Quota 
binding in 
2001? 
Quota 
binding in 
2003? 
# of tariff 
lines 
affected 
EU/Chile FTA Agricultural TRQs with regards to imports from Chile into the EU 
  
Beef N/A1 N/A2 no unknown3 12 
  
Swine N/A1 N/A2 no yes 38 
  
Sheep and goats N/A1 N/A2 yes yes 27 
  
Poultry N/A1 N/A2 yes yes 62 
  
Cheese and curd N/A4,5 N/A2 no unknown3 50 
  
Garlic 4 even no no 1 
  
Cereals N/A4 N/A2 yes unknown3 37 
  
Mushrooms 10 even unknown3 no 2 
  
Cherries N/A4 N/A2 no unknown3 1 
  
Sugar products 0, SP6 N/A2 no no 14 
  
Hake 10 even yes yes 4 
  
Salmon 10 even yes yes 3 
  
Tuna 10 even no no 1 
EU/Chile FTA Agricultural TRQs with regards to imports from the EU into Chile 
  
Cheese and curd N/A4 N/A2 no no 12 
  
Oil N/A4 N/A2 no no 3 
  
Mackerel and Hake 10 even no no 5 
  
Salmon 10 even no no 8 
  Tuna, Skipjack, etc. N/A7 N/A2 no no 5 
1
 the quota quantity is increased by 10% each year but never completely eliminated 
2
 the over-quota tariff is at MFN levels and is never decreased by this agreement 
3
 the quantity of imports is not available 
4
 the quota quantity is increased by 5% each year but never completely eliminated 
5
 some cheeses do become free after 4 years, others do not including those with a "PN" 
designation 
6
 the ad-valorem duty is eliminated upon implementation but the specific duty is maintained 
7
 the quota never increases, but Chile gives a preferential customs duty of 1/3 of the MFN duty 
 
Sources: Annexes 1 and 2 of the EU/Chile FTA and Annex 3 of the U.S./Chile FTA, accessed 
from sice.oas.org and trade data accessed from uncomtrade.org  
 
It is clear from the two tables that the U.S. and the EU have different market access 
results from the use of the same instrument. In the U.S./Chile FTA, free trade is reached after a 
maximum time period of 12 years for all of the products covered by TRQs. Additionally, the 
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initial quota was not found to be binding for most of the products covered by the TRQs in the 
year 2001 when negotiations were in progress. Moreover the quota levels were not binding after 
implementation in 2003 for most products. Poultry was the exception but that was because the 
poultry industries in the U.S. and Chile were given a 3 year adjustment period where the quota 
level on the TRQs was zero, making any trade of poultry in excess of the first tier quota.   
The TRQs in the EU/Chile FTA had two main characteristics: first, most of the products 
covered by TRQs never become free, and second, the reduction of the over-quota duty is even 
for those products that do become free. The EU/Chile FTA includes constant quota increases of 
10 or 5 percent each year for most of the goods subject to TRQs without ever eliminating the 
quota resulting in exclusions for liberalization; nevertheless, at some point the quota is likely to 
be non-binding. The over-quota tariff charged for the excluded goods is the MFN rate and 
therefore only changes if the MFN rate changes. For those goods that do become free, the over-
quota tariff applied is equal to the base tariff levels which are reduced evenly over the given time 
period. Most of the goods that do have eventual TRQ elimination are eliminated in 10 years 
indicative of the sensitivity of the goods subject to TRQs. Almost half of the quotas were binding 
for Chilean imports into the EU prior to the agreement and/or after the agreement was 
implemented. Four of the imported products covered by EU TRQs had no data regarding the 
quantity imported on the UN trade database and so it cannot be discerned whether or not the 
quota level was binding after FTA implementation.  
Chile has much fewer TRQs than either of its trading partners, and those that it did have 
were generally not binding. Chile seemed to follow suit with the U.S. and the EU with regards to 
its treatment of TRQs. In the US/Chile FTA, both of its TRQs are identical to the TRQ for the 
same product for the U.S. Similarly, the Chilean TRQs for cheese, curd and the fisheries 
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products are exactly the same as the corresponding EU TRQs for these products. The only 
unique TRQ for Chile is for oils, although its initial quota level is very high meaning that it is 
unlikely to be binding.   
4.2 Relative Assessment of the FTAs 
 The two agreements are clearly different both in terms of content and actual market 
access outcomes. Various studies have been conducted regarding the potential and realized 
economic impacts of the two agreements (see PLANISTAT-Luxembourg 2002, Rudloff and 
Simons 2004, FAS 2009, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1997). Less clear is how the two 
agreements differ from one another in terms of which side was able to attain a more favorable 
outcome and the reasons for it. In order to better understand these issues, this section begins with 
an assessment of the relative negotiated outcomes followed by assessments of the strategic goals 
of each side, including what each side would have preferred as an outcome; of the alternatives 
each party faced for a given product or institutional outcome7; and finally the process that 
occurred to get to the actual negotiated outcome. Data for this assessment comes from 
interviews, trade flow databases, and publications on the topic, both in terms of economic and 
political considerations. Based on an assessment of this data, the two agreements will be 
compared on the Pareto efficiency frontier as employed by Odell 2001 and Devereaux, Lawrence 
and Watkins 2006. 
Various Chilean negotiators and industry stakeholders rank the U.S./Chile FTA as their 
most favorable FTA mainly due to the lack of exclusions (Chile interviews). The U.S. was also 
fairly favorable to the FTA due to its lack of exclusions, the removal of the price band system 
                                                 
7An institutional outcome can mean what a particular side wanted in terms of the rules of the 
game for the exchange of a particular good such as specific standard requirements or the way 
that liberalization is handled. 
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(PBS)8 for wheat and the creative solutions found for difficult topics such as sugar and 
agricultural safeguards. Both sides believe that value was created in the agreement, and the 
explanations by the negotiators show the negotiations to be much more towards the value 
creation (integrative) end of the negotiations stratagem. Most U.S. opponents to the agreement 
even contend that the agreement works with a small open economy like Chile, although certain 
components of the agreement such as the sugar outcome would not be acceptable in other FTAs 
(USTR 2003). Chilean dissidents were a small although relatively loud minority with such 
groups as the wheat producers holding out on giving up the PBS as long as possible  (Leight 
2008). For the most part, freer trade was preferable to Chilean groups although wheat producers 
were not the only ones seeking additional protection; indeed, other agricultural sectors such as 
poultry and dairy were more difficult in negotiations although these groups were pleased that 
they were able to maintain some protection in the form of longer and more back-loaded tariff 
reduction schedules while at the same time ensuring a market for their products (Chilean 
interviews).  
Based on the relative strategies as well as the negotiated outcomes, the U.S./Chile FTA 
would be estimated to be very close to the Pareto efficiency frontier although slightly skewed to 
the U.S. due to the U.S. victory in eliminating the PBS as illustrated in figure 4.1. The agreement 
would have had greater value for Chile had they been able to gain more access to the U.S. market 
for their agricultural products. From the U.S. perspective, the agreement was not perfect either as 
some groups were not happy about the outcomes on labor, SPS, and environmental concerns, 
although most groups were favorable to the market access outcomes contending that enough 
                                                 
8
 The PBS refers to the system applied to imports of wheat, sugar or oils into Chile, wherein if 
the price at the border does not fall in between two price bands, a tariff or a rebate is applied to 
make the price fall within the band. The PBS is discussed in more detail in Annexes 1 and 2 and 
in the following case studies. 
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protection was maintained for sensitive sectors while allowing for improved access to the 
Chilean market (USTR 2003).  
Figure 4.1: Negotiated Outcome in the U.S./Chile FTA Depicted on the Frontier 
 
 In the agreement with the EU, Chile was successful in maintaining protection for their 
most sensitive products in agriculture, but they were not able to gain as much market access as 
they were in the U.S. agreement. In terms of maintaining protection, Chilean negotiators 
indicated that they were not concerned about losing the PBS like they were with the U.S.; 
however, as Chile prides itself on being an open economy more liberalization would have been a 
more favorable outcome. With regards to the limited market access given to Chile, EU 
negotiators indicated that they knew that Mexican negotiators had told Chilean negotiators to be 
pragmatic about the agreement9, and although there would be a lot of exclusions, an agreement 
with exclusions was better than no agreement at all (EU Interview). In other areas besides tariff 
barriers, Chile was happy to have avoided more in-depth sections regarding SPS, labor and 
                                                 
9The EU encouraged Mexico to advise Chile since the EU had just finished negotiating with 
Mexico. 
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environmental issues as they were able to simply “cooperate” on these matters and adhere to 
existing agreements (Chile Interview). In wines, however, Chile lost in that they would have to 
change labeling of their wine products, but they gained in that they were able to secure a GI for 
Pisco10. Because Chile was able to avoid some institutional requirements, maintain protection for 
sensitive sectors and gain access to the EU market, the EU agreement was acceptable; 
nevertheless it was certainly not ideal especially in comparison to the U.S. agreement because 
they were not granted as much market access. 
The EU saw Chile as being fairly non-threatening and their main goal was to address 
issues that Brazil wanted addressed in a potential MERCOSUR11 agreement. Indeed, discussions 
regarding an FTA began with MERCOSUR, Chile and the EU but when it became obvious that 
an agreement with Chile would be a much easier path than an agreement among all three parties, 
the EU decided to negotiate the two agreements separately and try to create an agreement for 
Chile which would mirror issues that Brazil saw as important for a MERCOSUR agreement (EU 
Interview). For the EU, the speed of discussions was also important as the EU-Latin America 
summit was approaching and the EU wanted to finish the agreement before this summit for 
political reasons (EU Interview). Moreover, at the time of the agreement, the EU was just 15 
members but that number was to grow soon. As such, the basic strategy with the EU was to 
address issues in the Chilean agreement that they wanted to address in an agreement with 
MERCOSUR, such as IP, ROO and GI, and to shape market access restrictions such that 
                                                 
10Pisco is liquor that is also grown in Peru and considered by the Peruvians to be a product of 
Peru which cannot be grown in Chile due to GI restrictions. The EU’s recognition of Chilean 
Pisco is therefore beneficial for Chile. 
11
 MERCOSUR is the name for the South American Customs Union which includes Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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protection for the most sensitive sectors was maintained. This strategy was successful in that the 
EU was able to address the issues they wanted to address and maintain protection for agriculture. 
In terms of the frontier, there was very little value creation in the EU/Chile FTA; much of 
the tariff schedule was pre-determined before the negotiations, with a negative list approach 
listing those goods that would not be free in the agreement. In terms of the negotiation stratagem, 
the EU strategy was much more based on value-claiming than on value creation. Moreover, 
Chile was not able to gain a significant amount of market access for sensitive agricultural 
products, and attempts at value-creation on the part of Chile were fairly unsuccessful as the EU 
was seen by Chilean negotiators to have their hands tied in much of the items under negotiation. 
However, an agreement with the EU, even without as much value creation was seen as being 
better than nothing at all. These considerations indicate that the outcome of the FTA was short of 
the efficiency frontier and skewed towards the EU as shown in figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2: Negotiated Outcome in the EU/Chile FTA Depicted on the Frontier 
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4.3 Introduction to the Selected Product Case Studies 
 The descriptive case study has shown that the U.S./Chile and EU/Chile FTAs are actually 
quite different both on the surface and when discussing the minute details. Indeed, the EU/Chile 
FTA contains much more political dialogue whereas the U.S./Chile FTA focuses much more on 
market access issues including one of the most comprehensive SPS agreements contained within 
an FTA. Furthermore, the EU/Chile FTA includes many more exclusions for the EU and for 
Chile which are not present in the U.S./Chile FTA. In order to explore more in depth the 
difference in negotiated outcomes and rationale for these differences, a series of specific product 
case studies is conducted in the following sections. The first section defines the negotiated 
outcomes in comparative terms. This is an important first step in the case study analysis as it 
must be clear how the two agreements differ with regards to the specific product before causality 
can be determined. The sections following this discussion of the independent variable will 
discuss in more detail the various independent variables as proposed by Odell for each sensitive 
product. 
Logic insists that key differences in negotiated outcomes must be attributed to differences 
in the U.S. and the EU as the situation in Chile was the same for both negotiations. These 
differences could be in many different areas; however, Odell insists that the key determinants of 
FTA outcomes are market conditions, domestic politics and negotiator beliefs or strategies. The 
following selected case studies will test these hypothetical independent variables to see if they 
could be attributed to the negotiated outcomes for each of the sensitive products identified earlier 
in the thesis: wheat, sugar, dairy, poultry, wine and fish. The case study was designed to answer 
questions for each good in order to test the causal mechanism both across countries and across 
product; the absence of causality across both countries and product cases will serve to weaken 
Odell’s theory as this is a most likely case for testing Odell’s theory. A most likely case is one 
52 
 
where “the independent variables in a theory are at values that strongly posit an outcome or 
predict a low-magnitude outcome” (Bennett and George 1997). This is the case in this study as 
each of these goods have been defined as sensitive in each of the countries by the literature and  
the data meaning that they are most-likely to have predictive value. If they do not, then Odell’s 
theory will be subsequently weakened, especially if similar outcomes occur for the U.S. and the 
EU with different independent variables or if different outcomes result from strikingly similar 
independent variables.   
4.3.1 The Dependent Variable: Negotiated Outcomes for Sensitive Products 
 As shown in the earlier case study, the two agreements with Chile are quite different; this 
continues to be the case when one looks at specific products. Indeed, if the outcomes are not 
different, then no difference in the independent variables should exist. If the outcomes are 
different, then a close inspection of the differences in the independent variables must be 
undertaken. To begin this analysis, it is important to understand how the negotiated outcomes 
differ. Not much research has been done in this area, although it is generally recognized that 
there are different implications depending on the path that is chosen for liberalization. While 
immediate liberalization and delayed liberalization have the same outcome in the long run, there 
is a value to discerning between these two outcomes; for example a slower liberalization period 
can allow a domestic industry to adjust to free trade but it also has implications for a potentially 
competitive sector in the partner country who would prefer to gain market access as quickly as 
possible in order to secure a market for their own production. As discussed previously, there is a 
difference between a TRQ that is binding and one that is not, as one can result in virtually free 
trade whereas the other can result in trade retardation due to high over-quota tariff barriers.  
Because of these subtle but important differences, negotiated outcomes must be 
differentiated and characterized in some way. Perhaps one of the simplest ways is to separate 
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outcomes into categories wherein the degree of actual liberalization is identified for each group. 
One benefit of such a characterization is that you can compare outcomes which may be labeled 
differently but ultimately achieve the same goal; a downfall is that while the characterization 
allows for some ranking, the actual quantitative difference between the negotiated outcomes is 
not measured12. As such, although the outcomes are characterized differently by some degree, 
the amount of that degree is not discerned in this analysis. Until research in this area improves, 
however, this practice will serve its purpose of describing the differences in the negotiated 
outcomes in the two FTAs under consideration.  The following points will define how these 
outcomes can be characterized, including references to the specific outcomes in the two 
negotiations in order of the best possible outcome to the worst liberalization outcome: 
• Full-immediate: this refers to a negotiated outcome that achieves immediate trade 
liberalization. It includes schedules F and A for the U.S./Chile FTA and year 0 for the 
EU/Chile FTA. 
• Full-expedited: this refers to a negotiated outcome that achieves free trade within five years. 
It includes schedules B, K, P, O for the U.S./Chile FTA and years 0, 3, 4, and 5 for the 
EU/Chile FTA. 
• Full-gradual: this refers to a negotiated outcome that achieves free trade over a longer period 
of time. It includes schedules C, D, E, G, H, J, L, V for the U.S./Chile FTA and years 7, 10 as 
well as TRQs that are eventually removed and not binding for the EU/Chile FTA. 
                                                 
12
 Although it may be possible to measure the quantitative difference in two negotiated 
outcomes, it is much more difficult to measure when goods are grouped together as a grouping 
may include various time periods and tariff reduction schemes.  
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• Full-restricted: this refers to a negotiated outcome which eventually results in free trade but 
has restrictions. It includes TRQs that are eventually completely removed but are initially 
binding during the implementation. 
• Limited: this refers to a situation wherein free trade is not formally realized, although the 
equivalent of free trade occurs. It includes TRQs that are not initially binding during 
implementation but are also never completely eliminated. 
• Limited-restricted: this refers to a situation wherein free trade is not formally realized and 
trade is also impeded in some way during the implementation period. It includes binding, 
non-expiring TRQs or those goods that maintain special provisions that prohibit completely 
free trade such as the R, EP, SP, and PN characterizations included in the EU/Chile FTA 
negotiated outcomes. 
• None: this refers to goods which are excluded from the agreement entirely; there is no 
liberalization of these goods within the associated agreement. 
Tables 4.5-4.10 in the following specific product case studies will refer to these definitions in the 
negotiated outcomes section so that the degree of liberalization may be compared for each 
agreement. 
4.3.2 Wheat Case Study 
 The first selected product case study is wheat. Wheat was a particularly contentious 
product in the two FTAs due to various conditions in each of the countries under consideration. 
At the time of the negotiations, wheat was considered to be particularly sensitive for Chile 
because it was one of the few products where domestic protection remained; indeed, the method 
of protection for wheat, the price band system (PBS), had been a fighting point for Chile in the 
national, regional and multilateral spheres. On the other hand, the U.S. wheat sector is very much 
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export-oriented, with high levels of domestic protection coupled with surpluses. The EU wheat 
sector shares similar characteristics to the U.S. wheat sector, but with a leaning towards 
exclusions in trade talks to avoid conflicts with existing domestic support regimes. Table 4.5 
steps through the dependent variable, negotiated outcome, and the independent variables 
considered to be important for negotiated outcomes, including market conditions, domestic 
politics and negotiator beliefs and strategies for wheat. The text following the table will discuss 
these independent variables in the context of their likely impact on the negotiated outcome. 
Additionally, a few issues not included in these independent variables will be discussed if they 
are seen as important to negotiated outcomes. 
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Table 4.5: Wheat Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Pre-FTA tariff protection 0.35/kg variable 31.50% variable 
  Degree of liberalization full-immediate none full-gradual none 
  Tariff reduction scheme schedule F -- schedule G -- 
  Phase-out period 0 -- 12 -- 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile   
  Production1 60 126 1.6   
  Consumption1 33 114 2   
  Net exports1 25.1 12.5 -0.4   
  Export market diverse diverse N/A   
  
Growth potential with 
partner small insignificant insignificant   
  Percentage SCT2,3 8.21 9.24 4.44   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade open mixed closed closed 
  
Trade negotiation 
expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration extensive extensive central central 
  Other political objective surpluses domestic protection 
millers/ 
PBS millers/ PBS 
Negotiator Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  Value-
claiming -- 
Value-
claiming -- 
  Hard tactics yes yes yes yes 
  Soft tactics no no yes no 
  
Awareness of own 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of other 
BATNA somewhat somewhat yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of MT 
2
  2001-2003 average 
3
 SCT-Single Commodity Transfer=share of the value of subsidies that are linked to the 
production value of the commodity. 
 
The dependent variable, the negotiated outcome, was quite different for each agreement. 
The U.S./Chile FTA featured a loss of the PBS for Chile and eventual elimination of tariffs for 
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imported U.S. wheat by way of a 10 year phase out period for durum wheat, while wheat and 
wheat flour were assigned to one of the most back-loaded schedules, scheme G. This schedule 
maintains tariff rates at MFN levels until the 5th year when the tariff begins to be reduced by 
8.3% in years 5-8, 16.7% in years 9-12, becoming completely free in the 12th year. The U.S. 
schedule completely liberalized wheat giving Chile immediately free access to the U.S. market 
as defined in schedule F. In the EU schedule, Chile also had a 10 year phase out period for 
durum wheat although other wheat and wheat flour were excluded, meaning that no additional 
liberalization would occur for these products. The EU also excluded wheat and wheat flour from 
their tariff reduction schedule entirely. By excluding the products, the EU and Chile were both 
able to maintain existing policy instruments in dealing with bilateral wheat trade. Chile was able 
to keep the PBS for wheat and the EU maintained their own mechanism which based tariffs on 
support levels. To this end, any additional liberalization for wheat would have to occur at the 
multilateral level or as a separate law in the future. 
The wheat sector in Chile is very much import competing. Production levels do not meet 
aggregate demand leading to net-imports of wheat as shown in table 4.5. This is opposite of the 
U.S. and the EU, which according to Odell’s theory, would lead Chile to be more defensive and 
value claiming in their strategy (Odell 2000). Additionally, wheat comprises the greatest share of 
hectares planted in Chile of any agricultural product. This motivates the producers and 
communities to mobilize into a defensive coalition, which was very much the case. There was 
not much potential for Chile to really become much more export-competitive in wheat, largely 
due to globally low prices and low-priced imports from its neighbors. The lack of a market 
alternative worsened Chile’s position vis a vis the U.S. and the EU. Nevertheless, even the U.S. 
and the EU are not competitive in wheat in Chile because with the added cost of transport, wheat 
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from the northern hemisphere is not competitive with wheat from Chile’s neighbors, primarily 
Argentina (Chile Interview). This improved Chile’s position somewhat as it made the U.S. and 
EU’s market potential worse.  
Price bands are the primary method that Chile has used since 1983 to protect wheat. 
Although Chile knew that they were unlikely to lose the PBS in their negotiations with the EU, 
they were aware that they would not be able to hold onto it so easily in the U.S. agreement. The 
PBS uses a ceiling and floor price in order to determine a range of expected prices. The final 
price of the imports must fall between the price bands or tariffs/rebates are implemented at the 
border in order to make the prices fall between these bands. The obvious implication for the U.S. 
is that the PBS proves to be very protectionist as under this system U.S. wheat would trigger an 
import tariff charge as was the case in the late 1990s (Leight 2008, 229-230).  
Politically, the PBS was met with criticism within as well as outside Chile. Chilean wheat 
producers wanted to keep the PBS for wheat and they let their government know that this was an 
issue that was very important to them. Indeed, from the beginning of the negotiations with the 
U.S., Chilean wheat producers were very defensive wanting to claim as much value as possible 
by insisting that they would not part with the PBS; these producers even left the umbrella 
producer association, SNA13, because they thought SNA was too open in their trade stance. 
Despite the tremendous pressure from this small pressure group, the overall view in Chile was 
that no exclusions was the real value in a U.S. FTA and that their own barriers could be removed 
if they were able to gain market access for their diverse basket of goods (Chile interview). 
Moreover, the wheat producers in Chile were met with resistance even from their domestic 
counterparts with Chilean processing companies pushing for a removal of the PBS and opening 
                                                 
13
 SNA=Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura; producer associations are discussed in more detail in 
the annexes. 
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of the border for U.S. wheat. All administrations had maintained the PBS up to that point and 
President Lagos, the Chilean president during the time of the negotiations, vowed to keep this 
system in place. Nevertheless, “the Lagos government – which regarded this FTA as potentially 
one of its most notable foreign policy achievements and was willing to make virtually any 
sacrifice to secure the agreement that had eluded both its predecessors – ultimately agreed to a 
provision under which the price bands would be phased out via a gradual lowering of the price 
floor beginning in 2008, and eliminated entirely in 2014” (Leight 2008, 231-232). In this case, 
Chile’s place in the international market as a whole played a greater role politically.  
Interview data also suggests that the negotiator’s beliefs likely played a role in the 
outcome of the negotiations. One interviewee indicated that Chile’s commitments with their 
MERCOSUR neighbors likely had some impact on the FTA negotiations. Chile knew that any 
agreements made with the U.S. had to be passed on to MERCOSUR neighbors because of a 
preferential clause in the Chilean association agreement with MERCOSUR. This changed 
Chile’s BATNA as it meant that if they were to give up the PBS for trade with the U.S., they 
were giving it up also to their neighbors who were actually much more competitive in wheat 
(Chile Interview). Moreover, after they lost the WTO dispute with Argentina on the oil PBS, 
they knew they were going to have to give up the wheat PBS eventually; they also knew when 
this announcement was made that the U.S. had gained a bit of an upper hand in this area because 
they could no longer claim that this policy was “WTO legal” (U.S. Interview). Although these 
circumstances put Chile at a worse negotiating position relative to the U.S., the Chilean side 
knew that they were going to have to give the PBS up and as such, the strategy was to get the 
best deal possible in other areas in exchange for giving up the PBS. Moreover, Chile had the 
sense that the U.S. did not know that they were actually willing to part with the PBS and so it 
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gave Chile somewhat of an advantage and flexibility in negotiating with the U.S. (Chile 
Interview).  
Wheat is a very export-competitive sector in the U.S. As evidence, the ratio of average 
U.S. exports of wheat as a share of total production was over 40%. According to Odell, this 
counter position to Chile in the market put the U.S. on the value-claiming side of the spectrum, 
which was indeed observed. Wheat goes to more than 130 markets all over the world; this 
diversification of trade makes the U.S. less susceptible to the changes in any given market. The 
top four foreign markets accounted for 39% of the total U.S. wheat from 1998 to 2003 on 
average, where Chile represented less than 1% (FAS 2010). Therefore the reach of U.S. wheat 
was very global with export markets in every part of the world at the time of the negotiations. 
U.S. wheat producers would always like to export more; however, they were not dependent on 
gaining access to the Chilean market. This better market alternative, according to Odell’s theory, 
raised the resistance points of the U.S. making them fight harder as failure to reach an agreement 
would hurt the U.S. less (Odell 2000).  
Policy interventions for wheat in the U.S. include income and price supports rather than 
border protections. Indeed, U.S. wheat is eligible for all commodity programs included in the 
farm bill, such as marketing loans, loan deficiency payments, direct and counter-cyclical 
payments, disaster assistance and crop insurance. The Single Commodity Transfer (SCT) was 
around 9% for both the U.S. and the EU, meaning that almost a tenth of the value of U.S. and EU 
wheat comes from subsidies (OECD 2011). Another measure of protection, the producer subsidy 
equivalent (PSE), for wheat for the U.S. and the EU was higher than the average PSE for 1999-
2001 for 13 major commodities putting wheat support in both countries at a higher end of the 
protection spectrum (Normile, Effland and Edwin 2004). Odell does not take existing domestic 
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policies into account; however, these are clearly very important strategically. For one thing, by 
affecting competitiveness, domestic policies may have made the U.S. feel as though they could 
be competitive in the Chilean market and therefore make them more value claiming.  
In terms of political pressure, U.S. wheat is very much in favor of market liberalization 
while at the same time maintaining their domestic support. The ability of the wheat sector to 
maintain a great amount of domestic support has been accredited to the abundance of political 
pressure existing for this group in congress (Hathaway 2001). Moreover, wheat producers’ view 
on trade can be summarized by a quote from a Wheat Associates press release: 
“…lowering barriers to trade dramatically increases the value and volume of U.S. 
agricultural exports, and increases farm gate prices. The United States’ failure to pursue 
or enact trade liberalization programs with trading partners results in missed 
opportunities – sales not made, flat or falling prices, and loss of market share to 
competitors who pursue trade opportunities more aggressively” (U.S. Wheat Associates 
2010).  
 
Indeed, wheat in the U.S. is the best example for a market-access oriented sector pushing for 
liberalization in world markets. The producers are not only concerned with securing a market for 
their wheat but securing a market for their wheat before other countries take their markets. Other 
large wheat producers such as the EU and China were of particular concern as Chile was already 
a very open economy with negotiations well underway with the EU. Preferential access for EU 
wheat was particularly undesirable as U.S. wheat farmers were already competing with Chile’s 
neighbors in South America. This suggests that the U.S.’s alternative to an agreement was 
somewhat worsened and therefore they should use more soft/integrative tactics (Odell 2000). 
They did not use softer tactics, however, suggesting that other factors were more important. 
In terms of negotiator strategies/behaviors, breaking the PBS was one of the U.S.’s main 
objectives of the agricultural negotiators in the FTA, making U.S. negotiators very aggressive in 
their approach to discussing liberalization in wheat (U.S. Interview). Indeed, U.S. negotiators 
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indicated that they were unwilling to give up on the removal of the PBS for Chilean wheat even 
as wheat producers on the Chilean side were unwilling to budge. The U.S.’s unwillingness to 
budge in this issue, combined with the political pressures in Chile against maintaining the PBS, 
likely had a great deal to do with the resulting loss of the PBS in the U.S./Chile FTA. Moreover, 
when undergoing negotiations, the U.S. used hard tactics on Chile such as insisting that Chile 
had no grounds to maintain the PBS due to their loss to Argentina over the oil PBS. They further 
criticized Chile for maintaining a system that was not compliant with WTO rules. Moreover, the 
U.S. was able to somewhat take advantage of their relative power by maintaining that an 
agreement would not be possible should Chile not concede in wheat and insisting that an overall 
agreement with the U.S. was much more valuable to Chile than maintaining a protectionist 
system for wheat. In this way, the U.S. was able to limit negotiations such that Chile would 
either have to give up the PBS or not have an agreement at all (U.S. Interview). U.S. negotiators 
knew that Chile would resist this which Odell argues should have made the U.S. more integrative 
in their strategy but they were not.  
 In the EU, market conditions were similar to the U.S. in that the EU was a large producer 
of wheat and also a net exporter. One main difference is that, although in absolute terms the EU 
produces more than double the volume of wheat that the U.S. does, the EU consumes almost 
three and a half times more wheat (table 4.5). Wheat production in Europe is quite significant 
both in that it is the most produced crop in the region and that it is grown in most regions 
throughout Europe with the only exceptions being a few areas in Spain, Italy and Sweden. 
France is the biggest wheat producer in Europe with a harvest of 33 million MT of cereals in 
2007 followed by Germany which has some of the most productive wheat regions in Europe 
(European Commission: Eurostat 2009). The high consumption level, combined with the 
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regional importance of wheat production, make wheat production important for food and 
livelihood security as well as important for rural development goals. In negotiations these 
conditions were likely to put the EU on the value-claiming part of the spectrum.  
With regards to European wheat trade, much of the wheat that is exported from the EU is 
exported all over the world. Wheat from France is commonly exported to its neighbors, 
particularly Italy and Spain, North and South America as well as the Middle East and Africa. 
German wheat is primarily shipped to its neighbors in the north, including much of the former 
Soviet Union and the Middle East. In 2003, the only German wheat shipped to the western 
hemisphere was to Chile (FAO 2011). The fact that the EU is net exporter of wheat is indicative 
of their success in becoming self-sufficient in wheat; however, like the U.S., the EU was not 
necessarily dependent on gaining access to the wheat market. For one, wheat production in the 
EU has been declining indicating that the EU was not looking for an additional market for wheat 
at the time of the negotiations (PLANISTAT-Luxembourg 2002). Again, these conditions would 
make the EU more likely to use hard/distributive tactics.  
In terms of wheat policy, the EU manages its price policies according to world supplies 
and prices in order to protect domestic producers and the farm programs used to protect them 
(Korves 2008). Like the U.S., the EU maintains income and price support programs for wheat. 
Additionally, there was a mandatory land set-aside program for wheat in order to limit 
production. For the income support program, wheat is eligible for compensatory payments that 
are decoupled from price14. The price support programs include a price floor system, which may 
require government purchase of the commodity. Moreover, the EU utilizes various border 
protections for wheat, including import tariffs, TRQs and export subsidies. Indeed, “import 
                                                 
14
 The payments are not decoupled from production as they are still based on current area 
planted. 
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protection has been a crucial feature of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)15, both to  
uphold the CAP principle of preference for EU-produced goods and to prevent lower-price 
imports from undermining domestic price support mechanisms” (Normile, Effland and Edwin 
2004, 18). Also similar to the U.S., the EU PSE for wheat was very high, estimated at 47% 
(Normile, Effland and Edwin 2004). Worldwide, wheat is one of the more highly protected crops 
and this is no exception for the EU; the EU average PSE was 36% for the 13 top protected 
commodities in the world, indicating that wheat was among the more protected even among 
other highly protected commodities. These domestic policies are clearly important in the 
negotiations for further economic policies but are practically ignored in Odell’s framework. 
As the largest cereal crop produced in Europe and one of the most protected crops, wheat 
is actually quite sensitive in Europe making its exclusion come as no surprise. Much like the 
U.S., the EU prefers to avoid linkages in FTAs to domestic support preferring that these issues 
be dealt with at the multi-lateral level (Woolcock 2008). As such, the EU tends to exclude much 
of the sensitive agricultural sector in their FTA negotiations. Moreover, negotiators in the Trade 
Directorate General (DG) indicated that they were aware that Chile’s PBS was under dispute and 
preferred to let that be dealt with at the multilateral level than at the bilateral level (EU 
Interview). Because of these issues, the EU and Chile chose to leave wheat trade policy off the 
table from the beginning, leading to no value creation possibilities, but an ability for Chile to 
maintain the protection they wanted and the EU to maintain their own protection. Greater 
awareness of Chile’s BATNA and a desire to address tough issues would have benefited EU 
more by way of greater wheat export potential. The institutional practice of excluding products 
before negotiations even begin suggests a negotiation process that clearly affects outcomes. In 
                                                 
15
 The components of the CAP and the political economy of the CAP are discussed in more 
detail in the annexes. 
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this instance, there is no two-level game as suggested by Putnam and reinforced by Odell, but 
rather discussions at the domestic level are the sole indicator of the outcome.  
4.3.3 Sugar Case Study 
 Sugar is a universally sensitive product, and that is no exception for the U.S./Chile and 
EU/Chile FTAs. The U.S. and Chile both have some sugar/sugar products which are free upon 
implementation, whereas the EU maintains protection and/or exclusions for all sugar/sugar 
products. Table 4.6 provides an overview of the negotiated outcomes for sugar as well as some 
insight into some independent variables that are proposed to have influenced outcomes. 
Generally, sugar is sensitive for all parties due to existing policies and the structure of the 
industries in each of the countries; nevertheless, the outcomes were very different, largely due to 
how the process of liberalization was approached in the two negotiations. 
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Table 4.6: Sugar Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Pre-FTA tariff protection variable variable 6%, 98% 6%, 98% 
  Degree of liberalization full-restricted limited-
restricted 
full-
restricted none 
  Tariff reduction scheme TRQ, sch. A TQ(3A), SP sch. G, A year 0 
  Phase-out period 12, 0 -- 12, 0 0, -- 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile   
  Production1 7 19.6 0.4   
  Consumption1 8.7 16.3 0.6   
  Net exports1 -1.6 3.2 -0.2   
  Export market N/A diverse N/A   
  
Growth potential with 
partner indeterminate indeterminate none   
  Percentage SCT2,3 55.80 56.78 34.15   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade closed closed closed closed 
  
Trade negotiation 
expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration concentrated extensive concentrated concentrated 
  Other political objective subsidies/ 
surpluses 
domestic 
protection millers/ PBS millers/ PBS 
Negotiator Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  value-
creating 
value-
creating 
value-
creating 
value-
creating 
  Hard tactics no yes no yes 
  Soft tactics yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of own 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of other 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of MT 
2
  2001-2003 average, % 
3
 SCT-Single Commodity Transfer=share of the value of subsidies that are linked to the 
production value of the commodity 
 
Table 4.6 shows that the negotiated outcomes for sugar were very specific and 
complicated. Before the agreements, the U.S. and the E.U. charged different rates for each tariff 
line with the U.S. charging a duty based on weight for most products and the EU charging a base 
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rate and a weight-related duty up to a certain limit. Chile’s pre-FTA tariffs were very simple and 
uniform with sugar products either having a uniform 6% tariff or a 98% tariff depending on the 
form of the sugar product. In the U.S. agreement, sugar is not excluded in keeping with the “no 
exclusions” principle of the discussions; it is, however, de facto excluded as it requires each 
country to be a net exporter in order to have preferential/free trade of sugar. Raw sugar for 
example, was assigned to schedule A, which is immediate liberalization, but there is a clause in 
the tariff schedule such that the only quantity which will enter for free will be in the amount of 
Chile’s sugar trade surplus. The same clause applies to the over-quota duty applied to the 47 
other sugar tariff lines included in the TRQ granted by the U.S. Similarly, sugar liberalization in 
Chile’s tariff schedules requires a surplus from the U.S. but should the U.S. have a surplus, the 
tariff rate is subject to the G schedule which is back-loaded and does not see complete 
liberalization until the 12th year of the agreement. Sugar is excluded in the EU agreement for 
both parties for many tariff lines; however, the EU did grant a quota for some sugar products and 
a reduction of the ad-valorem duty. The specific duty was maintained on sugar products from 
Chile. Chile excluded the sugar/sugar products which had an ad-valorem tariff of 98% before the 
agreement but they immediately liberalized their sugar/sugar products which had a 6% base 
tariff. With regards to general market access gains, Chile gained access to both markets through 
quotas while only allowing their less sensitive sugar products to enter Chile freely from the 
beginning of the implementation.  
 Chile’s sugar production is limited to sugar beet production. The Economic Research 
Service (ERS) defines Chile as a low-cost producer of sugar beets although they admit that this 
production goes entirely to domestic consumption, meeting 66% of domestic demand, with the 
remaining consumption requirements being met by Argentina, Guatemala and Brazil (ERS 
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2003). As shown in table 4.6, Chile is a net importer of sugar although in relative terms, they are 
neither a big producer nor a big consumer (FAOSTAT 2010). Although Chile is a low-cost sugar 
beet producer, there is really no potential for growth for Chilean sugar due to the low volume of 
production, the existence of high border/domestic protection on the part of importers and the 
presence of much more productive competitors such as Brazil. Indeed, Chilean sugar is best 
defined as import competing, putting them on the same side of the market as the U.S. but the 
opposite side of the market from the EU. As predicted by Odell, Chile and the U.S. were able to 
use more soft/integrative tactics whereas in the Chile/EU negotiations, more hard/distributive 
tactics were used.  
Sugar is one of the few areas where protection remained in Chile at the time of the 
negotiations. Of all sensitive product case studies conducted for Chile, sugar has the highest 
percentage SCT, although it is still lower than the values for the U.S. and the EU (OECD 2011). 
Moreover, the PBS was also applied to sugar, making it one of the few goods protected by both 
subsidies and border protection. The sugar PBS had been in effect since 1984 and, like the PBS 
for the other goods, has been controversial at the multilateral level. In 2001, Colombia 
challenged Chile’s PBS for sugar before the WTO, although the consultation did not result in a 
review panel (Leight 2008). Nevertheless, like the PBS for wheat and oils, while the 
maintenance of the PBS was fought for domestically, it was not something that Chile had much 
ground to defend.  
Like much of the world sugar industry, there is a monopoly in Chile for sugar 
manufacturing held by the company Iansa. This company has only 5 sugar mills that are 
clustered around the Chilean sugar beet production area in the middle of Chile (Buzzanell 2011). 
Production of sugar does not meet demand, and so Iansa imports sugar in the refined rather than 
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raw form (ERS 2003). As such, this company had an incentive in the FTA to lower protection 
levels for a certain amount of refined sugar imports to help meet the rest of domestic demand. 
Interestingly, it was the U.S. and the EU who gave TRQs rather than the other way around. It 
seems as though Chile was able to gain more access than their trading partners, gaining at least 
some level of liberalization for Chilean sugar exports to these markets. Ultimately, the final 
proposal regarding the net exporter clause in the U.S. agreement made the issue mute as it 
allowed sugar to be de facto excluded (Chile interview). Similarly, the sugar/sugar products that 
had the highest levels of protection were excluded from the EU agreement. Nevertheless, looking 
at sugar liberalization from the Chilean perspective provides a bit of a puzzle as it indicates that 
Chile was either really good at bargaining for sugar or, as will be shown in the rest of the case 
study, there were conditions in the U.S. and the EU which led to Chile getting a great deal for 
sugar.  
The U.S. produces more than 17 times the amount of sugar that Chile produces, although 
it also consumes over 14 times more sugar than Chile (table 4.6). Accordingly, it has a higher 
trade deficit for sugar than Chile (FAOSTAT 2010). The growth potential for U.S. sugar is fairly 
indeterminate; this insecurity is due to both international and domestic policies. As a large 
importer, the trade and domestic policies practiced by exporters has an impact on the ability of 
the U.S. sugar sector to grow and develop. Most imports come from Mexico, Argentina, 
Colombia and other Latin American countries (ERS 2003). Existing sugar policy in the U.S. is 
much more multi-faceted than that of Chile. Since 1981, the U.S. has utilized price supports, 
domestic marketing allotments to processors and TRQs to protect sugar. There is a general TRQ 
for imports of U.S. sugar that is non-preferential in addition to a preferential TRQ granted to 
Mexico. There is another high-tier quota above the initial TRQ which is mainly filled by Mexico 
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(ERS 2003). It seems likely that the U.S. gave Chile a TRQ simply because that is the way that 
the U.S. deals with sugar trade. Although this provision is less important given that it is only 
valid if Chile is a net-exporter. Indeed, negotiators from both sides contend that the net exporter 
clause was a brilliant example of value-creation between the U.S. and Chile. 
Regarding the U.S. stance towards sugar policy in trade agreements, the Sweeteners 
Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee (ATAC) made it quite clear that “negotiations on 
sugar in this and other FTAs do nothing to advance the principal negotiating objectives of the 
sugar and sweetener industry” and furthermore, that the U.S. should “focus its efforts on WTO 
negotiations and to reserve negotiations on sugar exclusively for that forum” (ATAC for Trade in 
Sweeteners and Sweetener Products 2003, 3). Indeed, the interests of the U.S. sugar industry 
remain in the reduction of world-wide distortions in prices caused by domestic and border 
policies protecting sugar whereas U.S. sugar policies are seen by the sweetener ATAC to simply 
provide a protective buffer against the harmful policies of other countries. Furthermore, as Chile 
and the U.S. are both net importers of sugar that protect their domestic markets from low priced 
imports, the sugar ATAC believed that sugar should have been excluded from the agreement 
entirely. The fact that there is an indefinite net exporter clause is the saving grace for much of the 
sugar industry in this FTA as they admit that Chile is unlikely to become a net exporter. A 
minority view in the Sweetener ATAC indicated that they were supportive of the 
administration’s commitment to free trade, even in sugar (ATAC for Trade in Sweeteners and 
Sweetener Products 2003). 
It seems in this case that while the sugar industry was quite adamant about leaving sugar 
out of the negotiations due to the U.S. position as a net importer facing lower priced imports, it 
was included anyway in the spirit of no exclusions. The question of whether the de-facto 
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exclusion counts as an actual exclusion may be up for debate. Indeed, if Chile does start 
significantly supporting their sugar industry and becomes a net-exporter, Chile would have 
gotten a great deal and the import-competing sugar sector in the U.S. would be all the worse for 
it. Regardless, some political considerations such as the desire for no exclusions seemed to be 
much more important than the political and economic considerations of the industry although the 
net outcome is the same in either case. Odell’s framework ignores institutions for the most part 
and in this negotiation, the “rules of the game”—that there would be no exclusions—seemed to 
be more important than economic or political conditions although the negotiated outcome 
certainly reflects these considerations given that neither side really wanted to fully liberalize 
sugar. 
The EU has different conditions than the U.S. or Chile with regards to sugar: it is an 
exporter and a much larger consumer of sugar products (table 4.6). The EU accounts for 14% of 
world sugar production, 13% of sugar consumption, 12% of total sugar exports and 5% of sugar 
imports from 1999 to 2002 (Europa 2004). Furthermore, although sugar is grown in most 
countries in Europe, around half of all sugar production comes from Germany and France alone. 
Furthermore, the EU facilitates relationships between growers and manufacturers “aimed at 
ensuring an equitable balance between the two sets of partners and encouraging inter-trade 
agreements of benefit to the entire sector and the competitiveness of EU production” by way of 
framework provisions and quota transfers between producers and manufacturers (Europa 2004). 
Thus, political action was likely quite strong for sugar given the relative concentration of 
production and the existing relationship between the producers and the millers. Odell argues that 
“interest groups mobilize and domestic politics shapes the government’s negotiating objectives 
and strategies” (Odell 2000, 57) so in this case, the sugar industry was likely the leading force 
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behind negotiating objectives for European sugar. A small non-binding quota was not 
threatening for the EU and they gained immediate market access for some sugar products to 
Chile which had previously had a 6% tariff and the PBS.   
The production and industrial concentration in the EU sugar sector is likely partially to 
blame for stagnation in European sugar policies. By 2004, sugar policies had not changed 
significantly in over 30 years given that much of the policies presented in the common market 
organization in the sugar sector in 1968 were still in place (Europa 2004). In terms of protection 
for the sector, the EU uses mechanisms such as minimum price supports, production quotas, 
storage of surpluses, refinement subsidies in addition to border protection which features a fixed 
duty, a system similar to the PBS, and export subsidies which are referred to as export refunds. 
The presence of these policy mechanisms has made European sugar very competitive but at the 
same time it has entrenched within the sector a perceived need for continued support (Europa 
2004). This clearly has implications for trade policy as the EU cannot implement trade policy 
which undermines domestic policy and protectionist trade policy is also kept in place in order to 
further protect the concentrated and organized sugar sector.  
Like Chile’s PBS, EU sugar policies have been disputed within the WTO. Australia and 
Brazil complained as early as 2002 about European export subsidies on sugar with the matter 
turning into two separate disputes within which numerous countries joined forces against the EU 
sugar policies (World Trade Organization 2005). The problems associated with WTO-disputed 
sugar policies combined with Chile’s struggles to maintain the PBS likely made it such that 
sugar would be too sensitive an issue for either to address in an FTA. Indeed, the EU has 
indicated that they prefer to deal with such issues as protection in the multi-lateral realm rather 
than the bilateral realm making real policy changes for sugar within the FTA an unlikely 
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occurrence. As such, the negotiated outcome was to exclude the most sensitive sugar entirely 
from negotiations while granting Chile a small import quota into the EU with very little duty 
liberalization. Odell’s framework largely ignores international pressures in addition to 
institutional considerations which were both issues in the EU/Chile sugar discussions. 
4.3.4 Dairy Case Study 
 Dairy is a somewhat more complicated case study to conduct compared to wheat and 
sugar. For one thing there are many different products in dairy and so a particular area may be a 
milk producer but not a significant cheese producer. As such, the pre-FTA environments in the 
U.S. and the EU were very specific with each product classified by fat content, container, etc. 
having a unique tariff rate. Chile’s pre-FTA environment on the other hand was much simpler 
due to their trade policy of the uniform 6% tariff for most products. This is not to say that Chile’s 
environment for dairy was less sensitive than the U.S. or the EU but rather that a simple outcome 
such as the use of only one schedule or simply excluding everything was less likely of an option. 
Table 4.7 depicts the negotiated outcome for liquid dairy such as milk and cream as well as the 
negotiated outcome for other dairy products including cheese and butter. The independent 
variables, market conditions, domestic politics, and negotiator beliefs are presented together 
although anything specific to a particular dairy product is discussed in the text.   
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Table 4.7: Dairy Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome-Liquid dairy U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Pre-FTA tariff protection variable variable 6% 6% 
  Degree of liberalization full-gradual limited-
restricted full-gradual none 
  Tariff reduction scheme TRQ, sch. A, C year 0-SP sch. B, C -- 
  Phase-out period 0, 8, 12 perpetuity 4, 8 -- 
Negotiated outcome-Other dairy U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Degree of liberalization full-gradual limited-
restricted full-gradual limited 
  Tariff reduction scheme TRQs, sch. A, B, D, F TQ(2a), PN sch. B, C TQ(1a) 
  Phase-out period 0, 4, 10, 12 perpetuity 4, 8 perpetuity 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Production1 89.04 220.5 2.486   
  Consumption1 90.49 211.8 2.500   
  Net exports1 -1.45 26.38 -0.194   
  Export market N/A Europe/ diverse Mexico   
  Growth potential with partner indeterminate indeterminate notable   
  Percentage SCT2,3,4 38.76 39.76 5   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade mixed closed open open 
  Trade negotiation expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration changing mixed concentrated concentrated 
  Other political objective subsidies subsidies/ 
surpluses/ GI 
growth 
potential 
growth 
potential 
Negotiator Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  mixed value-claiming mixed value-claiming 
  Hard tactics yes yes yes yes 
  Soft tactics yes no yes no 
  Awareness of own BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  Awareness of other BATNA somewhat yes yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of tonnes 
2
  2001-2003 average, %; the estimate is for milk 
3
 SCT-Single Commodity Transfer=share of the value of subsidies that are linked to the 
production value of the commodity 
4
 Chile had no Producer SCT  in 2001 or 2003 but in 2002, the % SCT was 15.01 
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One instrument that the U.S. uses extensively for dairy products is the TRQ. The U.S. has 
6 different TRQs for different dairy products including liquid dairy, cheese, milk powder, butter, 
condensed milk, and other dairy products. All of these TRQs are eliminated over 12 years with 
the over-quota tariff reduction following schedule J which is one of the most back-loaded 
reduction schemes. Nevertheless, none of the dairy TRQs were binding in 2001 or in 2003 
indicating that the agreement actually achieved liberalization in dairy, at least in the beginning. 
Many of the dairy product tariff lines which are not included in the TRQs for the U.S. are still 
protected by schedules B, C, D and J which are eliminated in 4, 8, 10 and 12 years respectively. 
Moreover, some dairy products were free before the agreement and therefore continue to be free 
(schedule A) and others become free upon implementation (schedule F). Chile utilizes schedules 
B and C for removal of tariff barriers to the U.S. not liberalizing any dairy products immediately 
but eliminating all protection by the 8th year (schedule C) at the latest (table 4.7). Moreover, the 
U.S. and Chile argue that after 12 years all dairy is completely free which is a great opportunity 
for the Chilean dairy industry.  
The EU agreement also featured a reciprocal TRQ for cheese and curd with a preferential 
quota of 1500 metric tons with a volume increase of 5% every year. Like in the U.S. agreement, 
this TRQ does not seem to be binding initially either; however, dairy never becomes free in the 
EU agreement although the quota level grows every year. If Chile were to become really 
competitive in cheese and curd, it would always hit a ceiling with the EU quota. Additionally, 
the EU excluded most other dairy including milk, cream, butter and other dairy making exports 
of those products to the EU costly by having liberalization of the ad-valorem duty only while 
maintaining the specific duty as indicated by the SP designation. Chile also completely excluded 
all dairy except cheese and curd which has the same non-binding quota as the EU tariff schedule 
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however so imports from the EU into Chile will also remain more costly than those from the 
U.S.  
 Of course, production, imports, exports and consumption in Chile was much lower than 
that of the U.S. and the EU (table 4.7). Consumption in Chile was only 2.7% of total U.S. 
consumption compared to 1.3% of European consumption. Much of Chile’s dairy demands were 
being met with domestic production leading to low import dependency. On average from 1997 to 
2003 Chile only imported about 10.8% of its dairy consumption (butter, cheese, milk, and cream) 
compared to 40.5% for the U.S. and 18.8% for the EU. Chile only imported an average of 2.5% 
of its whole milk consumption from 1997 to 2004. Chile exports a little bit more of its whole 
milk production, with average exports as a percentage of production around 17% from 1997 to 
2004. Indeed, Chile exports about 83% of its cream production compared to practically no 
exports as a percentage of production of other dairy products. Nevertheless, Chile had great 
growth potential in dairy with the growth rate for milk exports around 139% from 1997 to 2003 
(FAOSTAT 2010).  
The economic statistics make it hard to classify the Chilean dairy industry as import-
competing or export-oriented. For this, other factors in play in Chile at the time of the 
negotiations must be considered. For one, the Chilean dairy industry was in a period of change at 
the time of the negotiations. It was becoming much more modernized which allowed for greater 
productivity and diversification. Furthermore, “exciting new opportunities like the Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States also spurred export-minded activities in companies who had 
traditionally only looked internally for their markets” (Jefferson and Rice 2005, 2). Chilean 
negotiators concurred with this assessment as well discussing the potential of the Chilean dairy 
industry to develop and to benefit greatly from the U.S. FTA; they were disappointed that they 
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were not able to gain as much from the EU agreement as dairy was excluded. Furthermore, the 
TRQs that Chile was given in the U.S. agreement were not binding, at least not initially, which 
still allowed the Chilean dairy industry to grow (Chile Interview). As evidence, from the years 
2003 to 2004, Chile’s dairy exports grew by 212% (Jefferson and Rice 2005). Much of these 
exports went to Mexico with which Chile had a preferential FTA. Although net exports were 
negative on average from 1997 to 2003, the dairy industry definitely had growth potential 
especially when granted lower barriers to entry by trading partners. Moreover, because Chile had 
Mexico as a market alternative, Odell would claim that Chile would have had a higher resistance 
point which certainly seemed to be the case.  
  The Chilean Dairy Product Exporters Association (ExporLac) works with diary 
companies in order to promote Chilean dairy products in external markets. With the help of this 
organization, fifteen Chilean companies exported dairy products to the U.S. by 2005 (Jefferson 
and Rice 2005). The producer organization (FEDELECHE) was also in favor of the FTA like 
many other organizations within SNA. Obviously Chile was not a big exporter of dairy in 
general and certainly not to the U.S. or the EU; however the important thing for Chile was that 
the FTAs would create more opportunities for a more competitive Chilean dairy sector in the 
future. With regards to protection, the industry’s only border protection, besides SPS and other 
standards, was the uniform 6% tariff and without a great deal of domestic support, the industry 
had been able to survive due to their low cost advantage and their small domestic consumer base 
making it a less attractive market for import surges. Nevertheless, Chile did not immediately 
open its own market to U.S. and EU dairy imports. 
 Chile’s dairy sector clearly wanted to gain as much market access as possible for their 
growing industry. The politics were behind the agreement and the economics made Chile look 
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like a relatively non-threatening trading partner. It is clear, however, that the U.S. and the EU 
were not as open to liberalization in dairy as Chile based on the outcomes. Nevertheless, Chile 
tried to gain access where possible and was generally happy with the U.S. agreement in 
particular as it allowed them to enter into the U.S. market and gain full liberalization even if it 
would take some time to do so. The Chilean dairy sector needed time to become more 
competitive in order to take advantage of this opportunity in any event (Chile Interview). In the 
EU agreement, the EU’s practice of excluding much of dairy before it could even be discussed 
put Chile on the more defensive end of the spectrum and indeed, they maintained much more 
protections than the industry needed, reciprocating the EU’s treatment of their own dairy. There 
is really nothing that Chile could have done to gain more access to the EU market, except to try 
to raise the quota, because of the approach that the EU took to exclude dairy from the very 
beginning. Odell would identify this zone of agreement as being very small and indeed it was; 
however, in terms of what led to outcomes, the institution, or “rule of the game”, of listing 
exclusions prior to actual negotiations constrained and thus determined outcomes greatly. 
  According to the 2003 World Dairy Situation, the U.S. produces 13% of the world milk 
supplies although they are not a major world exporter compared to countries in Oceania and 
Europe. Dairy products are not widely traded compared to other commodities; only around 7% 
of milk products are traded with those traded goods often facing policies that limit competition to 
the domestic industry (Hemme, Weers and Christoffers 2003). The U.S. consumed more dairy 
than was domestically produced from 1998 to 2003 (table 4.7); moreover, the U.S. had a 
negative trade balance for both liquid dairy and other dairy. The only dairy products wherein 
consumption was less than production were cream and whole milk which was also the case for 
Chile (FAOSTAT 2010). This statistic is indicative of the sector’s structure: some dairy products 
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are exported although most are not making the dairy sector as a whole import competing. Those 
products that the U.S. does export are also exported by Chile and so trade in this sector was not 
complementary making it a more difficult sector for the U.S. Accordingly, the potential for 
growth was somewhat indeterminate. Again, being on the same side of the market as Chile 
certainly made the U.S. more defensive. 
Although the U.S. maintains much more protection for their dairy sector than Chile, 
Chile’s dairy sector was much more confident about their potential as an exporter than the U.S. 
Like other countries, the U.S. maintains a certain amount of protection for the dairy sector which 
includes border measures, the buying of surpluses by the government and strict standards. One 
article suggests that “trade barriers for many dairy products have limited U.S. imports of these 
products to less than six percent of U.S. consumption” (Sumner and Balagtas 2002, 1). These 
barriers include TRQs for imports of dairy products in addition to subsidies to dairy exporters of 
certain dairy products including milk powder, butterfat and various cheeses through the Dairy 
Export Incentive Program (DEIP). Additionally, milk prices were fairly well regulated by milk 
marketing orders which provide a minimum price that processors must pay. Moreover, the U.S. 
government had the practice of buying dairy products at the time of the agreement and although 
the program in the farm bill that provides this price support was supposed to be eliminated in 
1999, the program was extended through 2007 (Sumner and Balagtas 2002). Again, the need to 
create policies that are not in direct conflict with existing policies was a great part of the U.S. 
unwillingness to allow immediate liberalization. 
Perhaps partially because of this policy structure, the geography of milk production in the 
U.S. at the time of the negotiations was undergoing some changes. For one thing, dairy farms 
were becoming fewer but production continued to increase from 1997 to 2001. Similarly, the size 
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of the operations in the U.S. continued to grow during this time period and much of milk 
production was moving to the Western states from the Southeastern and Midwestern states 
(NASS 2002). The implication is that the sector could be becoming more productive. However, 
the geographical changes in dairy production could have indeterminate implications for political 
bargaining depending on if the sector is able to remain organized enough to push for more 
favorable policies for the sector.  
 The U.S. dairy sector was both offensive and defensive in this FTA negotiation. For one 
thing, they were used to having to defend their domestic support for the dairy sector and wanted 
to at all costs avoid linkages in the FTA to their support programs. The Animal and Animal 
Products ATAC (which includes dairy) indicated in their report that they were happy that the 
agreement “preserves the U.S. right to continue its domestic support and assistance programs by 
confining those issues to multilateral discussions at the World Trade Organization” (ATAC for 
Animal and Animal Products 2003). Furthermore, the group was pleased that the agreement 
addressed NTBs such as SPS and ROO. A big issue for dairy is getting their standards approved 
in Chile which the group urged still needs to be finalized before a final agreement. Another 
pressure was a market access one with the dairy sector wanting the tariffs for their products to be 
removed as quickly as possible in order to gain cheaper access to the highly competitive Chilean 
market that currently receives most diary imports preferentially from Argentina. Interviews 
indicate that the dairy sectors in the U.S. and Chile were able to express their interests and come 
to a mutually beneficial agreement for both. This shows that there was a bit of value creation and 
value claiming but that the negotiations were overall flexible and even, rather than one party 
dominating discussions. Of course, the U.S. placed limits on imports in order to protect domestic 
support programs. Based on market and political considerations however, exclusion of dairy by 
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the U.S. would have been unsurprising; the fact that complete liberalization occurred and that the 
sector was happy about it again reflects the commitment to no exclusions but also indicates that 
both sectors were confident in their ability to compete or they underestimated the other party’s 
potential.  
 The EU is a large dairy producer, consumer and exporter. Around 22% of world milk 
production is in the EU-15 countries and 26.7% of world production is in the EU-25. 
Furthermore, the EU-15 holds 29% of the world market share in dairy exports. Much of dairy 
production in Europe (50%) is converted into tradable dairy products (cheese, dry milk, 
condensed milk, etc.) which comprise much of the exports (Hemme, Weers and Christoffers 
2003). These exports go all over the world but particularly to other European markets including 
Russia and the Mediterranean. FAO statistics indicate that milk production in Europe from 1997 
to 2003 was on average over twice that of the U.S. and over 73 times that of Chile (table 4.7). 
Furthermore, EU dairy net exports were more than 10 times the production and consumption of 
dairy in Chile. The product with the least amount of exports and imports to total production was 
whole milk (6.2% and 8.7% respectively) which makes sense as much of milk production that is 
not processed into tradable products is consumed (FAOSTAT 2010). Odell would expect the 
EU’s position on the opposite side of the market to make them more integrative in their strategy, 
but it is not clear that this was actually not the case based on the limited amount of liberalization 
that took place on both sides. 
 Like other agricultural sectors in the EU, dairy has an arsenal of policies that protect the 
industry and are often questioned by other countries and by the EU itself in its continual reform 
processes. In the price policy realm, the EU had a target price for milk as well as intervention 
prices for butter and skimmed milk powder which allows the EU to buy the products should the 
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price fall below 92% of the intervention price. There is also public disposal and private storage 
which help to manage the supply and thus keep the producer price high. Another policy to 
manage the supply side of dairy is a milk quota system which was to end in 2000 but which was 
extended until 2007-08 at the time of the Agenda 2000 reforms. And of course, there are import 
tariffs and export subsidies for dairy products. Differences in the structure of dairy production all 
throughout the EU make policy reform difficult because “firstly, production costs and gross 
margins are very heterogeneous and, secondly, smaller and less efficient dairy farmers 
contributed to proper management of the landscape and nature in rural areas” (Benjamin, Gohin 
and Guyomard 1999). The insecurity with policies makes growth potential with Chile 
indeterminate. As such, although they were on opposite sides of the market, it is not sure that 
they saw themselves in that way; indeed the EU acted very much import competing in dairy 
largely due to the need to not undermine existing domestic policies. 
 In terms of dairy considerations in the FTA, dairy is considered to be one of those 
product groups with high domestic production and remarkable surpluses which of course leads to 
the EU not wanting to extend its own TRQs but with the preference to extend their own market 
access (Rudloff and Simons 2004). Indeed, the extension of the TRQ for cheese and curd helps 
the EU much more than Chile as the EU produces much more cheese than does Chile. However, 
the quota level was not being reached although data was not available for 2003 to know if they 
had filled the quota (United Nations 2009). Nevertheless, the sustainability impact assessment 
reported an increase in dairy exports from Chile with no increase in exports from the EU 
expected; the impact of the FTA on the dairy industry is non-existent for the EU likely due to the 
limited market access improvements (PLANISTAT-Luxembourg 2002). Indeed, excluding dairy 
from the very beginning of the discussion avoided any losses by the sector but also eliminated 
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the ability to capitalize on an FTA with Chile for the EU dairy sector. A more flexible stance in 
negotiating dairy might have yielded better results for the EU and for Chile. Based on market 
conditions, Odell would have expected more value-creation; however, domestic policies, 
particularly the need to protect existing domestic supports, and the EU’s practice  of excluding 
dairy from real scrutiny kept real progress from being made although a small amount of market 
access is better than none. 
4.3.5 Poultry Case Study 
 Chilean negotiators claim that the poultry negotiations with the U.S. were some of the 
more exciting negotiations in the agreement. Like in the previous case studies, poultry seemed to 
be quite sensitive in the negotiations as reflected by the outcomes. Indeed, the outcomes were 
quite interesting: there was a ten year TRQ for certain cuts of poultry and turkey meat for both 
the U.S. and Chile. These allowed zero quantities to enter for free the first two years and thus 
were classified as restricted because although liberalization occurs, it is in no way immediate. 
For the U.S. whole chickens were completely free (schedule A) while other poultry products 
were subject to the B and C schedules which have tariff elimination in 4 and 8 years, 
respectively, with even tariff reduction each year. Chile was able to utilize the H schedule for its 
sensitive poultry cuts not covered by the TRQs which allows for two years of adjustment before 
tariff reduction begins; this protection is completely removed by the 10th year. In the EU 
agreement on the other hand, Chile has eliminated all tariff barriers for poultry upon 
implementation of the agreement. The EU has a 7,250 metric ton TRQ for fowls and poultry 
however which increases by 10% each year. This TRQ was binding however making the degree 
of liberalization limited, as it is never eliminated, and restricted as the quota level was being 
filled and the EU capturing quota rents from Chile.  
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Table 4.8: Poultry Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Pre-FTA tariff protection variable variable 6%, 25% 6% 
  Degree of liberalization full-restricted limited-
restricted 
full-
restricted 
full-
immediate 
  Tariff reduction scheme TRQ, sch. A,B,C TQ(1d) 
TRQ, sch. B, 
H year 0 
  Phase-out period 10, 0, 4, 8 perpetuity 10, 4 0 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile   
  Production1 16.3 10.7 0.42   
  Consumption1 13.6 9.9 0.39   
  Net exports1 2.7 0.84 0.03   
  Export market diverse Europe/Asia N/A   
  
Growth potential with 
partner notable indeterminate notable   
  Percentage SCT2,3,4 0.06 29.06 -0.20   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade open mixed mixed open 
  
Trade negotiation 
expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration concentrated concentrated concentrated concentrated 
  Other political objective complementary 
consumption 
competition/ 
standards 
growth 
potential 
growth 
potential 
Negotiator Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  value-creation value-
claiming mixed mixed 
  Hard tactics yes yes yes yes 
  Soft tactics yes no yes no 
  
Awareness of own 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of other 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of tonnes 
2
  2001-2003 average, % 
3
 SCT-Single Commodity Transfer=share of the value of subsidies that are linked to the 
production value of the commodity 
4
 The U.S. had no Producer SCT  in 2002 or 2003 but in 2001, the % SCT was 0.175 
 
 Chile is a net exporter of poultry as shown by table 4.8 but the volume of exports to 
imports is not very large. Part of this is because Chile imports dark meat but exports white meat 
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to accord with domestic consumption patterns and the other part is due to Chile’s low volume of 
trade for poultry in general. From 1997 to 2003, Chile barely had any poultry imports with total 
imports as a percentage of production only accounting for a tenth of a percent on average. 
Nevertheless, Chile was not very dependent on exports in this time period either with exports as 
a percentage of production only amounting to around 6 percent. Poultry was certainly an industry 
of importance to Chile at the time of the agreement, but mainly as a means to meet domestic 
demand for protein. However, the potential did exist for Chile to become more of an exporter 
given the openness of Chile and potential preferential access to the larger U.S. and EU markets; 
as such, the poultry sector saw the FTAs as an opportunity (Chile Interview). Market access for 
Chilean poultry was clearly an objective given that the sector was not subsidized domestically 
and tariff rates were relatively low already leaving lower barriers to the U.S. and EU markets as 
the driving force behind any growth potential for Chile. As a net exporter, albeit a small one, 
Chile was on the same side of the market as the EU and the U.S. Nevertheless, Chile had to use 
mixed tactics in order to give their industry time to adjust and to be able to gain enough market 
access to benefit their growing industry. 
Geographically, poultry production is considerably concentrated in that most poultry 
production is conducted around the middle of the country, but also in that the poultry producers 
are actually quite organized. The Chilean poultry association (APA) is very active in trade 
negotiations working not only with their public sector but also with the public and private sector 
in the partner country where possible. In the U.S. agreement, they worked both with the National 
Chicken Council and the USA Poultry and Egg Export Council. Domestically, they worked 
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closely with their own negotiators and the larger umbrella producer association, SOFOFA16 
which was also export oriented. Odell argues that this interaction between “firms” and 
negotiators can move the frontier; in the U.S. agreement in particular, it certainly seemed to 
move the frontier outward and perhaps the inability to work with the EU in this way limited the 
frontier somewhat.  
Generally, the Chilean poultry sector can be characterized by a trade stance that is fairly 
open but at same time the sector realized that the U.S. is very competitive in poultry. They were 
able to be more open with the EU however, partly because EU consumers are not as 
complementary to Chile but also because the EU is not as competitive in poultry. APA was 
satisfied with the outcome of the U.S. negotiations as it gave the Chilean poultry industry three 
years to adjust before having to face increased imports of dark meat but also because they were 
able to get some of their excess poultry into the U.S. at the same time period. Furthermore, APA 
did believe that the negotiators had an impact on the outcomes but also indicated that APA’s 
involvement was very important in order to determine common goals and objectives (APA 
questionnaire). The TRQ with the EU gave Chile some of the market access that they wanted, 
but given the binding nature of the quota and the fact that poultry imports are never completely 
free means that Chile did not gain as much market access as was garnered in the U.S. agreement; 
moreover, the EU gained completely free access to the Chilean market which is clearly not a 
reciprocal arrangement. The major difference, besides the trading partner, was the ability of APA 
to negotiate with counterparts. This suggests that Odell was correct in his hypothesis regarding 
how the interaction between the firm and negotiators leads to value creation. Nevertheless, Odell 
does not address the impacts of the way negotiations are undertaken which was clearly important 
                                                 
16
 SOFOFA is the acronym for “Sociedad de Fomento Fabril” which translates to the 
manufacturers association. 
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in this case as Chile was simply not able to work with the EU like they were able to work with 
the U.S. because of the structure of EU trade negotiations.  
Much of the interesting parts of the negotiations with U.S./Chile negotiations were the 
way that the agreement was able to create value. Both sides were running against each other 
during the negotiations with Chile wanting to achieve its goal of gaining market access while at 
the same time limiting competitive imports from the U.S. Indeed, the final agreement was very 
creative and unique in that it had different outcomes for the different types of poultry meat which 
met the worries of both sides while at the same time allowing access to each other’s markets. 
Chile believes that their relatively small industry helped them get a better deal because they were 
seen as relatively non-threatening (APA questionnaire). However, the outcome suggests that the 
U.S. was aware of Chile’s potential; yet they did allow Chile a marked amount of access rather 
than excluding the sector. An inaccurate assessment can lower one’s resistance point and 
therefore enlarge the zone of agreement (Odell 2000) although in this case, it likely had much 
less to do with the outcome than the value-creation of the private-public sector involvement.  
According to the USDA, the U.S. is the largest poultry producer in the world and the 
second largest exporter of poultry meat behind Brazil confirming that they are quite competitive 
in poultry production. Additionally, the U.S. is the world’s largest exporter of turkey products 
(ERS 2009). Indeed, the U.S. produced 1.5 times more poultry meat than the EU and 38 times 
that of Chile on average from 1997 to 2003 (table 4.8). Moreover, poultry meat imports for the 
U.S. from 1997 to 2003 was just over a 10th of a percent of production whereas exports were 
over 16% of production. Interestingly, the U.S. also consumes a lot of poultry consuming an 
average of 13.6 million metric tons per year, more than the EU and Chile put together 
(FAOSTAT 2010). The U.S. exports poultry all over the world although Russia, Europe and their 
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North American neighbors are certainly the most significant importers of U.S. poultry 
(FAOSTAT 2011). As a major world exporter of poultry, additional access to any market is 
desired including that of Chile. According to Odell, being on the same side of the market as 
Chile is indicative of more integrative tactics which certainly seems to have been the case here. 
Geographically, poultry production is mostly conducted in the south. While there are 
many poultry associations or farm organizations that may focus on poultry if it is relevant to the 
region (such as Farm Bureau), the two export associations for poultry in the U.S. that had a lot of 
involvement in the Chilean negotiations were the Poultry and Egg Export Council, which is 
based in Georgia17, and the National Chicken Council, which is based in DC. Although these 
organizations work hard to serve the interests of the poultry producers, domestic support for 
poultry and other livestock is not comparable to the domestic support for grains. At the time of 
the agreement, much of the domestic assistance for poultry came from disaster aid, tariffs and 
export subsidies(Normile, Effland and Edwin 2004). The main protections clearly remain in 
trade policy wherein issues such as tariffs, SPS, quotas, and NTBs can have an impact on how 
much livestock and poultry are traded (ERS 2009). Nevertheless, the poultry producers prefer 
that these issues are addressed more fully at the multilateral level rather than the bilateral level 
(ATAC for Animal and Animal Products 2003).    
The U.S. poultry producers did want access to the Chilean market but at the same time, 
they recognized the potential that the Chilean poultry industry had to become a greater producer 
and exporter so they wanted to get into the Chilean market as quickly as possible while at the 
same time maintaining protection for their domestic industry. Indeed, negotiators from both sides 
indicate that the outcome for poultry really was value-creating for both sides as both were able to 
                                                 
17Georgia is the largest poultry producing state in the U.S. 
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have sufficient market access within a reasonable time period and since the agreement was 
completely reciprocal, both sides felt like they had negotiated the best deal. Furthermore, 
although an agreement could not be reached through mutual bargaining between private sectors 
in the two countries, there was sufficient information from these organizations in order for the 
negotiators to reach a mutually beneficial agreement in the end. 
The EU poultry sector at the time of the negotiations was characterized by fairly volatile 
exports and generally increasing consumption. Production was not as high as U.S. production 
levels; however, consumption in the EU was less than that of the U.S. The average imports and 
exports to production were much higher than the U.S. and Chile (18.7% and 26.5% respectively) 
indicative of a fairly active trading sector (FAOSTAT 2010). According to the EU Poultry 
association (AVEC), the poultry sector is fairly sensitive to domestic shocks caused by demand 
changes as well as to the international situation such as changes in world trading patterns which 
impact both EU export potential and imports making growth potential from a Chilean agreement 
fairly indeterminate. Moreover, the protection for the EU poultry sector is mainly in the form of 
import tariffs, TRQs and export subsidies. Removing these barriers for Chile would mean 
removing much of the protection that the sector has to make poultry competitive with Chile. So 
although the EU was presumably on the same side of the market as Chile, other conditions made 
the EU more import-competing and therefore more defensive in their tactics.  
Geographically, poultry production in the EU is dominated by France which in 2001 
alone made up almost 25% of all EU poultry production. Italy, the UK, Spain and Germany were 
also dominating players in the industry, with the group of 5 countries constituting almost 80% of 
total production. Nevertheless, the Association of Poultry Processors and Poultry Import and 
Export Trade (AVEC) looks after the interests of the entire EU poultry industry given that 
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poultry is produced in all but one of the 15 member states (Luxembourg). The organization had 
an office in Brussels at the time of the agreement in order to better represent the group in trade 
matters (AVEC 2002).  
The fact that the EU was self-sufficient in poultry meat from 1996 to 2001 and a net 
exporter indicates that the industry could be more export oriented and therefore desire more 
market access (AVEC 2002). This desire for market access was of course balanced by the EU’s 
desire to protect their domestic industry from competition, particularly low cost competition. 
One source from the industry at the time of the negotiations with Chile and MERCOSUR 
indicated that the EU poultry sector, including both producers and processors, would be unable 
to compete with the fierce competition presented by these low cost producers. Their idea to deal 
with this competition was to impose “precautionary principles” in the standards for poultry 
products in terms of environmental, SPS, and welfare standards in addition to strict ROO (ITSSD 
2002). As such, their views on trade were mixed but their strategy regarding the negotiations was 
fixed towards the value-claiming end of the spectrum with the objective to maintain protection 
while gaining access to the Chilean market. In these negotiations, the EU really was able to use 
their relative power to their advantage. Giving a preferential TRQ to Chile is a way to improve 
Chile’s access to the EU market18 while at the same time allowing them to maintain their current 
levels of protection. This is a situation of “winning some and losing some” where in this case, 
Chile lost for poultry. In the end, Chile gave access to the EU without much of a gain in access 
for their poultry sector. Although they did get a TRQ, it was the same TRQ as with other meats 
and therefore is indicative of distributive non-negotiable outcomes rather than the outcome of 
integrative negotiations. Odell discounts relative power as a determinant of FTA outcomes when 
                                                 
18
 Although some economists contend that EU preferential quotas given to developing exporting 
countries generate a preference margin but not a high rent (Dupraz and Matthews 2007). 
91 
 
it clearly can have some effects, particularly in comprehensive FTA negotiations wherein the 
value of reaching an agreement, even if it is not ideal in all areas, with a big country may 
outweigh considerations of the exact details of every product.  
4.3.6 Wine Case Study 
 Some products are sensitive across the board no matter who is negotiating because of 
high levels of domestic support, a reliance on the food product for food security and/or other 
policy issues. Wine is not typically one of those products that each country identifies as 
“sensitive” in the WTO, although in this agreement, wine was quite sensitive given that each of 
the entities has a significant and competitive wine sector. Like for other sensitive products, pre-
FTA tariff levels were very specific depending on the product for the U.S. and the EU, whereas 
Chile maintained a uniform 6% tariff for all wine imports (table 4.9). Interestingly, outcomes 
were almost as complicated as the pre-FTA situation with many different tariff reduction 
schemes used by the U.S. for different types of wine, different time periods for liberalization and 
special institutional provisions for the EU, and even Chile utilized of a few different schedules. 
Despite the very specific outcomes, most wine eventually becomes free upon implementation of 
the agreements. The exceptions to complete liberalization remain with the EU in their special 
provisions; those wines covered by PN are not liberalized due to GI considerations and are 
subject to the agreement on trade in wines in the agreement whereas those goods with the EP 
classification only have liberalization of the ad-valorem duty maintaining the specific duty tied 
to the entry price as such the degree of liberalization is classified by “limited-restricted”.  
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Table 4.9: Wine Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  
Pre-FTA tariff 
protection variable variable 6% 6% 
  Degree of liberalization full-gradual limited-
restricted full-gradual full-gradual 
  Tariff reduction scheme variable, sch. A 
year 4, PN; 
year 10, EP sch. A, V, E year 0, 5, 10 
  Phase-out period 0, 12 4, 10 0, 12 0, 5, 10 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile   
  Production1 2.3 17.8 0.56   
  Consumption1 2.5 16.9 0.18   
  Net exports1 -0.21 0.90 0.38   
  Export market Canada/UK diverse diverse   
  
Growth potential with 
partner indeterminate indeterminate notable   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade open mixed open mixed 
  
Trade negotiation 
expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration concentrated concentrated concentrated concentrated 
  
Other political 
objective consumption 
GI, 
consumption 
export-
oriented 
export-
oriented 
Negotiator 
Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  value-
claiming mixed 
value-
claiming mixed 
  Hard tactics yes yes yes yes 
  Soft tactics yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of own 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of other 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of tonnes 
 
The U.S./Chile FTA includes 7 different tariff reduction schemes for the U.S. for 
different types of wine. All 7 reduction schedules do not have total elimination of tariffs until the 
end of the 12th year although some are more back-loaded than others. Furthermore, some Chilean 
wines are classified by the V and E schedules which are both 12 year schedules although V is 
93 
 
back-loaded whereas E has tariff elimination in 12 equal stages. Additionally, the agreement 
includes a reciprocal preferential clause which states that if another country obtains better market 
access conditions than the conditions in the U.S./Chile FTA for wine, they must then apply the 
same market access opportunities to the partner country as well. The EU/Chile agreement is 
much more restrictive on the other hand with wine. There is an entire annex regarding the 
“agreement on trade in wines” and a similar annex for the “agreement on trade in spirits drinks 
and aromatized drinks”. These annexes specify that Chile cannot produce or sell any products 
which are protected by GI’s according to Article 22 of the WTO TRIPs Agreement19 or use any 
traditional expression, label, identification or production process which is trademarked by the 
other country as listed in annexes. The upshot of this is that Chile cannot call sparkling wine 
Champagne as it is not grown in the Champagne region in France among other examples. This 
applies to all domestically produced wine in Chile including that which is sold in Chile. The 
Chilean schedule in the EU FTA has liberalization for wines in years 0, 5 and 10 but without the 
PN subheading. This indicates that there were actually two negotiations going on for wine in the 
EU agreement: one related to the GI institutional framework for wines and the other concerning 
specific schedules applied to the wines. 
 While not as large a producer of wine as the U.S. or the EU, Chile has a very competitive 
and growing wine sector that depends a great deal on exports. Indeed, imports as a share of total 
production in Chile were less than a quarter of a percent whereas exports as a percent of 
production were almost 68% on average from 1997 to 2003 (FAOSTAT 2010). Chilean domestic 
wine consumption was less than a third of total production making them more than self-sufficient 
in wine production (FAOSTAT 2010). Low costs and many varieties gives Chile a great 
                                                 
19TRIPs refers to “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property” and is signed by many 
members of the WTO lying out the framework for intellectual property rights in trade. 
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opportunity to export even more wine if given greater access to large wine consuming areas like 
the U.S. or the EU. In 2004, over 50% of Chilean wine exports either went to North America or 
the EU with the rest going to neighbors, Asia and the Pacific (FAOSTAT 2011). Indeed, the 
potential for Chilean wine in the developed world and in emerging economies is quite notable. It 
did put Chile on the same side of the market as the EU though and indeed it seems as though 
integrative tactics were necessary on both sides in order to create such an institutional outcome 
combined with specific tariff outcomes. 
Chilean wine production is concentrated in the middle of the country with the wine 
export association, Wines of Chile, headquartered in Valparaiso which is a major Chilean port 
city and the location of congress. Indeed, while a wine producer association is included under the 
SNA umbrella, Wines of Chile did much of the leg-work in the FTAs, particularly in the FTA 
with the EU including communicating with Chilean negotiators as well as U.S. and EU 
negotiators and stakeholders where possible (Chile interview). Chile knew going into the FTAs 
with the EU and the U.S. that it was going to be difficult to obtain the market access that they 
desired because Chilean wine varieties compete with the U.S. and the EU in addition to 
Argentina who also seeks access to both markets; at the same time, both the U.S. and the EU 
have such a large wine consumer base making getting more market access an even greater goal. 
In both agreements, Chile wanted to claim as much value as possible because getting access to 
the other markets was much more valuable for them than maintaining protection. However, Chile 
could maintain more of a value-claiming approach in the U.S. agreement because they knew that 
the U.S. would not try to impose as many technical barriers, such as labeling requirements, as the 
EU. Nevertheless, they knew that if they wanted any kind of improved market access for their 
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wine in the EU, they would have to accept discussions over technical barriers and particularly, 
over GIs.  
 Unlike Chile, the U.S. wine sector is characterized by greater consumption than 
production and thus is a net importer (table 4.9). Indeed, imports as a share of total production 
was on average 20.8% from 1997 to 2003. At the same time, the U.S. exported about 11.6% of 
the total production of wine indicating that there is a demand on the international market for U.S. 
wine although it is clear that U.S. consumers demand foreign wine. The U.S. exports wine mainly 
to the UK and Canada. In terms of U.S. wine imports, most wine comes from Europe particularly 
from Italy, France and Spain and South America with Chilean wine ranking above Argentinean 
wine from 1993 to 2005 (Pick and Perez 2006). The main benefit for wine in the U.S. agreement 
according to the U.S. was that “tariffs on U.S. and Chilean wines are being progressively 
harmonized down to the lowest wine tariff rate and will be eliminated by 2016” (FAS 2009). 
This is in line with the idea that wine trade with Chile is important both in terms of imports and 
exports.  
Most U.S. wine production is concentrated in the state of California with over 90% of 
U.S. wine production coming from California from July 2004 to June 2005 (Pick and Perez 
2006). California wine is characterized by larger wineries whereas wine production in the greater 
U.S. consists of more frequent but smaller-scale producers. As a result, much of the wine that is 
exported is from California or the Pacific Northwest. Politically, one problem that the ERS found 
to be relevant for the domestic wine market is that inter-state commerce for wine is fierce with 
states preferring to create domestic barriers of entry to out-of-state wine  (Pick and Perez 2006). 
Nevertheless, WineAmerica (The National Association of American Wineries) exists to 
encourage growth and development of the wine industry as a whole and to influence policy for 
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the benefit of American wines (WineAmerica 2011). This policy influence is both domestic and 
international commerce and regulations oriented. However, the political influence of the wine 
sector in the U.S. is not comparable to that of wheat or sugar for example likely because of the 
heterogeneity of the domestic industry and the presence of internal disputes which divide 
producers over economic issues. 
Strategically, the U.S. wine sector wanted to gain access to the Chilean market while at 
the same time maintaining a bit of protection for the domestic wine sector against competitive 
Chilean wine. The U.S.’s opposite position in the market, made them much more value-claiming 
although this was likely balanced somewhat by consumption patterns. The specificity of the 
negotiated outcomes indicates that the negotiations were likely much more motivated by 
economics than politics. Some of the wines have gradual tariff reduction over 12 years whereas 
some are so back-loaded that there is no tariff reduction until the 12th year when it becomes free. 
Moreover, this assessment is in line with the assessment of the political pressure coming from 
wine being fairly weak. Power did not seem to play as large a role in the U.S. negotiations either 
as the Chilean wine association was very experienced in trade negotiations and was able to shift 
negotiations to a more economic rather than political sphere (Chilean Interview).  
 The EU wine sector is similar to the U.S. in that although they are a large producer of 
wine, they are also large consumers of wine (table 4.9). The EU did manage to be a net exporter 
of wines, however with exports as a share of total production around 28.7% compared to imports 
as a share of total production was around 23.6%. The EU is the largest producer of wine in the 
world and EU wine exports account for 70% of global wine exports (European Commission: 
Agriculture and Rural Development 2011). Moreover, EU wine exports go to markets all over 
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the world. This put them on the same side of the market as Chile although this was not the sole 
culprit in explaining the EU’s behavior in the negotiations. 
With regards to wine policy, the EU has struggled with balancing supply and demand. 
Reforms in 1999 sought to fix this problem by “giving producers the chance to bring production 
into line with a market demanding a higher quality and to allow the sector to become competitive 
in the long term…by financing the restructuring of a large part of the present vineyards” 
(European Commission: Agriculture and Rural Development 2011). Essentially, domestic policy 
relates to making EU wines more competitive domestically and internationally by increasing the 
value of their production while reducing the actual acreage in wine by restricting the planting of 
new vineyards. This policy creates an interesting political dynamic as it keeps wine production in 
the hands of established wine producers rather than allowing for greater diversification. This 
reinforces political concentration in the wine sector regardless of the actual region of production. 
Indeed, political concentration is likely the reason that these policies came about in the first 
place. Odell hypothesizes that domestic groups shape a governments negotiating objectives and 
indeed these wine producers had great incentives to get GI recognition for their wines in order to 
increase their value.  
The growth potential for EU wine in Chile was fairly indeterminate, partly due to policy 
issues in the EU and partly due to the small consumer base in Chile. One problem with 
competing with Chilean wine is that Chilean wine sold domestically is much cheaper than wine 
from the EU. Even a low uniform 6% tariff rate for wine imports is not good for high-valued 
wines from the EU. Moreover, the wine consumer base is fairly small and the group of 
consumers who are willing to pay more for EU wine is even smaller. In addition, many Chilean 
wine varieties originally came from Europe and as such compete directly with EU wine. In order 
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to become more competitive in Chile, the EU needed to establish rules for intellectual property 
wherein native wine production in the EU cannot be “imitated” in Chile. The FTA negotiations 
were a good place to address this issue as progress at the multilateral level was minimal and 
making a more intellectual-property oriented agreement with another wine producer would help 
the EU tremendously both in making their wines more competitive with this small market but 
also in showing that progress in this area can be made. This initiative was followed in the FTA 
negotiations with Chile with wine being discussed from the very beginning with a great deal of 
value claiming from the EU seeking to preserve their own GIs to the greatest extent possible. 
Nevertheless, the EU had a greater need to get this kind of agreement and therefore also had to 
use softer tactics like working with the industry in Chile, getting support from Pisco producers 
who would presumably benefit from GI restrictions as well, and generally having to convince 
Chile that an agreement with these restrictions would be worth the improved market access that 
Chile would receive. Nevertheless, the EU still had to remain somewhat inflexible and to use 
their relative power in order to get these restrictions so that they could meet their goal of 
becoming somewhat more competitive in Chile and to set a precedent for multilateral discussions 
regarding GIs. 
Indeed, there seems to be a different dynamic to discussions regarding non-tariff barriers 
compared to discussions over tariffs. Relative power becomes much more of a determinant of 
outcomes because it shapes the agenda. The EU wanted institutions for wine to be discussed and 
so they were; nevertheless, Chile accepted these assuming an overall agreement would outweigh 
the additional institutional costs. Clearly, Chile thought that their wine sector was able to 
compete with and perhaps even benefit from institutional harmonization with the EU. 
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4.3.7 Fish Case Study 
Fish trade can actually be quite sensitive despite that it is not a traditional agricultural 
“commodity”; the reason for this is that much of fish trade benefits developing countries through 
export revenues, employment and food security but this trade often is impeded by SPS 
requirements, high tariff rates and subsidies in developed countries (MRAG: DRID 2008). 
Indeed, this is considered to be the case for Chile as they are a large producer of fish and fish 
products and export these products primarily to the developed world including the U.S., Japan, 
and the EU. In addition to the international insecurity in fish trade, there are a few characteristics 
in the U.S. and the EU with regards to fish trade with Chile which make this sector an important 
one when discussing sensitivities in free trade agreements. In FTA negotiations, fish is always 
discussed separately from agriculture largely because in the WTO fish is also considered 
separate and discussed separately. This was the case in the two FTAs under question although 
outcomes are very similar to other sensitive agricultural products making use of the tariff 
reduction schedules in the U.S. agreement and TRQs in the EU agreement (table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10: Fish Case Study: An Evaluation of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Negotiated outcome U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Pre-FTA tariff protection free, variable variable 6% 6% 
  Degree of liberalization full-gradual full-
restricted 
full-
immediate full-gradual 
  Tariff reduction scheme sch. A, F, B, D 
TQ(4a, 4b, 
5) sch. A 
TQ(3a, 3b, 
4) 
  Phase-out period 0, 4, 10 0, 4, 10 0 0, 10 
Market Conditions U.S. EU Chile   
  Production1 5.3 8.1 4.7   
  Consumption1 7.1 14.7 1.0   
  Net exports1 -1.8 -6.6 3.6   
  Export market N/A N/A Northern hemisphere   
  
Growth potential with 
partner none none little   
Domestic Politics U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Views on trade mixed mixed open mixed 
  Trade negotiation expertise high high high high 
  Regional concentration concentrated concentrated concentrated concentrated 
  Other political objective consumption consumption, 
standards 
export-
oriented 
export-
oriented 
Negotiator Beliefs/Strategies U.S. EU Chile-U.S. Chile-EU 
  Strategic position  value-
claiming 
value-
claiming 
value-
claiming 
value-
claiming 
  Hard tactics yes yes yes yes 
  Soft tactics no no no no 
  
Awareness of own 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
  
Awareness of other 
BATNA yes yes yes yes 
1
  1997-2003 average, millions of MT 
 
The negotiated outcome for fish products in the U.S. agreement was surprisingly almost 
unblemished with protection. Indeed, Chile’s tariff schedule included no restrictions on fish 
imports from the U.S. removing the existing 6% tariff for all fish products upon implementation 
of the agreement (table 4.10). The U.S. agreement only included protection for seven fishery 
products: prepared or preserved salmon in oil (B), sardines (B), tunas and skipjack in oil, in 
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airtight containers (D) and bonito (B). The B schedules are eliminated in 4 equal stages whereas 
the D schedule for tuna is eliminated in 10 equal stages. The base tariffs in the U.S. for the 
sensitive fish products ranged from 6% (bonito and salmon) to 35% (whole tuna fish). A lot of 
fish products were already free before the agreement and therefore remained free under the F 
schedule, where other fish products that had some tariff protection were free upon 
implementation of the agreement by way of schedule A.  
The EU agreement not only included reciprocal TRQs20 for fish for both parties but also 
included longer tariff schedules for other fish not included in the TRQs with the shortest 
becoming free in year 0 (cooked lobster meat) but most becoming free in years 4 and 10. The 
TRQs include hake, salmon and canned fish (tuna, skipjack, sardines, anchovies, etc). While the 
same TRQs apply to both countries, the negotiated outcome is different for Chile than for the EU 
as the quota was binding for Chilean exports of hake and salmon to the EU in 2003 whereas it 
was not binding for the EU. This means that if current trade patterns continue, the EU will 
capture quota rents for Chile whereas EU imports into Chile will be free. Unlike other products 
discussed, the negotiated outcome for Chile in the EU agreement is for all practical purposes 
equal to that of the U.S. agreement since no quotas are binding and the remaining products were 
assigned to the year 0 schedule meaning they would be free upon implementation of the 
agreement.  
According to the State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Report release by FAO in 
2004, Chile was the 6th largest producer of marine and inland capture fish and the 5th fastest 
growing fish producer in the world. While fish and seafood production overall for Chile lag 
behind that of the U.S. and the EU, there is also a lot less domestic consumption (table 4.10). 
                                                 
20
 By reciprocal, I simply mean that both countries maintain the same TRQ quota levels. The 
over-quota tariff levels, however, relate to the bound levels previous to the agreement. 
102 
 
Like in wine, total imports to domestic production was less than 1% on average from 1997 to 
2003. Moreover, exports as a percentage of production was almost 80% indicating that Chile’s 
fish sector is very much for export (FAO 2010). Salmon constituted 50% of total fish exports and 
94% of total aquaculture exports by 2002 (Gobierno de Chile 2010). In 2003, the majority of 
fishery exports went to the U.S. (29.7%) followed by Japan and China (27% and 6.2% 
respectively) in terms of value (Subpesca 2003, 5). One main reason that the U.S. is the number 
one export market for Chile in terms of value is because the U.S. imports mainly high value fresh 
and frozen Atlantic salmon, trout and hake. Although Japan also imports frozen salmon and 
trout, much of the fish imports to China and Japan are fish meal which is actually Chile’s largest 
export in terms of volume although it accounts for a much lower value of exports compared to 
salmon, trout and hake  (Subpesca 2003, 6). With regards to the EU, Germany was the second 
largest importer of frozen hake and the third largest importer of Atlantic salmon and trout from 
Chile and the EU is the third largest trading bloc importer of Chilean fish products behind APEC 
and NAFTA21 (Subpesca 2003, 5). It would seem as though Chile was on the opposite side of the 
market compared to the U.S. and the EU but, like in dairy, it largely depends on the form of the 
export to determine sensitivity. 
Geographically, fish and fish processing employment is mostly concentrated in 4 of 12 
regions in Chile and while it only employed a little over 2% of the population in 2002, the 
percent of population employed in these sectors is much higher in these four regions with two 
regions in the south being the home to around 50% of all fishermen (Gobierno de Chile 2010). In 
terms of organizational capacity, Chile has a sub-secretary for fish which keeps records 
                                                 
21
 APEC refers to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum which has 21 members and 
NAFTA refers to the North American Free Trade Agreement which is a trade union between the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico. 
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regarding fish production and processing in the high seas, coastal fishing zones and inland 
capture in addition to overseeing domestic fishery policies. There are organizations for fish 
commerce/political bargaining in Chile as well: the Institute of Fish Promotion (IFOP), the 
National Fish Society (SNP), the Association for producers of oysters and scallops, and an 
organization for salmon and trout producers.  
According to the Chilean negotiators, the salmon producers were very involved in the 
negotiations and the negotiations over fish were much more difficult for the EU agreement than 
the U.S. In both settings, Chile’s preference was to garner additional market access. They wanted 
to maintain their presence in the U.S. market and to increase their potential in the EU market 
which is a much larger consumer of fish and therefore a potential export opportunity to be 
realized. The outcomes reflect a very economic outcome for all parties. Indeed, Chile is not a big 
importer of fish in general, so giving free access to the U.S. market for fish products is not that 
threatening to the domestic industry. Nevertheless, they maintain TRQs for EU fish products, 
likely due to the maintenance of these on the part of the EU.   
The U.S. does rank above Chile in marine and inland fishery production: it is ranked 
number 3 just behind China and Peru. Nevertheless, fish and seafood production in the U.S. was 
less than 1 million MT more than Chile on average from 1997 to 2003 (table 4.10). However, 
consumption was 7 times that of Chile and imports as a share of total production was about 66% 
compared to less than 1% for Chile. Moreover, the U.S. was the world’s second largest importer 
of fish products in 2002 behind Japan (FAO 2004). The composition of U.S. fish imports is 
mainly shrimp, salmon and tuna. The U.S. did export an average of 30% of fish production from 
1997 to 2003 however, although it is clear that the U.S. fish industry is not as export-oriented as 
Chile although they may be significant exporters of some specific fish products. Indeed, much of 
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U.S. exports were re-exports or exports of imported fish products which had been changed in 
some way such as canned or processed into fish oil (NOAA Fisheries: Office of Science and 
Technology 2003). As such, it would seem that the U.S. fish industry is structured such that it 
imports higher value fish products which are demanded by consumers thereafter exporting those 
same high value fish products which are not consumed in the same or in a different form. The 
implications for the sector are that it relies on imports both to meet domestic demand and in 
order to fuel additional exports for the sector. In terms of fish trade with Chile, the U.S.’s deficit 
was $675 million in 2003. While the U.S. is obviously open for trade in fish, a more favorable 
trade balance would clearly be the desire for the sector. In any event, neither the U.S. nor Chile 
really has the potential to grow much in the partner market because of diminishing fish supplies 
and already very open trade.  
Like the sub-secretary for fish in Chile, the U.S. has a federal agency, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service which deals with the management, conservation and protection of the 
marine resources in the U.S.’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)22. As one would imagine, the 
focus of marine fisheries is in Alaska, the periphery of the U.S., and the Caribbean. About half of 
marine fish is caught in the Alaska region. Although fishing is a large employer in Alaska, it 
only constitutes about 2.2% of the employment in agriculture, forestry and fishing in the U.S. 
when combined with hunting. In spite of its low impact on the U.S. economy both in terms of 
employment and market benefit, in an FTA fish it is discussed separately and is treated more 
sensitively due to the precarious nature of it as a natural resource which faces unique problems 
with depletion and environmental changes. These special issues make it so that the U.S. would 
seek more protection for the fishing industries with which the U.S. specializes but at the same 
                                                 
22
 The EEZ is a 200 nautical mile zone off of the coast of a country of which that country has 
exclusive rights to exploration and management according to the United Nations. 
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time, there is a consumer base and industrial sector who would like cheaper access to a variety of 
fish which is not necessarily produced in the U.S.  
Despite some lingering political issues with regards to fish trade with Chile, the outcomes 
of the U.S./Chile FTA suggest that much of the discussions were based mainly on economics. As 
expected, much of fish trade between Chile and the U.S. was liberalized. The fishery products 
that were not liberalized immediately were processed fish products which also happen to be the 
products which compete directly with the U.S.’s fish export sector. Indeed, the desire for the 
U.S. to have free access to fresh fish products but to exclude prepared fish products makes the 
most economic sense for the U.S. fish sector. Fortunately for Chile, much of their exports to the 
U.S. before the FTA were in fresh or frozen form; nevertheless, this prevents their fish 
processing sector from developing its export potential although much of Chile’s processed fish, 
particularly fish meal, goes to Asia rather than the U.S.  Compared to similar conditions for other 
products, the outcomes for fish were not as extreme—perhaps because they were less political—
which points to a weakness that would be inherent in any theory regarding outcomes which 
concerns to the degree to which each of these proposed conditions affects outcomes. 
While countries in the EU are not in top ten lists for most fishery products, the EU as a 
whole is actually quite a large producer of fish and fishery products with 1.7 times the fish and 
seafood production of Chile and 1.5 times the seafood production of the U.S. Like the U.S., the 
EU is quite a large consumer of fish products consuming over twice that of the U.S. and over 14 
times that of Chile on average from 1997 to 2003 (FAOSTAT 2010). Moreover, the EU has one 
of the world’s highest trading deficits in the industry (FAS 2006). Imports are more than double 
the production of fish products. Imports of marine fish alone were over 4 times more than the EU 
production on average from 1997 to 2003. Moreover, exports of all types of fish were almost 
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equal to production indicating that the EU is quite active in the re-exportation of processed fish 
products similar to the U.S. (FAOSTAT 2010). Indeed, in 2004, 82% of EU fish imports were 
non-processed fish (FAS 2006). Moreover, the EU is not as price competitive with Chile 
particularly in salmon and faces fierce competition from many Asian countries in tuna and 
anchovy production and canning (FAO 2004). These fairy extreme market conditions would 
seem to be indicative of an increased propensity to protect the sector which was not really the 
case when compared to other “sensitive” products.  
There are just a few players in the EU which produce a great deal of fish and fishery 
products (Spain and Denmark for example) whereas other countries produce very little to no fish 
products, particularly those countries outside of the original EU-15. Similarly, consumption 
varies greatly in the EU with Portugal and Spain consuming the most fish each year. This makes 
fish very unique for economic policies and negotiations as protection for the industry would 
benefit a small group of people whereas liberalization would have larger impacts to the EU 
overall with some increased benefits for some concentrated consumers. Indeed, perhaps the fact 
that more people would benefit from liberalization was part of the rationale for full liberalization 
at the end of 10 years. While consumers are typically under-represented in policy settings, the 
economic setting could not be ignored. 
With regards to the more sensitive fish products, a great deal of EU fish and fishery 
products are imported from Norway (almost 20%) making the Chilean FTA somewhat more 
difficult as Chile exports a lot of salmon and trout, two fish also produced heavily in Norway. 
Indeed, Norway held 84% of the EU market share in fresh salmon. The existence of competitive 
imports in high value fish like salmon, makes Chilean high value fish exports import-competing 
which was met with resistance from the salmon fishing sector. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the 
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salmon producers in Chile had more trouble in negotiating with the EU with regards to market 
access for their produce. As for other fish products, the EU resists imports of processed fish 
product using the longer (10 year) schedule for these producer in order to protect their import 
competing fish processing industry  (FAS, USDA 2006). The outcomes for most fish products 
seem fairly well linked to pre-FTA tariff levels. However, those with higher tariff levels before 
the FTA got longer schedules than those products with lower tariff levels indicating a fairly 
economic and institutional approach to tariff liberalization.  
While tariffs were an issue in the EU FTA negotiations, institutional issues also played an 
important role. The first issue was that of the EEZ: fish production in the EU used to be much 
greater but subsidies promoted a great deal of over-fishing reducing the amount of fish available 
to harvest which has created a need in the EU to have access to other fisheries (Gorez 2006). In 
order to deal with the issue of the exclusive economic zone, there is an article under cooperation 
which states:  
“in view of the importance of fisheries policy in the relations between them, the parties 
undertake to develop closer economic and technical collaboration, possibly leading to 
bilateral and/or multilateral agreements on fisheries on the high seas” (Part III, Title 1, 
Article 25). 
 
Indeed, Spain’s resistance to recognize the 200 nautical mile EEZ limit of Chile was a problem 
for Chile who depends a great deal on being able to fish and control the fishing in their high seas. 
Nevertheless, with waters becoming overfished in Europe, Spain has to look for other places to 
fish and the relationship that Spain has with many South American countries including Chile due 
to the colonial past provides an opportunity for continued economic interests. Regardless, an 
agreement was not reached in this FTA and as such, Chile relies on domestic policies23 and 
                                                 
23
 Such as a policy of not allowing ships to port that have been fishing its high seas and not 
allowing fishing licenses to non-Chileans. 
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multilateral agreements24 in order to protect its fishing zones. The EU fishery industry must also 
have quota systems for fishing in order to avoid further depletion of their fish resources. 
Moreover, the EU has tried to make up for job loss in the fishing sector due to reduced quotas by 
encouraging aquaculture production which can help create jobs in the extra 12 new members in 
addition to the original 15 member countries through the reformed Common Fisheries Policy 
which helps provide financial support for these ventures (FAS 2006).  
The next issue regarded SPS issues which can often prohibit imports of fish products into 
the EU. Indeed, the SPS measures annex in the Chile/EU agreement is 54 pages and includes 
various provisions regarding prohibiting fish with certain diseases, conditions, etc. with some 
fish subject to checks 100% of the time at the border. And of course, investment in the fisheries 
sector is an important issue for the EU/Chile agreement as a whole as the largest provider of 
investments to Chile. Annexes were included in the agreement covering the areas of government 
procurement and capital movements which would presumably make it easier for the EU to make 
investments in Chile including the area of fisheries. The EU focus to building institutions is 
somewhat ignored by Odell but it clearly shaped negotiations in many areas, including fish. 
4.4 Comparative Outcomes for Selected Products 
In determining the relative importance of certain independent causal variables, it is 
important to look at relative outcomes in the two agreements for the selected case studies. In 
particular, a possibility, or efficiency, frontier allows for a visual representation of how well each 
side was able to reach their negotiating objectives. Understanding this helps in two ways: it 
defines to a certain extent the degree to which each trading partner was able to gain in a 
negotiation, and it also helps to clearly identify the differences in negotiated outcomes for 
                                                 
24
 Such as the international agreement which created the EEZ, the Third United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. 
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different products based on the relative desires of the trading partners. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict 
the relative outcomes for each of the sensitive products in the U.S. and EU agreements, 
respectively. An important note to this graphic is that the outcomes all relate both to the 
negotiating objectives of each party and to the degree to which each side was able to gain vis-a-
vis all possible outcomes. Of course, since only 6 products were studied, the relative outcomes 
for each good are only compared to 5 other goods. When a good, such as fish in the EU/Chile 
FTA, is on the efficiency frontier, it simply indicates that it was the product with which both 
sides were most able to meet their negotiating objectives in relation to all of the sensitive goods 
studied.  
Figure 4.3: Relative Negotiated Outcomes for Selected Products in the U.S./Chile FTA 
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Figure 4.4: Relative Negotiated Outcomes for Selected Products in the EU/Chile FTA 
 
A general assessment of the two figures suggests that in the U.S. negotiation there was 
more value-creation taking place as most of the products are clustered fairly close to the frontier. 
One of the main reasons that this likely occurred was the absolute commitment to a 
comprehensive agreement with complete liberalization. The practice of not excluding anything 
made negotiations veer towards the side of integrative bargaining rather than defensive claiming. 
In the EU/Chile FTA, the points are much closer to the EU axis because there was a great deal 
that was not “negotiated” but rather involved each side simply trying to claim value where 
possible given the other side’s exclusions. Moreover, Chile was not able to gain a great deal of 
market access for their goods which was a great negotiating objective for many of the sensitive 
products. Additionally, the outcomes are generally more centered in the U.S. graphic, which was 
indicative that Chile got more of what they wanted in the U.S. FTA compared to the EU FTA for 
the sensitive products. 
As for the relative outcomes for the specific products, there were two products in the 
U.S./Chile FTA which shared the efficiency frontier: sugar and poultry. These two goods were 
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both considered to be efficient outcomes because both sides got what they wanted through value 
creation rather than value claiming. For sugar, both wanted it to be excluded, and in fact it was 
excluded, but at the same time, it was discussed and “liberalized” should either become a net 
exporter. Moreover, it was a great outcome for Chile as they were allowed to keep the PBS 
longer for sugar than for wheat. Poultry was also efficient in the U.S. agreement because both 
sides were able to maintain market access to the partner country but with an adjustment period 
for the most sensitive cuts of poultry. Many countries would have excluded all poultry in 
negotiations rather than try to find a common ground and determine exactly why poultry was 
sensitive and to deal with that in particular rather than leaving everything out.  
The other goods in the U.S./Chile FTA did not quite make it to the frontier. Dairy ended 
up being a better outcome for Chile as they were able to gain the market access that they wanted; 
however, the long over-quota tariff reduction schedules for imports into the U.S. made it less 
ideal although Chile knew that their dairy industry needed time to become more competitive. 
U.S. dairy probably could have gained faster access to the Chilean market although outcomes 
were generally favorable to the U.S. too making it close to the frontier. Similar to dairy, a lot of 
market access was gained for both parties in wine, which they both wanted, but the outcome was 
skewed to the U.S. because they were able to keep really long reduction schedules for Chilean 
wine. Chile would have preferred more immediate access for their processed fish products in the 
U.S. agreement but they were able to gain a great deal of market access for their fresh fish 
exports which constituted their main trade flows with the U.S. at that time. The U.S. got 
immediate access to the Chilean market in fish, but their stance was much more import-
competing so more protection would have been better for the U.S. Nevertheless, the U.S. was the 
clear winner on wheat. The U.S. was able to do away with the wheat PBS which was a large part 
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of their negotiation objectives; however, Chile was able to maintain a 12 year schedule for wheat 
making market access for the U.S. more gradual than they probably would have liked. The loss 
of the PBS was the biggest deal for Chile and so losing it was considered a loss for their overall 
strategy; however, they were more willing to part with it more easily than the U.S. believed and 
so the outcome was not entirely on the U.S.’s resistance line.  
For the EU, only one product made it to the frontier and the differences in the outcomes 
were much more spread out. For one thing, fish was the only product studied that actually 
obtained full liberalization by the end of the 10 year implementation period. Moreover, much of 
the fish products entered free from implementation. Chile was able to avoid more difficult 
discussions of the EEZ for the most part and the EU gained access to the Chilean market as well. 
Once again, it is important to point out that it was a better outcome than that which was obtained 
for the other products because it was free, there were no special provisions or strict institutional 
arrangements to abide by and the restrictions which remained in place, really just the TRQs, only 
applied to a small number of tariff lines. 
The products in the EU agreement which were not on the frontier were all excluded in 
some way. Wheat was excluded entirely from the agreement which was what both parties wanted 
but of course is indicative of no value creation. As such, it was placed between the two resistance 
lines far away from the frontier. Other goods had better outcomes simply because they were 
discussed. Sugar for example, was excluded for the most part but there was a little bit of market 
access gain for both parties; Chile got a TRQ to the EU although it was restricted by the heading 
SP which allowed the EU to maintain the specific duty and the EU was able to get a few sugar 
products into Chile completely free at the beginning of the agreement. Wine was certainly not 
ideal for Chile as they accepted an “Agreement on trade in wines and spirits” which would force 
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them to change their own production and labeling practices for wine; nevertheless, wines not 
covered by GIs became free after 4 and 10 years. The EU gained complete access to the Chilean 
market however, helping to explain why the outcome is so skewed toward the EU. Dairy and 
poultry were also skewed heavily towards the EU, mainly because the EU was able to garner 
much greater market access than Chile. For poultry in particular, the EU got full-immediate 
access to the Chilean market while only giving Chile a TRQ. In dairy, the EU was not able to get 
access to Chilean liquid dairy although the TRQ that they got for other dairy products was not 
binding and actually quite large. Chile, on the other hand, did not gain as much access and 
although they did have ad-valorem tariff reduction for liquid dairy, everything was excluded 
from complete liberalization.   
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CHAPTER 5: ODELL’S THEORY TESTED 
 Based on the descriptive case study and selected product case studies presented in chapter 
4, it is important to determine if the theoretical propositions posited by Odell were actually 
relevant both within case and across cases. As such, this chapter will discuss if the difference in 
the U.S. and EU negotiated outcomes can be attributed to the independent variables: market 
conditions, negotiator beliefs and strategies, and domestic politics. Moreover, the relative 
importance of these independent variables in each of the selected case studies will be assessed to 
determine if Odell’s theory was strong enough to explain the negotiated outcomes. Lastly, 
Odell’s theory will be accepted, accepted with reservations, or rejected. 
5.1 Cross Case Comparisons: The U.S. versus the EU 
 There was a marked difference between the negotiated outcomes for Chile, the U.S. and 
the EU both in general terms as well as in specific product outcomes. In general, the EU 
agreement was much more focused on political cooperation whereas the U.S. agreement was 
more focused on economic integration. For example, there was a greater degree of liberalization 
in the U.S./Chile FTA compared to the EU/Chile FTA, and the U.S. agreement featured no 
exclusions. Moreover, institutional changes were much less common in the U.S. agreement. In 
terms of paths to liberalization, the U.S. utilized TRQs and back-loaded tariff reduction 
schedules whereas the EU utilized uniformly phased-out tariff reduction schedules. There were, 
however, many ways that the EU was able to exclude products while still allowing for an 
improvement in market access including TRQs, some of which never become free, only partial 
tariff reduction25, and outright exclusions.  
                                                 
25This included provisions which allowed for the EU to maintain their specific duty or the 
practice of excluding a product because it is protected by GI. 
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5.1.1 The Impact of Market Conditions on Negotiated Outcomes 
 In general, Odell finds market conditions to be very important in economic negotiations 
as they determine the parties who decide to enter into negotiations, the kind of tactics which are 
used, and the degree to which political action may be taken (Odell 2000). While Odell discusses 
various ways that market conditions affect negotiations, the main ideas are that the side of the 
market that you are on in relation to your partner impacts the way you negotiate, people who will 
be impacted economically will attempt to shape governmental priorities in negotiations, and the 
market alternative is important to determine how a party will act in negotiations.  
With regards to the impact of having a complementary or similar position in the market, 
it did help to determine the way that the negotiations went for some, although not all, of the 
products. For example, just because the EU was on opposite sides of the market as Chile in dairy, 
sugar and wheat, did not necessarily mean that more integrative tactics occurred. Often the EU 
acted in an import competing way when market conditions suggested that they were not import-
competing. This suggests an alternative factor in play that will be discussed later: domestic 
policies may create certain market conditions but political bargaining may still refer to the initial 
state or to the need to maintain these market conditions. The U.S.’s position on the same side of 
the market did not necessarily mean that value-claiming behaviors were undertaken either. For 
example, in sugar the U.S. was on the same side of the market but value-creating tactics were 
used. Again, this suggests an alternative factor in play which will be discussed later: the “rules of 
the game” affect negotiations and negotiator strategies.  
It was true for the most part that those affected most by an economic negotiation were the 
most active in attempts to shape the government’s position in a negotiation. This was especially 
the case in the U.S. negotiations over wheat. The wheat producers were very involved and 
wanted the PBS eliminated, and as such it was a large negotiating objective of the U.S. A good 
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example in the EU was wine, wherein producers really wanted to get recognition of their GIs. In 
line with what previous political economy theory suggests, consumers were particularly under-
represented in negotiations, despite that outcomes in these products impacted them. The benefits 
of the agreements to consumers was always a highlight given to promote the FTAs; in terms of 
negotiating sensitive products however, it seemed to have very little to do with outcomes. 
Of course, the market alternative seemed to be important in these negotiations. In general, 
Chile had fewer market alternatives compared to the U.S. and the EU in much of the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, that did not necessarily mean that Chile used softer claiming tactics 
and gained less. As shown by figures 4.3 and 4.4, Chile actually did have some gains in the 
negotiations and although they were mainly achieved through a value-creating strategy, they 
were not necessarily small gains as Chile was able to successfully secure some degree of market 
access into the U.S. and the EU. However, the U.S. and the EU often used their relative market 
alternative to their advantage. Neither the U.S. nor the EU needed an FTA with Chile for 
economic reasons and therefore, they had an advantage in gaining economic concessions. Again, 
Chile still did have some gains though and so clearly this BATNA condition involves much more 
than just market alternatives.  
5.1.2 The Impact of Negotiator Beliefs on Negotiated Outcomes 
Generally, Odell insists that negotiators will use the strategy which they believe to be 
most effective in negotiations and that they adjust their strategy based on their own biases. Odell 
argues that “given incomplete information, the more diplomat A believes B will resist or exploit 
a value-creating strategy, the less likely A will be to choose such tactics, other things equal” 
(Odell 2000, p. 74). For the EU, it is common practice to use a negative list approach in FTA 
discussions where some goods are excluded from the very beginning of the agreement. 
According to Odell’s propositions, the EU would be unlikely to do this if they did not believe 
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that Chile would accept it; however, an interview with the EU Trade Directorate revealed that the 
EU does this as a matter of practice in FTA negotiations, regardless of their negotiating partner. 
The extent to which this is a “strategy” by the EU or an institution is arguable26. Indeed, it forms 
the basis for the “rules of the game” for the negotiations which are largely ignored by Odell but 
are clearly important for the outcome.  
 The U.S. knew going into the negotiations with Chile that they would be willing to 
actually create a completely comprehensive FTA with no exceptions (U.S. Interview). It was also 
sure that this could not be accomplished with mainly value-claiming strategies. The U.S. had to 
be willing to give up concessions in order to meet the objective of no exclusions. As such, this 
confirms to a certain degree Odell’s insights but at the same time, it also points to an alternative 
hypothesis which suggests that the “rules of the game” affect the strategies used in negotiations. 
5.1.3 The Impact of Domestic Politics on Negotiated Outcomes 
 Clearly domestic politics are important in determining objectives in negotiations and 
what a government can and cannot do in these negotiations. Odell insists that governments must 
be credible in that they must actually represent the interests of their constituents and also that 
there is a higher risk of ratification failure if there is more distance between negotiators and 
constituents (Odell 2000). In each of the tables for each of the products, it was important to 
clearly define what the views on trade were for the sectoral interest groups as well as the degree 
to which they were experienced in negotiations in general and their degree of involvement in the 
current negotiations. These domestic political conditions really did define how the negotiators 
bargained and in particular it helped to define rationale for a particular outcome. Often it was the 
case that economic conditions such as surpluses impacted negotiations. In other instances it was 
                                                 
26
 Institutions may very much be integrated into a strategy; however, Odell should include this in 
his assessment of this causal variable and he does not adequately do so. 
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the case that millers held a considerable stake in outcomes and therefore shifted negotiations in a 
certain way to their benefit.  
Regardless of the relevance of domestic politics, in terms of consistency, it is not possible 
to say that a particular condition led to a certain outcome. For example, a closed view on trade 
did not necessarily mean that the product would be completely excluded. Indeed, domestic 
politics are very complex and it is the summation of all of the political conditions which can help 
to account for the outcomes. This helps to identify a limitation to any theory predicting outcomes 
in FTA negotiations: the degree to which these independent variables affect outcomes cannot be 
estimated with any kind of precision as it varies with every single agreement. Indeed, domestic 
politics shape negotiations and thus negotiated outcomes, but how they do that is often a 
complex puzzle wherein one particular side got their way and the other did not.  
5.1.4 Other Factors Affecting Negotiated Outcomes 
 The assessment of Odell’s independent variables in the past three sections reveals that a 
few important components are missing from his theory. The most common variable to impact 
negotiations that is not included in his theory is that of the impact of the institutional approach 
taken in each of the FTAs. The “rules of the game” in particular really do affect negotiator 
behavior and the negotiated outcomes. In the U.S. agreement, the objective to have an agreement 
with no exceptions was a very big determinant of the strategy they used; indeed, the U.S. likely 
used more value-creating strategies than they would have if the negotiations did not have the 
objective of no-exceptions. Similarly, in the EU agreement, the practice of excluding items 
before negotiations even began was a huge determinant of outcome. In these cases, the outcome 
was determined entirely by that “negative list” produced in the very beginning without any 
negotiations taking place. While these factors are important in determining weaknesses in 
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Odell’s theory, they are also very relevant in determining the difference in negotiating with the 
U.S. versus the EU. 
 Another important factor was the influence of existing domestic policies. Existing 
policies can help to explain outcomes which are not in-line with the expectations of certain 
conditions. For example, the EU was often a net exporter of a good but it could have been the 
case that they were net exporters due to existing policies. Moreover, the opening of the market 
could threaten the effectiveness of these policies. As such, it makes much more sense for the EU 
to maintain domestic policies which create surpluses than to implement trade policies which 
threaten the implementation of the domestic policies.  
 Lastly, Odell dismisses relative power as a factor contributing to negotiated outcomes, 
but in these two case studies, it was the case that Chile accepted more than they likely would 
have with a more “equal” trading partner. This phenomenon was particularly apparent in the 
negotiations with the EU where Chile accepted the “negative list” approach and an outcome 
worse than GSP in some cases, just because an agreement with the EU was better than no 
agreement at all. Even in specific products relative power was apparent; Chile gave the EU much 
more access to their market in poultry for example than they were able to gain for their own 
poultry industry. In the U.S. agreement, the U.S. was able to use their relative size to push for the 
removal of the price band system for wheat. If the U.S. were a smaller trading partner, they 
probably would not have been able to push the PBS issue as much as they did and make it a 
“deal breaker” in negotiations. Political science theory has posited that relative size is important 
in negotiations and this case study supports this notion despite Odell’s dismissal of it. 
5.2 Cross Case Comparisons for the Selected Products 
 Next, it is important to assess the degree to which the independent variables were able to 
explain the outcomes in the selected case comparisons. It is important to note that once again, 
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these case studies show that the degree to which each independent variable influences the 
outcome is different from case to case. For one thing, the relative position in the market was 
relatively less important in determining the outcome for wheat compared to sugar in the U.S. 
agreement. Indeed, politics and the negotiating objectives of the U.S. were great determinants of 
the wheat outcome whereas negotiating behavior and market conditions were much more 
relevant for the sugar outcome. In fact, the sugar outcome would have been much different under 
different market conditions as a net exporter clause would not be possible if either country were 
an exporter and they were still trying to “exclude” it. Nevertheless, it is clear that these factors 
did have an influence on the relative market outcomes for the different products. 
 One important observation of each selected case study was the degree of specificity in the 
outcomes. All products, even within product goods such as wheat flour versus raw wheat, were 
treated differently suggesting that market conditions were very important for outcomes. Durum 
wheat was less sensitive for Chile than wheat flour and this decreased sensitivity was reflected in 
the outcomes with the U.S. This was the case for all selected products in both agreements. There 
were no selected products which had a uniform outcome. Even in the EU, when a TRQ was 
given, it was given to specific tariff lines and the other tariff lines within that product category 
were either excluded entirely or were subject to a different schedule. This means that although 
market conditions, negotiator beliefs and domestic politics may impact the negotiations for a 
particular good in general, the specific outcomes are very much tied to market conditions 
regardless of the category of liberalization or protection applied.  
Nevertheless, other factors seemed to play a role in general treatment of a group of 
goods. Indeed, there was a marked difference in how wheat, sugar, dairy, poultry and wine in the 
EU agreement were treated compared to fish. Domestic politics and negotiator strategies very 
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much were involved in outcomes for the former goods. It was certainly their political sensitivity 
that gave all of those products exclusions as there were varying levels of production, 
consumption, net exports and yet they were all excluded in some way whereas fish was 
eventually liberalized.  
 Being defined as import-competing or export-oriented did not necessarily mean outcomes 
would be the same. For one thing, it depended greatly on which category the other party fit into 
as well. The fact that the U.S. and the EU are large consumers of wine did not result in a 
significant amount of market access granted to Chile, likely due to the competitiveness of the 
Chilean wine sector. Moreover, the potential of a sector to become more competitive seemed to 
have some influence as evidenced by the negotiated outcomes for both dairy and poultry. Neither 
industry was particularly well-developed in Chile at the time of the negotiations, however the 
potential for these industries was clear to the EU and the U.S. making outcomes more sensitive 
than was warranted by current market conditions. Additionally, the existence of competitive 
imports in a product area seemed to register a slight influence in outcomes. Were the EU not 
facing domestic competition already from Norway in salmon, outcomes for Chile may have been 
more favorable.  
 Based on interviews, negotiating strategies most certainly differed according to the 
product under discussion, and this certainly had an influence on outcomes. In sugar for example, 
the U.S. was so committed to no exclusions that they worked hard with Chile to come up with an 
outcome that would meet the no exclusions requirement while at the same time protecting a very 
sensitive sector. In the EU, it could be argued that their strategy in much of these specific 
product cases was simply to draw a line which could not be crossed. The relative outcomes are 
very indicative of “hands tied” tactics wherein Chilean negotiators could not have much 
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influence as EU negotiators claimed that they were not able to make better deals. In addition, 
Chile also pursued more aggressive strategies where appropriate, such as refusing to give up the 
wheat PBS until the very last moment, but also used a great deal of value creation where 
possible, particularly in the U.S. agreement. 
5.3 Conclusions on Odell’s Theory 
 It is clear that market conditions, negotiator beliefs/strategies and domestic politics and 
institutions were much more important determinants for specific products than for the 
agreements overall. The specificity of the outcomes combined with the method of treatment for 
these sensitive products were very clearly influenced by these independent variables. 
Nevertheless, the level of influence each of these independent variables had on the outcomes 
varied from good to good. Moreover, there were some factors which were not included in 
Odell’s theory but were clearly important for negotiated outcomes. The “rules of the game” were 
important determinants of negotiator behavior and outcomes as were the existence of domestic 
policies. Moreover, relative power cannot be completely ignored in economic negotiations 
because it clearly influences negotiation strategies and what each party is willing to accept in a 
negotiation. These three factors do not involve constituents directly, but they do impact the 
negotiators stance and behavior towards the negotiations. As such, the findings of this thesis are 
influenced towards acceptance of Odell’s theory but with reservations. 
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CHAPTER 6: LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research presented has essentially served two purposes: to add to the existing ENT 
literature by way of case studies testing Odell’s theory of economic negotiation, and to address 
the less researched but certainly relevant topic of agriculture as a sensitive issue in free trade 
agreements. The comparative analysis allowed for a unique characterization of the key 
differences in the U.S. and the EU in FTA negotiations over agriculture, while the selected 
product case studies reviewed the processes of identifying and understanding sensitivities in 
specific agricultural goods and the resulting treatment of these goods in FTAs. While valuable, 
this research has had various limitations. Moreover, more research needs to be done in this area 
in order to continue to address gaps in the literature so that it can be better understood what leads 
to outcomes in economic negotiations, particularly over “sensitive products”. This chapter 
discusses the limitations, provides some suggestions for further research and briefly concludes 
the research findings.   
6.1 Limitations of the Research 
 As with many studies that deal with potentially politically sensitive topics, this research 
was hindered a great deal by a lack of access to data. It was not possible to get transcripts for the 
negotiations, leaving the researcher to rely on interviews and publications regarding the 
negotiations rather than on original transcripts. As such, although it was possible to ascertain a 
general assessment of how the negotiations proceeded, it was not possible to know exactly how 
the negotiations developed on a timeline basis and the turning points therein particularly for each 
sensitive product. Given access to this kind of data, more in-depth process-tracing could have 
been undertaken. 
Another data problem was that as it has been ten years since the negotiations, it can be 
supposed that interview data, although important and useful, is restricted only to what the 
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negotiators remembered and likely is subject to some biases after ten years of review for the FTA 
outcomes. However, much of this could not be helped because, as a European Commission 
bureaucrat put it, much of the information is still “classified” and although the interview 
participants were all very forthcoming, it is not possible to know what has been left out of the 
conversation. Furthermore, while it is possible to know who negotiated FTAs, it is not always 
possible to reach these negotiators and discuss the FTA negotiations as many have higher 
political appointments which demand their time and attention and others have since retired. And 
while some negotiators were willing to be interviewed and discuss the negotiations, they were 
not necessarily willing to fill out a survey regarding the negotiations because of lack of time, 
lack of interest, or an unwillingness to put their insights “on paper”. Moreover, the lack of access 
to more people with influence in FTAs also led to an inability to properly use triangulation, an 
important component of case study methodology. 
Aside from data availability, there were some inherent limitations in this research that can 
be associated with the research design. First of all, the focus on Odell was both a feature and a 
downfall of the study. It was a feature in that it allowed the research to be much more focused 
but it was limiting in that there are many other potentially acceptable theories that were not 
discussed but could have been valuable for understanding in the case study analyses. The 
negotiation process model and the discussions presented by Milner and Putnam regarding two 
level games were particularly relevant for such a study but as the purpose of the study was to test 
Odell’s theory, it seemed inappropriate to discuss the case studies using these models.  
One last limitation considered is that the research was focused on agriculture. Once 
again, this allowed the research to be more focused and it is certainly a valuable contribution to 
the relatively under-researched area of agriculture in trade negotiations; however, it limited the 
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scope of the research somewhat, particularly as the outcomes for sensitive agricultural products 
were not compared to products which were not sensitive. Moreover, because this research is 
focused on sensitive agriculture, it does not highlight potentially more sensitive topics in FTA 
negotiations. For example, a Chilean negotiator indicated that labor was much more difficult in 
the U.S. agreement than agriculture and yet this thesis does not address this difficult area at all. 
The next section will provide some possible suggestions for future research which can help to 
address gaps in the current research presented and provide a basis for other ideas that could 
expand upon the work offered in this thesis.  
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
 First of all, many similar studies could be conducted that would help to address many 
gaps in this research. If it would be possible to have access to negotiators, it would be an 
excellent contribution to distribute survey’s to these negotiators and build a database full of 
information regarding actions and reactions in negotiations, assessments regarding BATNAs, 
resistance points, negotiation strategies and tactics. Of course, as suggested by the limitations 
above, this might be difficult to achieve but if it were possible, it could provide the basis for a 
whole body of literature regarding negotiations and their associated outcomes.  
 Secondly, it would be useful to do a similar study to this thesis but base that study on a 
comparison of outcomes between the agriculture sections and the industrial sections for example. 
Annex 2 provides a background of why agriculture is contentious in liberalization debates, but 
there is no mention of why industrial products may be sensitive and thus a comparative study 
regarding the negotiations and treatment of two different sectors could prove to be interesting 
and useful. This kind of study could focus on testing a particular theory to determine if it is valid 
across sectors or it could simply help to illuminate how the two sectors differ in their product 
treatment and possible reasons why based on various literature from each sector. 
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 Thirdly, more research certainly needs to be done in order to determine how outcomes 
really differ in FTAs. As shown throughout this thesis, it is often very difficult to classify 
outcomes as often multiple trade policies apply to one product. It would be valuable to have 
quantitative assessments in particular with regards to different negotiated outcomes as it could 
allow for more quantitative research to be done which can help in the identification of 
correlations. Indeed, current research in this area does not really allow for suitable comparative 
analysis. 
6.3 Final Conclusions 
 This thesis has demonstrated that agriculture is indeed sensitive in free trade agreements 
and therefore outcomes for these goods are often unique and specific according to the sector. The 
treatment of goods in this sector ranges from exclusions to immediate tariff liberalization. In 
between, products may feature back-loaded tariff schedules, TRQs, or they may be required to 
make significant institutional adjustments in order to address issues of intellectual property, 
safety concerns, or other technical requirements. No matter the treatment of the sensitive good, 
relative gains often exist for each trading partner even if they are minimal. Chile was able to 
secure favorable outcomes for many of their agricultural goods. The U.S. agreement was much 
more favorable to Chile for the specific products but much of this was due to the use of 
integrative tactics between the U.S. and Chile compared to a more value-claiming approach used 
in the EU agreement.  
While part of the reasoning behind negotiated outcomes can be attributed to Odell’s 
theoretical independent variables, market conditions, negotiator beliefs and strategies, and 
domestic politics, there are a few other variables which cannot be ignored. The negotiation 
process and relative size of the negotiating parties cannot be ignored nor can the pressures that 
exist due to existing policies and institutions in the countries involved. Nevertheless, the 
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specificity of the tariff schedules serves as a solid basis for backing up Odell’s prediction 
regarding market conditions affecting negotiations, but the general treatment of the sensitive 
goods is much more easily described in terms of the impacts of the negotiator behavior and 
domestic political conditions. Overall, Odell’s theory is a competent basis for understanding 
what leads to outcomes in FTAs; the additional theoretical understanding of the impact of the 
institutional considerations in the negotiation process could however add to the 
comprehensiveness of this theory.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: European Union Member States, EU-15, Eurozone 
European Union Member States EU-15 Eurozone 
Austria X X 
Belgium X X 
Bulgaria     
Cyprus   X 
Czech Republic     
Denmark X   
Estonia   X 
Finland X X 
France X X 
Germany X X 
Greece X X 
Hungary     
Ireland X X 
Italy X X 
Latvia     
Lithuania     
Luxembourg X X 
Malta   X 
The Netherlands X X 
Poland     
Portugal X X 
Romania     
Slovakia   X 
Slovenia   X 
Spain X X 
Sweden X   
The United Kingdom X   
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Appendix 2: Tariff Elimination Schedules of the U.S. and Chile in the U.S./Chile FTA 
U.S/Chile Free Trade Agreement 
  Name Expiration Scheme 
  A 0 Immediately free 
  B 4 tariffs removed in 4 equal annual stages 
  C 8 tariffs removed in 8 equal annual stages 
  D 10 tariffs removed in 10 equal annual stages 
  E 12 tariffs removed in 12 equal annual stages 
  F 0 Continue to receive duty-free treatment 
  G 12 years 1-4: no tariff reduction; years 5-8: tariffs reduced by 8.3%/year; years 9-12: tariffs reduced by 16.7%/year;  
  H 10 years 1-2: no tariff reduction; years 3-10: tariffs removed in 8 
equal stages 
U.S. Only 
  J 12 years 1-7: no tariff reduction; years 8-12: tariffs removed in 5 
equal stages 
  K 2 tariffs removed in 2 equal stages 
  L 10 years 1-6: tariffs reduced by 5%/year; years 7-9: tariffs reduced 10%/year; year 10: free 
  M 10 variable 
  N 0 duty free 
Chile Only 
  O 3 years 1-2: no tariff reduction; year 3: free 
  P 3 year 0: tariff reduced by 80%; year 2: tariff reduced by 90%; year 3: free 
  V 12 
years 1-6: no tariff reduction; year 7: tariffs reduced by 3.3%; 
year 8: tariffs reduced by 21.7%; year 9: tariffs reduced by 
40%; year 10: tariffs reduced by 58.3%; year 11: tariffs reduced 
by 76.7%; year 12: Free 
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Appendix 3: Tariff Elimination Schedules of the EU and Chile in the EU/Chile FTA 
EU/Chile Free Trade Agreement 
  Year 0 0 Immediately free 
  Year 7 7 tariffs removed in 7 equal stages 
  Year 10 10 tariffs removed in 10 equal stages 
Chile Only 
  Year 5 5 tariffs removed in 5 equal stages 
EU Only 
  Year 3 3 tariffs removed in 3 equal stages 
  Year 4 4 tariffs removed in 4 equal stages 
  R special tariff concession of 50% of the basic customs duty 
  EP special liberalization concerns ad-valorem duty only, specific duty linked to the entry price is maintained 
  SP special liberalization concerns ad-valorem duty only, specific duty is 
maintained 
  PN special no liberalization as these products are covered by denominations protected in the Community 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Competitive Liberalism and the Opening of the World Market 
 The following two chapters lay the groundwork for studying the two FTAs. Chapter four 
provides an economic and trade background of Chile, the U.S. and the EU at the time of the 
negotiations. Chapter five addresses the background of agriculture in negotiations as well as the 
sensitivities in agriculture for the three entities. These two chapters are essential in understanding 
the situation prior to the negotiations which gives us an idea as to the negotiation context and the 
negotiation process itself. It also gives us an understanding of why each of the entities decided to 
enter into trade negotiations and thus an idea of the alternatives for each of the entities.  
A.1.1 Chile as a Leader in Liberalization 
Chile is a country of many firsts: the first South American country to become a member 
of OECD, the first South American country to have a free trade agreement with the U.S., and the 
first of the Latin American countries to shift from an import substitution strategy to a free market 
and liberalization strategy. These are not the only reasons that Chile is unique; indeed, Chile sees 
themselves as somewhat of a trendsetter with respect to economic prowess and openness which 
may be made considerably easier due to the wide range of climate within Chile awarding the 
country a variety of natural resources and thus the ability to specialize in trading an assorted 
basket of goods rather than specializing in a few and protecting the rest.  
Many have hailed Chile as a “miracle” because of the great success it was merited after 
following the advice of the “Chicago Boys” to open up the economy by privatization of many 
government owned firms, the implementation of liberal trade policies, and the removal of capital 
controls. Indeed over the last few decades since the end of the Pinochet era and the beginning of 
democracy in the late 80’s and early 90’s, Chile has seen phenomenal growth of over 5% on 
average per year. Chile has even come out of the global financial crisis mostly unscathed due to 
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stringent fiscal policies requiring savings of income from the government owned copper 
company, CODELCO, in times when the copper prices are high in order to stimulate the 
economy when necessary as was the case when the financial crisis began (OECD 2010). This 
section will highlight the impacts of the economic reform process within Chile from the 1990’s 
as well as the current trade and macroeconomic regimes. For detailed accounts of the Chilean 
economic reform process or the “Chilean miracle” see Edwards 1993, Kurtz 2001 and Klein 
2007.  
A.1.1.1 Chilean Reform Impacts 
The end of the 1980’s saw the end of the Pinochet regime and the return to democracy for 
Chile. The first president elected in 1989 was Patricio Aylwin who decided to continue the 
neoliberal regime started by Pinochet albeit with a few more social programs. By the 1990’s, 
“exports had become the engine of growth and the Chilean experience with trade reform was 
praised as a big success by the multi-national institutions and observers from different 
ideological persuasions” (Edwards 1993, 1374). This “engine of growth” continued through 
further tariff reductions throughout the 1990’s as well as efforts to reduce inflation. By 1997, 
inflation was only 6.2%. While employment in agriculture continued to grow to its peak 
employment of 901,700 persons in 1992, inequality was rampant as many laborers were women 
who could only get seasonal agricultural employment. Additionally, by 1997 only 27.7% of land 
was owned by peasants (Kurtz 2001). The 1990’s in Chile also saw the beginning of 
environmental regulation in Chile which had become greatly important due to the extensive use 
of natural resources. 
Beginning in the 1990’s but really taking hold in the 2000’s, Chile has continued its 
neoliberal strategy by entering into over 20 trade agreements with over fifty countries. The 
earliest agreements made were partial preferential agreements with its South American neighbors 
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throughout the 90’s. Chile was also a founding member of the WTO and has continually showed 
its commitment to multilateral trade progress. In the early 2000’s, Chile entered into agreements 
with many of the economic powerhouses of the world including the U.S. and the European 
Union in 2003 and 2002, and China in 2005. The WTO report on Chile stated that “just over 92 
per cent of Chile’s total merchandise trade is carried out with preferential partners” (World Trade 
Organization 2009, viii).  
A.1.1.2 Chile’s Economic and Social Stability 
As mentioned, Chile was the first South American country to become a member of the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). According to the OECD 
news report regarding the membership attainment, Chile was being recognized for “nearly two 
decades of democratic reform and sound economic policies”  (OECD 2010). In their agricultural 
policy assessment of Chile, OECD further insists that “the key to Chile’s strong economic 
performance has been sound macroeconomic management, institutional and structural reforms, 
trade openness, and the prudent management of mineral resources” (OECD 2008, 1). Other 
reasons for economic success within Chile include Chilean Central bank autonomy, ideas (in the 
area of trade openness but also general support and autonomy of the people for the government), 
effective and reasonable tax policy, transparency on the part of the government, and willingness 
for the government to reduce poverty through social spending (DeShazo 2005). 
With regards to macroeconomic management, Chile’s macroeconomic stability is based 
upon three main pillars: an inflation targeting monetary policy regime (around 2-4%), a floating 
exchange rate, and stringent fiscal policy that requires a structural surplus. Another component 
of these pillars is the flexibility therein. For example, the low inflation target has remained a goal 
for the Central Bank in Chile; however, when the world economy began to slow in 2008, the 
government was able to lower interest rates in order to boost the economy despite its previously 
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tight monetary policy. The growth rate between 2003 and 2008 was around 4.8% indicating 
continued growth in the region (World Trade Organization 2009). Additionally, the way that 
Chile retains much of its structural surplus is by savings generated during high copper prices and 
profits earned by the state-owned copper company, COLDECO. Also important for Chile is the 
existence of a “solid banking system that is well regulated and supervised” and “increasing 
commercial and financial integration with international markets” (Marshall 2010, 15). Foreign 
direct investment was around 3% of the GDP in 2008 with much of this investment going to 
mining, electricity and communications (World Trade Organization 2009).  
Economic growth is one of the most frequently cited statistics used to describe the 
“Chilean Miracle”. Over the last few decades, the economic growth within Chile has been fairly 
high as the economy has become more open and efficient. Some economists argue that this 
growth has been harmful to Chile because it involves an unequal distribution of benefits. With 
regards to wealth distribution, one paper cited that the 10 richest percent of the Chilean 
population accounts for “nearly half the country’s income” (Tucker 2006, 6). Despite the 
alarming inequality statistics, the human development index27 ranks Chile as 44th out of the 182 
nations and classifies the country under “high human development” which makes it the highest 
ranked with regards to human development for all Latin American countries (Human 
Development Reports 2009). 
The total gross domestic product (GDP) in Chile comes from a diverse set of sectors 
(Table A.1.1). From 2003 to 2008, agriculture and forestry became a larger part of GDP, while 
mining, one of the most important sectors of the Chilean economy, became a smaller part of the 
overall GDP. Services had mixed changes with housing related areas such as construction and 
                                                 
27
 The human development index is a development measure that tests healthy living, education, 
and standard of living. 
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financial services growing, and government related services, such as education and public 
administration, decreasing. Overall, industrial manufacturing takes up the largest share of the 
economy; however it has experienced a small decrease over the time period reviewed. Many 
critics of the Chilean neoliberal strategy criticize the decreasing share of manufacturing as a 
consequence of their neoliberal strategy as the country moves to its area of comparative 
advantage in unfinished or raw goods such as minerals and natural resources including copper, 
wood pulp, frozen fish or fresh fruits. They argue that if Chile does not diversify and create more 
value added goods, then their growth will not be sustainable in the long run (Kurtz 2001). 
Table A.1.1: GDP by Economic Activity for Chile, 2003 versus 2008 
GDP by Sector (base year 2003) 
Economic Activity Millions of 2003 pesos    2003 % of GDP 2008 2 % of GDP 
Agriculture and Forestry    1,842,431          3.60     2,404,127  3.72 
Fish       627,436          1.23        762,779  1.18 
Mining    4,321,571          8.45     4,344,726  6.72 
Industrial Manufacturing    8,398,990         16.42   10,200,496  15.77 
Electricity, Gas and Water Utilities    1,461,211          2.86     1,138,643  1.76 
Construction    3,531,382          6.90     4,829,432  7.47 
Restaurants and Hotels    4,950,883          9.68     6,781,008  10.48 
Transportation    3,540,881          6.92     4,713,877  7.29 
Communications    1,170,554          2.29     1,824,618  2.82 
Financial Services and Businesses    7,650,975         14.96   10,855,501  16.78 
Real Estate    2,977,723          5.82     3,508,858  5.43 
Education and health services    5,911,639         11.56     7,007,883  10.84 
Public Administration    2,214,717          4.33     2,582,358  3.99 
Subtotal   48,600,393         95.00   60,954,305  94.24 
Less Bank Charges    1,740,067          3.40     3,004,893  4.65 
Plus Value Added Tax Collected    3,770,274          7.37     5,435,900  8.40 
Plus Import Duties       525,815          1.03     1,291,704  2.00 
Gross Domestic Product  51,156,415       100.00   64,677,016  100.00 
Source: ODEPA, 2010. Chile 2010, http://www.odepa.gob.cl/ 
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A.1.1.3 Chile’s Trade Regime 
Economists have referred to Chile’s current trade regime as “Regionalism” or “Additive 
Regionalism”. This regime essentially involves entering into many regional or bilateral trade 
agreements in order to capitalize on a very open trade environment and to possibly bring about 
liberalization on a multilateral level. Chile has currently signed 23 preferential trade agreements 
(PTA’s) with 59 countries. It has trading partners on all continents that were agreed upon as 
early as 1991 and as late as 2009  although the 2009 agreement with Turkey has not yet been 
implemented. Furthermore, Chile has 52 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s) which have also 
been mentioned as a reason for Chile’s liberalization strategy. According to a policy review by 
the WTO “Chile considers foreign investment an essential engine of growth and an integral part 
of its open economic policy” (World Trade Organization 2009, viii). 
Because Chile already has such low tariff barriers with an effective tariff at around 1-2%, 
it would benefit most from liberalization at a multilateral level (Schiff 2002). However, since 
negotiations are somewhat cumbersome at the multilateral level, “preferential arrangements have 
been put forward as being a more practical and feasible route to reach broad liberalization” 
(Andriamananjara 2003, 1). The reasons that these bilateral agreements lead to broader 
liberalization is because once many agreements are made it is essentially like a web of 
agreements wherein benefits of trade agreements with one country may extend to another 
country not involved in the agreement; alternatively, if these benefits are not extended to another 
country with which trade is frequent, that country may want to enter into a PTA with the initial 
country in order to avoid the trade diversion effects of the exclusive PTA’s (Andriamananjara 
2003).  
With regards to the effectiveness of this strategy, a World Bank economist and some U.S. 
economists have found that this regime has had mixed results for Chile. According to Maurice 
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Schiff of the World Bank, north-south agreements are more beneficial than are south-south 
agreements but a “welfare-reducing RIA [regional integration policy] can be turned into a 
welfare-improving one by lowering external trade barriers sufficiently” (Schiff 2002, 974). The 
empirical basis for Schiff’s assessment of north-south and south-south trade agreements is a 
study by Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr wherein they determine trade policy options for Chile. 
They determine that market access is vital to the additive regionalism strategy employed by 
Chile. Furthermore they find that the reason that an Agreement with NAFTA would be better for 
Chile than one with MERCOSUR is essentially because NAFTA can allow for better market 
access than can MERCOSUR and additionally “trade diversion costs of MERCOSUR dominate 
the welfare effects for Chile even when improved access to MERCOSUR markets is 
incorporated” (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr 1997). 
The trade strategy in Chile involves a lot of trade promotion both in country as well as in 
the region. Chile wants to be the model for neoliberal success and also wants to continue to be 
that neoliberal success (Wehner 2009). As such, they spend resources to promote trade. With 
regards to agricultural trade promotion, The Chilean Ministry of Agriculture allocates 14 million 
U.S. dollars of its budget to promote its agricultural goods through its trade promotion authority, 
ProChile (Sotomayor 2007). In addition to ProChile, Chile Alimentos is also utilized to promote 
agricultural exports.  
There are many reasons for Chile using this open trade strategy. One study by Benedicte 
Bull suggests that there were four reasons for Chile entering into so many trade agreements: 1) 
there were a lot of regional and bilateral free trade initiatives at the time that they first began 
entering into agreements, especially among their South American neighbors, 2) Chile was 
already fairly open and had little to lose by entering into more agreements, 3) Chile needed to 
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strengthen political ties after the Pinochet dictatorship, and 4) “negotiating agreements with other 
countries was a strategy to overcome opposition from groups likely to gain increasing influence 
when congress resumed its tasks, including that of endorsing trade policy” (Bull 2008, 203-204). 
From another perspective, additive regionalism can also achieve some less obvious 
political goals. According to Leslie Wehner, Chile goes out of its way to be a leader of the 
neoliberal regime and a proponent for free trade not only for economic reasons such as greater 
efficiency, market access, or FDI, but also to meet foreign policy objectives. In particular, she 
lists three foreign policy goals that can be achieved through Chile’s trade regime: to balance the 
power so that Latin America may not be as dependent on global powers, to bring about order and 
rules to global economic relations, and “to shape how the construction of economic integration 
should be in Latin America by promoting its own conception of the market welfare enhancer” 
(Wehner 2009, 7). Beyond the Power, Governance and Ideas promoted by Wehner, other foreign 
policy objectives may exist which include becoming an ally with the U.S. to promote the 
creation of the FTAA. At the same time, it can put Chile at a bit of a disadvantage if they become 
too dependent on the U.S. because of their FTA, then the balance of power might again go in the 
favor of the U.S. and may make it difficult for Chile to disagree on military or social issues. 
Chile’s trade regime agenda also includes extensive involvement at the multilateral level. 
As a member of seven negotiating groups within the WTO, Chile hopes that issues such as 
agricultural subsidies, trade liberalization, developing country market access, and the uses of 
anti-dumping can be discussed and moved forward on a multilateral level. According to the 
previously mentioned studies, Chile stands to gain a lot if liberalization were to occur on a 
multilateral level especially if it were liberalized in the area of agriculture where protectionism 
still persists. Chile stands to gain because the country is already very open so market access for 
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the goods in which they have a comparative advantage is the most important component of their 
trade regime. 
With regards to tariffs, Chile has applied a uniform MFN tariff of 6% since 2003 with the 
main exceptions remaining in agricultural goods by way of simply higher tariffs and a price band 
system (PBS) for sugar, wheat and wheat flour, and, previously, oils. While the uniform low 
tariff puts it at a somewhat weaker bargaining position with regards to trade negotiations, it 
shows Chile’s willingness to be an open economy and has helped it earn the spot of the 10th most 
economically free country in the world (The Heritage Foundation 2010). Furthermore, the 
uniform tariff is beneficial to Chile because “it sets effective protection the same for all sectors at 
the nominal protection rate” (Schiff 2002, 979) combined with the fact that it is simple and 
transparent, benefits can be realized by way of lower business and social costs including a 
decrease in corruption.   
The price band system allows for an adjustable tariff rate wherein if the international 
price falls below a certain level or rises above a certain level, then the tariff applied to the 
product is adjusted accordingly. Within the upper and lower bound, the typical tariff is applied. 
This PBS has been under dispute a few times within the WTO and was ruled unfair in a dispute 
instigated by Argentina. As such, Chile has been ordered to either eliminate their PBS or to keep 
the applied tariff at MFN rates. It has been suggested that these price bands were being 
penetrated in any case by mixing oils and sugars so that food processors in Chile could get 
around the price band system (Chile Interview). As such, the PBSs were on the way out before 
the WTO ruling. Furthermore, in the U.S./Chile FTA, the PBS will be eliminated completely by 
the end of the 12 years and these goods will be completely free at that time at least with the U.S. 
and likely with Chile’s other trading partners.  
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While some tariff barriers still exist, for the most part, they are fairly minimal. The real 
trade distortions in Chile are in Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT). Chile has fairly high sanitary standards within their own country, which 
is considered to be essential for their agro-exporting model according to the study by Sotomayor, 
and the U.S. and other trading partners recognize the institutions Chile has in place to ensure that 
food is safe and sanitary. It is logical then that Chile would expect other countries to meet their 
safety and sanitary standards. However, it can be difficult to determine the difference between 
making food safer and the existence of trade barriers. According to the WTO SPS Information 
Management System database, Chile has implemented 361 new SPS requirements from May 
1996 to August 2010. In 1999, Chile issued a SPS requirement for Avocados originating in 
California for reasons of “plant health” and “regionalization”. Chile also has SPS measures for 
vegetables, melons, papayas, stone fruit, apples, pears, citrus fruit, poultry, trees, carrots, seeds, 
and other fruits, vegetables and meats that are specifically associated with the U.S. These 
requirements can be somewhat cumbersome especially since they often arise during times of 
high imports into Chile and for goods that can spoil. If the U.S. or another trading partner has a 
complaint about the SPS measure it usually cannot be resolved in time to benefit the exporters. 
This area really is one of the few sticking points where Chile continues to show protectionism 
via unfair border requirements. 
A.1.1.4 Trade Flows and Trading Partners in Chile 
Chile has been fairly export oriented for some time largely due to their abundance of 
some resources, notably copper. Indeed, “by 1835, Chile was exporting 12,700 tons of copper a 
year, much of it to the United States” (Trade and Environment Database 1997). Much of the 
copper produced in Chile is sold to China, the U.S., France and South Korea as a primary 
product which is then converted into other copper goods (MBendi Information Services 2011). 
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While copper may have gotten Chile’s “foot in the door” of many trading partners, it is 
somewhat interesting that this would be the transition into the neoliberal regime as most copper 
production is done by the state owned copper company. The share of copper exports to the U.S. 
to total copper exports from Chile has declined over the last few years. In 2006, as much as 19% 
of total copper exports from Chile went to the U.S. whereas in 2009, only a little under 8% of 
copper exports went to the U.S. (United Nations 2009). This suggests that Chile is diversifying 
its trade with the U.S. which is something many trade economists feared Chile would be unable 
to do.  Chile’s world copper trade exports have been declining since 2007 although it is still not 
certain if that is simply because of the downturn of the economy or whether they will go back up 
to higher levels of copper exports again in the future.  
Aside from copper, Chile also exports a lot of agricultural natural resource goods such as 
wood products, grapes, and fish. In a list of the top 15 agricultural exports (which excludes fish), 
the top exports were fresh grapes (ranked 1st of the top 15 agricultural exports), wood products 
(in 7 different end products in the top 15 with 30.3% of trade of the top 15 agricultural exports), 
wine or beer (ranked 4th and 5th respectively), berries and avocados (6th and 11th), and pork and 
poultry products (7th and 14th) (ODEPA 2010). Chile remains self-sufficient in agricultural trade 
overall, mainly as a result of its comparative strength in fruits and forestry (Figure A.1.1).  
150 
 
Figure A.1.1: Agricultural Trade in Chile, 1998-2009 
 
Source: ODEPA, 2010, http://www.odepa.gob.cl/ 
With regards to trading partners, Chile has 23 significant trading partners with which they 
have agreements according to the ProChile website. Chile gives MFN to everyone, including 
non-WTO members; however market access is important to Chile hence the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements. In terms of value of total trade, the EU trades more overall with 
Chile although the exports to the EU have doubled, and in some cases tripled, the imports from 
the EU in 2004 through 2008 (Figure A.1.2). The U.S. is the second largest trading partner in 
terms of value of trade whereas China comes in a fairly close third. The other top trading 
partners for Chile are MERCOSR countries and other Asian countries such as Japan and Korea 
who are the 5th and 6th largest trading partners in terms of value respectively. Asian markets seem 
to be growing in general including trade with India. Overall trade with Chile’s trading partners 
did slump in 2009 (Figure A.1.3). The lowest amount of trade is with Central American countries 
with the bottom 5 trading partners in terms of value coming from that area including Panama, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Cuba, and Honduras (World Trade Organization 2009).  
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Figure A.1.2: Total Chilean Trade with the EU, 2004-2008 
 
Source: ProChile. 2010. http://www.prochile.cl/servicios/estadisticas/comercio_exterior.php 
Figure A.1.3: Chilean Trade with Trading Partners, 2004-2009 
 
Source: ProChile. 2010. http://www.prochile.cl/servicios/estadisticas/comercio_exterior.php 
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Liberalization seems to have had a small impact on trading partners. The case where the 
difference between pre-trade agreement trading levels and post-trade agreement trading levels is 
the most dramatic is China (Figure A.1.3). After their trade agreement was implemented at the 
end of 2006, trade increased drastically taking them from fourth in terms of total trade value to 
second in just four years. After the signing of the U.S. and EU agreements, trade increased for 
some time; however the slumping economy has seemed to put a halt to the upward trend, at least 
temporarily, in terms of values of trade.  
In terms of trade balance, the evidence does show that Chile tends to have a higher trade 
balance with northern partners over southern partners. Chile has generally had a positive trade 
balance with the U.S., the EU, Cuba, Venezuela, India, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, China, Korea, Japan, Mexico, and Panama. Chile has had a negative trade balance 
with MERCOSUR partners in general which include Argentina, Ecuador, Columbia, and Peru. 
There have been mixed results for Pacific trade partners and Australia as well as a mostly 
negative trade balance with EFTA countries over the last 5 or 6 years.  
There are a few explanations of why the trade balance is generally not in Chile’s favor in 
the south compared to the north. One such reason is that northern entities are not competitors of 
Chile in Chile’s area of comparative advantage mainly because Chilean agriculture is counter-
seasonal to northern economies. In the south, however, they compete more with their neighbors 
and because the Chilean economy has shifted to more efficient areas through the process of 
liberalization, Argentina and Peru are able to provide more of the agricultural goods in which 
Chile is not self-sufficient such as grains and oils. Furthermore, these neighbors can be more 
competitive than the U.S. and European trading partners because of lower transportation costs 
and so Chile imports a lot of the import competing goods from the south. Chile’s imports of 
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grains and other goods in which they are not self-sufficient has led to a negative trade balance 
with the south that they do not experience with their northern trading partners (Table A.1.2). 
Furthermore, the distance in general provides somewhat of a trade barrier between Chile and 
northern economies in that it would not be profitable for northern economies to flood Chilean 
markets with goods and the same applies to Chile’s exports to the north. 
Table A.1.2: Agricultural Trade Balance Comparison between North and South Trading Partners 
for Chile by Agricultural Sector, 2008-2009 
Exports by Sector, 1,000's of U.S.$ 
  North America Europe South America 
sector  2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Total Agriculture 3,788,158 3,369,615 322,237 219,316 1,748,215 1,395,310 
Farming 2,501,652 2,432,776 301,198 214,607 1,042,929 874,979 
Fishing 238,887 179,266 20,412 4,230 162,406 135,727 
Forestry 1,047,619 757,573 627 480 542,879 384,605 
Imports by Sector, 1,000's of U.S.$ 
  North America Europe South America 
sector  2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Total Agriculture 670,599 373,945 6,555 8,438 2,671,018 2,087,579 
Farming 584,625 315,284 5,182 6,695 2,075,200 1,475,872 
Fishing 48,043 34,871 14 293 540,240 576,370 
Forestry 37,931 23,790 1,360 1,451 55,578 35,337 
Commercial Balance, 1,000's of U.S.$ 
  North America Europe South America 
sector  2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Total Agriculture 3,117,558 2,995,670 315,682 210,878 -922,803 -692,269 
Farming 1,917,027 2,117,492 296,016 207,912 -1,032,271 -600,893 
Fishing 190,844 144,395 20,398 3,937 -377,834 -440,643 
Forestry 1,009,688 733,783 -733 -971 487,301 349,268 
Source: ODEPA. 2010. http://www.odepa.gob.cl/ 
 
A.1.1.5 Chilean Environment Going into the FTAs with the U.S. and the EU 
As the negotiating time was the same for the U.S. and the EU FTAs, the Chilean 
domestic environment was the same for both agreements. In general, there was public support for 
continuing the liberalization strategy. One interviewee stated that the public were over 70% in 
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favor of FTAs with the U.S. and the EU. Indeed, the largest issues in the discussions were over 
agriculture. In a study by Valdez, agriculture is listed as Chile’s main sticking point in trade 
negotiations; he pinpoints issues such as pressures for protection for import-competing goods, 
safeguards, other protectionist measures, and country of origin rules as tough issues in trade 
negotiations with any partner (Valdes 1995). This section will provide a literature review of the 
Chilean situation going into the FTAs both in terms of the benefits associated with negotiating 
with the U.S. and the EU and also in terms of the sensitivities that Chile deals with in trade 
negotiations.  
Much literature exists regarding the comparative advantages/disadvantages of Chile 
going into a FTA negotiation with the U.S. versus MERCOSUR. Indeed, much of the 
comparative studies regarding the U.S. and the EU were done after both agreements had been 
negotiated and signed. Nevertheless, some of the studies draw general conclusions which can 
relate to both the U.S. and the EU. For example, Schiff determines that a north-south agreement 
is better economically than a south-south agreement although the article holds that “the smaller 
and poorer member country is likely to lose at the expense of the larger and more developed 
one” (Schiff 2002, 973-974). Nevertheless, Schiff argued that there were ways to make 
agreements between Chile and larger entities more beneficial for Chile. Indeed, the success of 
FTAs with the U.S. and the EU were said to rely on the ability of Chile to secure market access 
in U.S., EU, and EFTA markets and the ability of Chile to keep the costs of country of origin 
labeling (COOL) and intellectual property rights down. This article agrees with other 
assessments which state that a Chilean agreement with MERCOSUR or Andean Pact countries 
would not be as beneficial for Chile. Indeed, Valdes determines that a NAFTA agreement would 
be better than one with MERCOSUR because “its macroeconomics are more stable…and the 
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adjustment costs would be smaller” (Valdes 1995, 1296). He further states that an association 
agreement with MERCOSUR might be better for Chile than a full agreement so that Chile would 
not be subject to the tariff rules of MERCOSUR. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr also find that 
NAFTA would be a better option for Chile because it provides sufficient market access whereas 
the trade diversion costs of MERCOSUR are too high for it to be highly beneficial to Chile. 
The Schiff article discusses different issues with regards to joining these agreements 
including issues of credibility, political issues such as security, and current protection issues. 
With regards to agriculture, Schiff discusses how the products in which Chile has a comparative 
advantage are highly protected in many markets so in order to reduce these protections, Chile 
must also be willing to make sacrifices with regards to its import competing goods such as 
grains, oils, and sugar. They further recommend in negotiating the agreements that Chile be 
willing to drop the price band protection in favor of no exclusions in the agreements. The article 
concludes by reinforcing the thoughts of the other studies that the key is market access 
improvement and that Chile would benefit as well by lowering their tariff even more.  
Chile did take the advice of many of the economists with regards to its approach to the 
free trade agreements. In the 1990’s, Chile began preliminary talks with NAFTA but was held up 
by the U.S. not having Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) which would have allowed easier 
passage of the bill and the bill, if passed, would be in its final form rather than face amendments 
by the houses of Congress. So rather than try to work out an agreement with the region as a 
whole, Chile decided to get an agreement by “going through the back door”. The first trade 
agreement was with Canada in 1996. Mexico was the next step through the backdoor and that 
agreement was signed in 1998. With TPA in the realm of possibility, the U.S. wanted to get 
serious about talks regarding a trade agreement not just with Chile but also with their neighbors, 
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Peru and Columbia. Peru and Columbia broke the joint negotiations after only a few rounds and 
the U.S. continued through a total of 14 more rounds of negotiations with Chile before an 
agreement was reached in 2003.  
Chile was not only negotiating with the U.S. and the EU in the early 2000’s. Indeed, an 
interviewee indicated that the proposals given to the U.S. were not likely unique but rather much 
like the ones given to the EU and Korea with whom they were currently negotiating. 
Additionally, Chile was ready with a policy network to bring about what they wanted in the 
agreements. The Chilean negotiators themselves, a government organization called DIRECON, 
asked producer groups to communicate with their counterparts in the U.S. and then bring what 
they could agree upon to the table. This approach was one of the main differences between the 
U.S. and the EU negotiations. It is much harder to connect with producer groups in the EU due to 
the organization and language barriers that come with dealing with 15 different countries. 
Nevertheless, the producer groups in Chile were very involved with their U.S. counterparts. The 
farm organizations in Chile that were most involved included: the National Agriculture Society 
(SNA)28, the Producer and Commerce Federation (Confederacion de la Produccion y el 
Comercio), the National Confederation of Cooperative Farmers (Confederacion Nacional de 
Cooperativas Campesinas), the Export Association (ASOEX), the Federation of Fruit Producers 
(FEDEFRUTA), Association of Poultry Producers (APA), Federation of Meat Producers 
(FEDECARNE), Federation of Milk Producers (FEDELECHE)29, the Association of Industrial 
Dairy Products (ASILAC), and the Federation of Food Process and Agri-Industry of Chile 
                                                 
28
 SNA represents 27 producer groups in Chile. The exceptions are fisheries and forestry but it 
does include wine and most “traditional crops” as well as meat and milk.  
29FEDEFRUTA, APA, FEDECARNE, and FEDELECHE are all underneath SNA. 
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(FEPACH)30. SNA also personally went to some U.S. senators in order to work out mutually 
beneficial agreements.  
In addition to the producer groups working together, side rooms were implemented 
beginning in the 10th round held in Miami in the U.S. negotiations. For the most part, groups 
could come to a reciprocal agreement. In some areas, Chile did not really push for protection, 
like in rice; because the U.S. wanted protection for their rice producers, Chilean rice producers 
got protection as well due to reciprocity. Furthermore, producers from different groups were able 
to be heard because they set up three side rooms: large producers, labor, and small and medium 
enterprises. If an agreement could not be reached between producer groups in the side rooms or 
otherwise, it would be dealt with by the main negotiators. Interestingly, there were no side rooms 
in the EU negotiations. Producer groups did not travel with the negotiators from the EU side or 
take part in the actual negotiations with Chile. According to EU representatives, the negotiators 
knew what the producers wanted without them being there as this was determined before 
negotiations.  
With regards to Chile’s tactics during the negotiations, they wanted to foster a feeling of 
trust between all of the negotiators and the producers. Indeed although there was this 
environment, at times it was not extremely beneficial for the Chilean negotiators to let the 
producer groups know how things were going. In these instances, the producer groups from the 
Chilean side would occasionally go first to the U.S. and EU negotiators to ask how things were 
going so that they had something to bargain with when next talking to their own negotiators 
(Chile Interview). The U.S. side had one negotiator whereas the EU side reportedly had four 
different people to talk to regarding agricultural market access in the negotiations. This made the 
                                                 
30
 ASOEX, ASILAC, and FEPACH are all part of SOFOFA which is the Federation of Chilean 
Industry. 
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environment less personal with the EU but the producer groups were still able to somewhat 
achieve their purpose of understanding where the negotiations stood so that they could put 
pressure on their own negotiators.  
One benefit to the Chilean side of the negotiations is that they knew and understood the 
political and economic situation within the U.S. and the EU. According to an interview with 
Chilean negotiators, Chile understood the situation in the U.S. much more so than the U.S. 
understood the situation in Chile whereas the EU was also fairly well aware of the Chilean 
environment. Chilean negotiators knew that the U.S. did not have much room to maneuver based 
on constituencies, whereas the U.S. probably did not know that Chile was already somewhat 
willing to part with the PBS. The EU knew that Chile wanted market access and to maintain 
protection for their sensitive agricultural products but also did not want too many requirements in 
terms of SPS, environment or labor. The EU was okay with letting Chile maintain their 
protection partly due to their belief in progress at the multilateral level rather than bilateral level 
and partly in return for more in depth discussions of non-tariff barrier issues.  
Another strategy employed by Chile was to negotiate agriculture along with market 
access rather than as a separate issue. For a country with such a diverse market package, it is 
better to argue market access as a package rather than to just focus on one small aspect within 
agriculture. The U.S. wanted to negotiate agriculture separately though and so they did but the 
market access negotiator was also the agriculture negotiator. For the EU, it was not as much of a 
problem especially since Chile already had an existing institutional agreement with the EU. Their 
so-called “Community Co-Operation Framework Agreement” dated from 1990 and there was 
already significant trade and investment flows between the two countries making tariffication not 
as big of an issue.  
159 
 
With regards to agricultural negotiations in both agreements, an offensive approach was 
taken with regards to export oriented products whereas a defensive approach was taken for 
import-competing goods. Although Chile was willing to give up the PBS going into the 
negotiations, they were not simply going to give it up if they did not have to yield in this area. 
However, it provided a good way to bargain for something else that Chile wanted like to avoid 
labor or intellectual property restrictions. In Chile, traditional agricultural production (cereals 
and sugar) was becoming less important as the product mix was pushing along Chile’s 
liberalization strategy. Indeed, the country had already re-oriented itself towards export oriented 
agriculture wherein it was much more important to produce a diverse set of high value goods 
rather than to continue to try to produce those goods not within their comparative advantage.  
From the Chilean perspective, a trade agreement with the EU was desired for a lot of the 
same reasons that an agreement with the U.S. was desired. Although in the case of the EU, Chile 
knew that it would be harder to get the EU to open up in the area of agriculture where it would 
really benefit them. Nevertheless, feasibility studies showed that an agreement with the EU 
would be beneficial for Chile (Harrison et al. 2001, Nowak-Lehmann et al. 2005, Valdez 1997, 
etc). Nowak-Lehmann and her colleagues qualify however that the gains from an agreement with 
the EU may be eroded if the EU subsequently makes agreements with Chile’s southern 
competitors.  
Overall, Chile was very receptive to trade agreements with the U.S. and the EU. It sought 
to institutionalize existing trade relations including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
which was at the time granted by both the U.S. and the EU to Chile. This goal mainly related to 
garnering more access to EU and U.S. markets for its agricultural goods. While Chile would 
have liked to avoid more provisions regarding SPS, intellectual property, labor and the 
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environment, these were significant bargaining tools in order to gain the market access that they 
really wanted from the two large economic entities.  
A.1.2 U.S. Under a Regime of Competitive Liberalism 
The opening quote for their WTO trade policy review sums up the U.S.’s view on trade 
quite nicely: 
“For more than 60 years, the United States has pursued a policy of trade liberalization—
seeking open markets and expanded international trade—based on the belief that 
reducing trade barriers creates jobs, advances economic reform and development, and 
reduces poverty worldwide” (World Trade Organization 2001, 5). 
 
Indeed, the U.S. along with the EU established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) which would be the basis for multilateral trade and its corresponding institution, the 
WTO. The report states that the U.S. pursues regional and bilateral trade areas in order to further 
liberalize trade and to complement the efforts made at the multilateral stage. Indeed, the report 
states that “by moving on multiple fronts, we spur more rapid trade liberalization” (World Trade 
Organization 2001, 5) showing very clearly the idea behind the U.S.’s trade regime under Bush 
known as “competitive liberalism”. This regime entails the U.S. entering into many trade 
agreements in order to push along progress at the multilateral level, to facilitate gains in the area 
of market access for agricultural goods, and to advance environmental and labor issues. 
Interestingly, this trade regime would not have been possible without Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA). It has been suggested that negotiating trade agreements with the U.S. is 
fruitless without the existence of TPA. Without TPA, Congress has the ability to make changes 
to the trade bill even after it has been approved by both governments in negotiations. As such, 
the trading partner may not want the agreement after it has been through changes in both houses 
of congress. Furthermore, this reduces credibility on the part of the U.S. negotiators because they 
may say one thing and congress decides another making a deal particularly difficult to make. 
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However, Clinton did not have TPA because some think that it gives the executive branch too 
much power in trade negotiations. Those congress people who have constituents that are 
particularly against FTAs would especially like the ability to make changes to such a bill in order 
to garner greater approval from their constituents. Of course, even with TPA, the executive 
branch must hold consultations with various committees and stakeholder groups but it is 
impossible to make everyone happy all the time. Nevertheless, TPA is a very important 
component of the U.S. trade regime when pursing competitive liberalism (GAO 2007). 
The U.S.’s trade regime also includes various preferential trade liberalization measures 
aimed at assisting less developed countries (LDC) to extend “the benefits of trade liberalization 
to the developing world and foster their further integration into the multilateral trading system” 
(World Trade Organization 2001, 6). These measures include the GSP, the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act, the Andean Trade Preference Act, and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership 
Act (World Trade Organization 2001). These measures often become obsolete of course with the 
created of a PTA as these typically solidify this preference or improve upon it. This does not 
mean that the U.S. has to give a LDC a comparable agreement and as such a LDC may be taking 
a risk when entering into FTA negotiations with the U.S. because the U.S. will demand the LDC 
open their markets in order to keep this preferential treatment (U.S. Interview).   
Of course the U.S. trade regime also includes considerable safety nets for the portion of 
the population who are negatively affected by trade. Indeed, the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
program exists to help firms and industries who are negatively affected by trading by providing 
training, alternative job opportunities and payments of up to $10,000 (Hanrahan, Becker and 
Jurenas 2002, 4). Also important for agricultural producers is the distribution of subsides which 
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help with income support even if they are not directly related to trade (these subsidies will be 
described in more detail in annex 2).  
A.1.2.1 U.S. Economy, Trade Flows and Trading partners 
 Unlike Chile, the U.S. is much less reliant on agriculture as a major component of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and trade. Indeed, in 2003 and 2008 (in order to be comparable to the 
Chilean data), agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting accounts for less than 1% of the GDP 
whereas the combined sectors account for almost 5 percent in Chile in 2003 and 2008 (Tables 
A.1.1 and A.1.3). Indeed, the largest contributors to GDP in the U.S. include manufacturing, real 
estate, business services and government with each contributing over 10% of GDP. Additionally, 
an average of only 1.5% of the U.S. workforce has been employed in agriculture and related 
industries between 2004 and 2009 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).  
  
163 
 
Table A.1.3: GDP by Economic Activity for the U.S., 2003 versus 2008 
GDP by Sector (base year 2005) 
Economic Activity 
Billions of $U.S., % 
2003 
% of 
GDP 2008 
% of 
GDP 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 115 0.92 132 0.95 
Mining 231 1.86 199 1.43 
Utilities 208 1.67 221 1.59 
Construction 619 4.97 552 3.97 
Manufacturing 1,405 11.28 1,647 11.86 
Wholesale trade 681 5.47 762 5.49 
Retail trade 819 6.57 823 5.92 
Transportation and warehousing 318 2.55 388 2.79 
Information 486 3.90 643 4.63 
Finance and insurance 948 7.61 1,117 8.04 
Real estate and rental and leasing 1,482 11.90 1,704 12.27 
Professional and business services 1,347 10.81 1,575 11.34 
Management of companies and enterprises 226 1.81 222 1.60 
Administrative/support waste management/remediation 
services 
332 2.66 395 2.85 
Educational services, health care, and social assistance 909 7.30 1,038 7.47 
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food 
services 
454 3.64 497 3.58 
Other services, except government 315 2.53 325 2.34 
Government 1,565 12.56 1,647 11.86 
Total Gross Domestic Product 12,459 100 13,885 100 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2010. Survey of Current Business. May 2010. 
Internet site: http://www.bea.gov/Industry/Index.htm 
 
In terms of trade for all goods and services, the U.S. has had a trade deficit since 2000 
and that deficit has been between $600 and $760 billion from 2004 through 2009. This deficit is 
due to the U.S. being a net importer of goods. Service exports from the same time period were 
from $50 to $136 billion (US Census Bureau 2010). The U.S. has however remained a net 
exporter of agricultural goods and exports of agricultural goods accounted for an average of 
8.5% of all exports from 1998 through 2009. Like Chile, there was a drop-off of agricultural 
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exports from 2008 to 2009 likely due to the worsening economy (Figure A.1.4). However, the 
scale of agricultural exports and imports in the U.S. is much larger than that of Chile.  
Figure A.1.4: Agricultural Trade in the U.S., 1998-2009 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture: Economic Research Service. 2011. "Foreign 
Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS)." Internet site: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/fatus/ and Foreign Agricultural Service. 2011. "Global Agricultural 
Trade System." Internet site: http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats 
 
A.1.2.2 U.S. Environment Going into the U.S./Chile FTA 
At the time of the negotiations, the U.S. and Chile were both facing pressures with 
regards to the FTA outcomes. In the U.S. there was anti-trade sentiment felt (mainly from labor 
and environmental groups unhappy with NAFTA) but at the same time, there was a fear that the 
U.S. was falling behind with regards to involvement in the international economy. Furthermore, 
progress at the multilateral level was difficult to achieve due to differences of opinion between 
the developed and developing countries. As such, Bush was able to get TPA in order to push 
along his trade policy known as “competitive liberalism” Falling behind the rest of the world and 
multilateral trade progress was not the only foreign policy reason to pursue a competitive 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Bi
lli
o
n
s 
o
f U
S 
D
o
lla
rs
Exports Imports
165 
 
liberalism strategy. Indeed, two important foreign policy strategies in pursuing FTAs are to 
strengthen strategic relationships and to promote reform in partner countries (GAO 2007, 3).  
As a developing country in the southern hemisphere, Chile was part of many groups often 
opposed to the U.S. in multilateral trade talks including the Cairns Group whose purpose is to 
push forward agricultural trade reforms. As such, they could prove to be a useful ally at the 
multilateral level. Furthermore, they would provide an important link to the South and to Latin 
America which would be crucial for FTAA talks. The FTAA was important for the Bush 
administration because it was “intended to go beyond NAFTA to encompass all trade among all 
of the region’s countries, and eventually supersede the panoply of current regional FTAs and 
those that are being negotiated” (CRS 2002, 7). 
Another reason for entering into more trade agreements was of course to avoid the trade 
diversion costs being felt as the world shifted to a global policy of additive regionalism. Chile 
was already in trade negotiations with the Korea and the EU and as Canada and Mexico already 
had agreements with Chile, the U.S. wanted to avoid the trade diversion costs associated with 
their northern competitors making agreements with Chile. The more preferential access 
Canadian, European and Korean farmers had to the Chilean market, the fewer opportunities 
American farmers would have to enter in the Chilean market. This was especially worrisome as 
much of U.S. production is not competitive with Chile’s southern neighbors meaning their main 
competition in Chile is their northern competitors.  
The U.S. strategy in trade agreements can be a bit more aggressive than the Chilean 
approach. In fact, the U.S. is said to have given Chile, and rumored also other trading partners, a 
proposal that is even worse than what the country is already getting because it does not usually 
take into account GSP wherein developing countries can have a better trade environment with 
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developed countries simply because of their development status. According to a Chilean 
negotiator, there are typically around 4 proposals from the U.S. Chile was very pleased with the 
final U.S. proposal and some rank the U.S./Chile FTA as the overall best FTA that Chile has. In 
fact, many U.S. congressmen thought Chile may have gotten too good of a deal because they 
stressed that the Chilean FTA would not be a model for other FTA’s during the 
Chilean/Singapore FTA enactment debates on the Congressional Record.  
The U.S. took an interesting strategy when negotiating with Chile as it began the 
negotiations with no exclusions. Everything would be free by the end of the phase out period for 
both countries. For many agricultural goods such as sugar, this approach is usually not within the 
realm of possibility. In fact, the U.S./Chile FTA is the only FTA in existence without exclusions. 
However, the negotiating teams went about this process in a very clever manner. For example, in 
sugar the negotiated outcome was that if either country is a net-exporter of sugar, then sugar 
would come into the trading partner country completely free. As neither the U.S. nor Chile are 
net exporters of sugar, it is de facto excluded while appearing to be already completely free. It is 
interesting that sugar was de-facto excluded as it was identified by a U.S. negotiator as one of the 
most sensitive products in U.S. FTA negotiations with Latin America whereas Chile’s 
“sensitive” products were not excluded. In reality, neither Chile nor the U.S. were too worried 
about no exclusions since neither party was likely to flood the markets of the other; however, 
that does not mean that they went with a completely easy going strategy given their constituency 
constraints.  
A.1.3 The EU as a Multilateralist 
In an interview a representative of the European Union indicated that the EU would much 
rather that liberalization and trade reform be made at the multilateral level rather than the 
bilateral level. Indeed, this assessment was backed up by the trade policy review submitted by 
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the EU. They indicated that “an open and strong multilateral trading system is the best guarantee 
against the threat of unilateralism and constitutes one of the key tools to manage the process of 
globalization” (World Trade Organization 2002, 8). Furthermore, all bilateral and regional 
initiatives by the EU are in place to “contribute to and strengthen the multilateral system” (World 
Trade Organization 2002, 15). Indeed, much of trade policy under the Prodi Commission from 
1999 to 2004 related to progress at the multilateral level (external policy) within the framework 
of Doha and the various multilateral trade rounds maintaining a careful balance against the 
internal EU market and expansion of the European model (European Commission 2004).  
Trade policy in the EU is governed by Article 33 of the EC treaty within the Common 
Commercial Policy. According to the WTO trade policy review submitted by the EC, “the 
commission ensures the uniform representation of EU trade policy views at both bilateral and 
multilateral level, assisted by the consultative Committee…composed of representatives of the 
Member States” (World Trade Organization 2002, 7-8). Of course, all trade policy is 
implemented, adjusted and reviewed by the trade Directorate General (DG). Trade negotiations 
may, however involve other DGs including the Agricultural DG and the Enterprise and Industry 
DG among others (EU Interview).   
Interestingly, trade policy in the EU “should be seen in the context of the overarching 
objective of sustainable development set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, as 
well as Article 6 which requires environmental concerns to be integrated into all EU policies-
including trade policy” (World Trade Organization 2002, 8). This means that the EU must 
complete Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) for all of its trade negotiations. The SIA 
includes information regarding economic, social, and environmental sustainability on the whole 
as well as for particular sectors such as agriculture, mining, or forestry. Indeed, the assessment 
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hopes to “optimize the outcome of the trade measures, with the definition of flanking measures 
aimed at mitigating any negative impact and enhancing any positive repercussions of the trade 
measures” (PLANISTAT-Luxembourg 2002, 17).  
A.1.3.1 The EU Economy, Trade Flows and Trading Partners 
 The EU is a very large participant in the global economy. Indeed, the EU is the largest 
importer of services and contributes almost half of all foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 
the world. Furthermore, many of the western European countries count themselves among the 
top ten importers and exporters outright including Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
(World Trade Organization 2011). At the time of the EU/Chile FTA negotiations, the EU only 
included 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The EU 
has extended to 27 member states since May 1, 2004 (European Commission 2011) to which the 
Chilean agreement now applies. The monetary union, known as the Eurozone, has not been 
adopted by all 27 member states, however, with ten states currently maintaining their own 
monetary system (see Appendix 1 for a breakdown of the EU-15, EU-27 and Eurozone 
members).   
In 2009, the EU ranked first in world trade in both merchandise trade and commercial 
services trade. The share in world total merchandise exports from the EU was just over 16% with 
the majority of exports consisting of manufactured goods (81.3%). The share in world total 
merchandise imports was even higher at 17.41%. These imports were also a majority 
manufactures (60.6%) with fuels and mining products constituting 27.7% and agricultural 
products constituting 8.4%. In the commercial services trade sector, the EU share in world total 
exports was over 26% with the share of world total commercial services imports at 23.55% 
(Wordl Trade Oorganization 2011).    
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Interestingly, the EU has been a net importer from 1999 all through 2010 (figure 5). 
Within the EU, only seven member states have had a consistent trade surplus from 1999 to 2010: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The Czech 
Republic did have a trade deficit from 1999 until 2004, thereafter garnering a surplus. 
Alternately, Italy had a trade surplus up until 2003 and thereafter had a trade deficit which was at 
some points quite large (over 20 billion in 2006 and 2010) (Eurostat 2011).  
Figure A.1.5: EU Trade Balance, 1999-2010 
 
Source: Eurostat. 2010. “Share of EU in the World Trade.” Internet site: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database. 
 
Outside of the Eurozone, much of the imports and exports are to and from the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom is part of the EU but maintains its own 
monetary policy and as such is outside of the Eurozone (Appendix 1). The top 20 main trading 
partners are shown in table A.1.4. The countries highlighted in blue are those with which the EU 
has had a trade surplus with since 1999. The EU has had a very favorable trade balance in 
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been both greatly positive and fairly negative during the time period analyzed. The EU has had a 
significant trade deficit with China however with China’s imports exceeding the EU exports by 
as much as almost 120 billion euros in 2008. Russia, Japan, Libya, and Norway have also 
managed to export more to the EU than they imported from the EU. In terms of absolute value, 
however, the top six exporters to the EU include the UK, the U.S., China (except Hong Kong), 
Russia, Switzerland and Japan (Figure A.1.6). On the other hand, EU exports go predominately 
to the UK and the U.S. Nevertheless, China, Russia, Switzerland and Poland are important 
export markets for the EU (Figure A.1.7).  
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Table A.1.4: Trade Balance of EU Top Trading Partners, Millions of Euros, 1999-2000 
Partner\time 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Extra-Euro area-
16 26017 -29491 38153 90887 63649 65092 6894 -19281 9796 -52675 15445 -8637 
United Kingdom 27520 28581 46898 55512 55539 60499 50417 50021 61551 55711 48597 47611 
United States 20908 30251 41481 58088 56923 60805 65975 74348 63927 49942 36518 52804 
China (except 
Hong Kong) -21604 -32771 -32550 -32708 -40386 -53000 -75355 -91184 
-
112335 
-
119749 -88652 
-
114027 
Russia -10960 -25819 -20330 -17207 -20153 -22492 -35139 -43534 -34682 -44035 -34232 -46776 
Switzerland 12302 13310 13234 11928 12545 12902 12615 15208 15065 16612 13796 19565 
Poland 10069 9612 8953 9356 7441 9486 12971 17865 23737 27178 15162 16626 
Czech Republic 1109 2090 2205 1458 756 2037 1768 1165 345 -2636 -6621 -8230 
Sweden -59 209 1223 1358 1537 2075 2797 2188 3514 1933 3267 4908 
Japan -28793 -33001 -24706 -20113 -21397 -21436 -19369 -22820 -24842 -23767 -15201 -16140 
Turkey 4576 10880 896 3705 5470 8919 9691 9841 9005 10248 8519 17151 
Hungary 1007 1167 -617 22 742 1179 983 1876 1241 2264 -2490 -3217 
Norway -5559 -14886 -14214 -16550 -18598 -17472 -21348 -25803 -20317 -33359 -22080 -22865 
Denmark 2252 1226 2218 2374 1160 432 2657 3423 5541 4450 163 2519 
Brazil 633 -978 228 -1319 -5220 -5741 -6150 -7428 -9731 -8203 -3080 -927 
India 270 -215 -784 406 -194 392 1662 1717 3549 1775 3155 2758 
South Korea -4917 -5188 -3683 -3226 -5644 -7790 -9642 -12324 -10908 -8465 -5660 -4858 
Romania 515 1057 1361 1348 1779 2669 4679 7638 10687 12236 4396 4445 
Algeria -2556 -9845 -8497 -6043 -6859 -5881 -10477 -13650 -8893 -12841 -3170 -5898 
Libya -4717 -10543 -8517 -6379 -7940 -10229 -16089 -21896 -22818 -28757 -14325 -21159 
Saudi Arabia 467 -5269 -1492 -91 -2106 -5319 -8080 -8204 -1849 -4774 3972 3185 
Source: Eurostat. 2011. “Extra-Euro Area (EA16) Trade, by Main Partners, Total Product.” Last Update: June 17, 2011. Internet site: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tet00054 (accessed June 21, 2011).   
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Figure A.1.6: The Top Six Exporters to the EU, Millions of Euros, 1999-2010 
 
Figure A.1.7: The Top Six Importers from the EU, Millions of Euros, 1999-2010 
 
Source for figures 9 and 10: Eurostat. 2011. “Extra-Euro Area Trade by Main Partners, Total 
Product.” Last Update: June 17, 2011. Internet site: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode
=tet0053 (accessed June 21, 2011) 
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A.1.3.2 The EU Environment Going into the Chilean FTA 
Like the United States, the European Union was interested in trying to strengthen 
economic ties and integration with the south in the beginning of the twenty-first millennium. 
Indeed, the European Commissioner at the time of the agreement gave a statement discussing the 
agreement with Chile and how it was a priority for the EU to build stronger relations with Latin 
America. The proposed deadline for an agreement was proposed to be before the second EU-
Latin American summit (SICE, OAS 2002). Furthermore, the EU saw Chile as somewhat of a 
link between the north and the south as Chile was a country in the south that most embraced 
globalization and its benefits (European Commission: Trade 2000). When discussing why the 
EU was interested in Chile and MERCOSUR, it was to strengthen regional integration, help the 
south develop, and to advance multilateral progress. Furthermore, an agreement with Chile was 
especially strategic as it would help the EU by creating allies in Doha and would also be 
important for a potential agreement with MERCOSUR. The idea of an agreement with 
MERCOSUR was very tempting for the EU as it would be an agreement of two customs unions 
and would further strengthen the multilateral trading system (EU Interview).   
When the EU began negotiating a trade agreement with Chile in April of 2000, the EU 
already had significant relations with Chile including a so-called “Community Co-Operation 
Framework Agreement” dating from 1990 and significant trade and investment flows between 
the two entities. The previous agreement was created to have cooperation in economic, 
industrial, environmental, commercial, social and institutional fields and was amended in 1996 to 
include a political dialogue. The EU was the largest trading partner and the second largest 
foreign investor to Chile at the time of the trade negotiations. In 2000, 40% of all FDI in Chile 
was from the EU  (European Commission: External Relations 2002). Spain was only behind the 
U.S. in terms of investments in Chile and in 2001, 44 multinationals from Europe were operating 
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in Chile. Without a doubt, the European Union wanted to remain a large partner with Chile and 
Commissioner Lamy even discussed how the EU wanted to remain Chile’s main service provider 
in a statement announcing the successful end to negotiations (SICE, OAS 2002).   
As stated before, Chile had plenty of experience in negotiating trade agreements when 
going into the discussions but the EU also had plenty of experience as well as they were in the 
process of adding even more members to their own economic association within Europe. 
Furthermore, they had experience working with Chile before. They knew the situation in Chile 
with regards to the sentiment towards liberalization and open markets even in the light of still 
existing agricultural pressures. The EU was also fairly aware of what they could and could not 
get away with in regards to its own “constituents”. Although the U.S. had some constraints due 
to individual state, corporation, and senator concerns, the EU had much more pressure to create 
an agreement that all 15 existing members could approve of while at the same time allowing for 
a little room for negotiation in order to get the tough things that they wanted approved. Indeed, 
negotiators and producer groups in Chile indicated that the discussion with the EU was less of a 
“negotiation” than with the U.S. as Chile knew going into it that the EU had very little room to 
maneuver in order to meet the needs of its members.  
One reason that developing countries try to negotiate trade agreements with other larger 
entities is to make permanent benefits that they currently receive from the GSP. In the case of the 
EU, the GSP includes lower tariff barriers for developing countries without expectation of 
reciprocation (European Commission 2010). It allows other countries to participate in trade and 
develop their markets while retaining higher tariffs on imports in order to encourage 
development of industries. GSP is not permanent, however as they can be removed at any point 
that larger countries such as the U.S. or the EU feel that a country is developed. Furthermore, 
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GSP benefits can become eroded for developing countries if its competitors also receive GSP or 
if preferential agreements are completed between the EU and developing countries that are better 
than GSP (Cooper 2004). For this reason, Chile needed a way to make the benefits they were 
receiving through GSP more permanent. Indeed in 2006, amendments were made to the 
Association Agreement which essentially allowed Chile GSP benefits through the FTA. By 
essentially lowering tariff levels in the EU to the level of GSP. As such, in May of 2007, the EU 
removed GSP from Chile (Europa 2007). 
Despite the EU’s orientation towards the multilateral system, at the time of the EU/Chile 
FTA discussions, there was a lot of progress being made at the bilateral and preferential levels all 
over the world including within the EU. For example, at the time of the negotiations, Chile was 
at the same time negotiating agreements with the U.S., Korea, EFTA31 and some pacific 
partners32; Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela were negotiating to become members of 
MERCOSUR; Canada was in negotiations with Costa Rica; the U.S. was negotiating with other 
less developed countries such as Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Singapore; DR-CAFTA33 and well 
as agreements between many Central American countries and Asia were also being discussed. 
This global initiative to enhance bilateral and preferential relations all over the world 
undoubtedly affected the EU’s decision to enter into bilateral negotiations.  
The other reasons that the EU was likely under pressure to conclude an agreement with 
Chile included a desire for the EU to avoid further trade diversion costs (that could incur due to 
Chile’s agreements with other countries including a large competitor-the U.S.), but also so that 
                                                 
31The European Free Trade Association includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
32
 The P4 is the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement and includes Chile as 
well as three of its Pacific neighbors including New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam. 
33
 CAFTA=Central American Free Trade Agreement and includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
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they could promote their initiative of promoting sustainable development, as well as to 
strengthen ties with the south so that they may continue to have economic and social influence in 
Latin America. The main point of Doha was to integrate the developing countries more solidly 
into the multilateral trading system which in the EUs view would create global welfare and 
development opportunities (World Trade Organization 2002). 
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Annex 2: The Forbidden Fruit in Liberalization 
 The idea of liberalization is to allow for goods to flow freely from one place to another. 
This allows each supplier to become more specialized and thus increases welfare. This idea, 
however, is often not a possibility in reality and that is especially the case for agriculture. The 
following chapter will discuss why agriculture is particularly sensitive followed by a discussion 
of how agriculture is sensitive as evidenced in the special treatment of agriculture in multilateral 
trade. The last three sections of this chapter will discuss agriculture in the context of Chile, the 
U.S. and the EU with particular attention to goods which are “sensitive” for each country, their 
related treatments in trade negotiations, and the structure of agriculture for each country.    
A.2.1 Agricultural Goods Protection 
 Since the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), much of the protection for agricultural 
goods has undergone a process of “tariffication” wherein much of the border protection has been 
converted into tariffs or tariff-rate quotas. With a tariff, importers must pay a percentage of the 
value of the good upon entry into a foreign market. A tariff rate quota has differing tariff 
schedules depending on how much of a particular good has been imported during that year. A 
country may have a smaller, or preferential, tariff or even duty-free access up to a certain level 
after which, all imports are charged a higher tariff rate. These tariffs can be set for a particular 
country, for a particular commodity, or for all trading partners with or without preferential 
treatment for some importers. Often developed countries will allow the initial duty-free quota to 
be filled by less developed countries first in order to allow them preferential access to their 
market (Durpraz and Matthews 2007).  
 There are special ways of handling tariffs that can also help to protect domestic 
agriculture in FTAs. One of the more common methods, particularly for Latin American FTAs is 
a longer tariff reduction phase-out period for the sensitive goods (Kjöllerström 2006). This 
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process is argued to allow the domestic industry time to adjust to free trade and become more 
competitive with the increasing imports. In addition to long phase-out periods, tariff schedules 
can often be “back-loaded” wherein much of the tariff reduction occurs towards the end of the 
tariff schedule. It is not uncommon for an agricultural good to have no tariff reduction until years 
after an agreement has been made. Additionally, some goods may have permanent tariff 
reductions wherein the tariffs are reduced infinitely but never become free. For example, a good 
might have a permanent tariff reduction of 10% meaning that each year the bound tariff is 
reduced by 10%. Similarly, a quota may increase in volume by a certain percentage annually. In 
these cases, protection continues to decrease without actually ever being eliminated.  
Additionally, it is interesting to note that often countries have higher set tariffs, also 
known as bound tariffs, but actually apply much lower tariff rates. This may occur for a variety 
of reasons such as to boost domestic supply of a good in order to lower prices for consumers or 
to make up for a domestic production shortage; regardless of the reason, it raises the question of 
whether a tariff rate comparison or a tariff negotiation should be based on the bound rate or the 
actual applied rate. For the EU, the tariff reduction schedule is usually related to the WTO MFN 
rates whereas for the EU trading partners, it normally refers to the applied tariffs (Rudloff and 
Simons 2004).  Chile has a much lower applied tariff rate for example than its official bound rate 
(Table A.2.1). The EU, on the other hand had a higher applied rate than a bound rate indicating 
that they over-charged tariffs in 2009 and, in this case, the overcharge was for non-agricultural 
goods. The U.S.’s applied tariffs were lower than Chile’s, however the U.S. also charged non ad-
valorem duties that were based on a % of the total tariff lines. The EU also charged this non ad-
valorem duty and had the highest applied tariff for its agricultural goods compared to the U.S. 
and Chile. Indeed, this tariff for agricultural goods was equal to their bound rate and more than 
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doubled Chile’s applied tariff of 6% and almost tripled the U.S.’s applied tariff of 4.7% for 
agricultural goods.  
Table A.2.1: Comparison of the U.S., EU and Chile Tariff Rates, Bound and Applied, 2009 
      United States European Union Chile 
  
Final 
Bound 
Applied 
2009 
Final 
bound 
Applied 
2009 
Final 
bound 
Applied 
2009 
Simple average of import duties     
  All goods 3.5 3.5 5.2 5.3 25.1 6.0 
  
Agricultural goods 
(AOA) 5.2 4.7 13.5 13.5 26.0 6.0 
  Non-agricultural goods 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.0 25.0 6.0 
  
Non ad-valorem duties (% 
total tariff lines) 8.2 8.2 4.8 4.6 0.0 0.0 
MFN duty free Imports   
  in agricultural goods (AOA)   39.9   41.3   0.3 
  in non-agricultural goods   48.3   54.8   0.4 
Source: World Trade Organization. 2011. “Trade Profiles.” Updated March 2011. Internet site: 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E (accessed on June 
20, 2011). 
 
In addition to tariff treatment, there are other ways of protecting agriculture. For one 
thing, many agreements have special safeguards. These generally allow a country to place 
temporary restrictions on imports in special circumstances meriting import restrictions such as a 
surge in imports. The special agricultural safeguards go beyond normal safeguards in that they 
allow a country to instate these safeguard measures automatically when imports or prices rise 
above a certain level. Additionally, the restricting country does not have to prove that injury was 
actually done to the industry in order to use these measures. The only restrictions on special 
safeguards are that they may not be used on non-tariffed products or on goods that are within the 
quota limit and the amount of the restriction cannot exceed MFN tariff rates (Kjollerstrom 2006). 
Interestingly, the U.S.-Chile agricultural safeguard is only triggered by price. The EU-Chile 
agreement on the other hand has “an emergency safeguard clause for (all) agricultural goods, 
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applicable when imports cause serious injury or disturbances in the markets” (Kjollerstrom 2006, 
86).  
Similar to safeguards, within most FTAs, there is also the possibility to use 
countervailing duties or anti-dumping measures. These allow a country to temporarily halt trade 
or to apply an additional duty or tariff to goods if the country feels that the imports are causing 
harm to the industry. Interestingly, although safeguards, countervailing duties and anti-dumping 
duties are allowed according to WTO rules, they are not often applied. One interviewee in Chile 
indicated that while they did not want the U.S. to be able to hold on to safeguards, they were not 
altogether too concerned as the U.S. rarely invoked these measures (Chile Interview). However, 
Milner and Rosendorff insist that these tools which they refer to as “escape clauses” can be 
essential to getting an agreement because it lends flexibility on all sides but in order to be 
optimal, they must create sufficient costs of enforcement otherwise they will be overused leading 
to losses in welfare (Rosendorff and Milner 2001). EU agreements often feature “flexible 
adjustments” which allow for review of the agreement and flexibility in case of changes in 
domestic agricultural policy (Rudloff and Simons 2004).  
Non-tariff barriers can be among the more vicious forms of protection for agriculture. For 
example, in the case of sanitary and phytosanitary concerns, a country may create a new standard 
or requirement which makes it such that a good on its way to a country may be rejected at the 
border due to not meeting these new requirements. A relevant example is when Chile banned all 
U.S. wheat imports in 1996 due to the detection of the Karnal bunt fungus. They refused to 
recognize the USDA phytosanitary certificates effectively halting wheat trade from the U.S. 
(FAS 2004). Indeed, many U.S. groups were worried about SPS as a more significant trade 
barrier with Chile and wanted a specific SPS agreement to take care of these issues.  Another 
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bother to importers of agricultural goods are technical barriers to trade. Indeed, the WTO states 
that “having many different regulations and standards makes life difficult for producers and 
exporters. If regulations are set arbitrarily, they could be used as an excuse for protection” 
(World Trade Organization 2011). These technical barriers can include the degree to which 
something is tested or other methods to ensure that food products are safe and meet the safety or 
health requirements of the importing country. Some countries may also require country of origin 
labeling or other labeling standards which may require more cost or time on the part of the 
exporter. 
A common mode of protection for agriculture is domestic subsidies. The AOA called for 
the eventual complete removal of all export subsidies and the reduction of trade distorting 
subsidies, including those that are considered minimally trade-distorting and classified by the 
“blue box”, by 20% from 1995 to 2001 for developed countries. Green box subsides are 
considered to have little impact on trade and thus can be used freely and include such things as 
research and investments, environmental protection, rural development, food safety and direct 
payments to producers which are not based on price or production (World Trade Organization 
2011). While the U.S. and the EU have included these trade distorting subsidies or policy 
programs, both entities have begun to move towards the green box subsidies although even these 
are said to have an impact on the international trading system as the U.S. and the EU are large 
producers and exporters.  
A.2.2 Rationale for Sensitivities in Agriculture 
 There are various arguments for why agricultural goods are special and thus must be 
treated in a different manner than other non-food goods. Some of these reasons are domestic-
political, such as food security or rural development. Economic rationale is used when imports of 
a good that is protected and has remarkable surpluses will cause domestic prices to decrease 
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leading to the need for more subsidization. In addition to these justifications, there are certain 
conditions which may lead to more protection for this sector that may or may not necessarily be 
present in other sectors such as industry concentration, safety requirements or the level of 
organization on the part of the producers. Moreover, these justifications could be considered as 
even more relevant for developing countries compared to developed countries as issues such as 
food and livelihood security are important to the development process.  
A.2.2.1 Domestic Political Rationale for Agricultural Protection 
 The domestic-political rationale for special treatment of agriculture can vary by country 
and by product. For example, the argument that trade barriers should remain for agricultural 
products in order to ensure that a nation is able to feed its people without the help of imports may 
be valid for such goods as rice and maize; it does not, however, seem relevant to use food 
security as a justification to protect cotton. However, cotton is considered a key crop in many 
developing countries (particularly in Africa) and as such, it is indirectly contributing to food 
security as these cotton farmers must remain globally competitive in order to have income and 
thus meet the nutritional needs of their families. In any event, it is important to know and 
understand the domestic-political rationale for retaining protection for various agricultural goods. 
In her article concerning The Special Status of Agriculture in Latin American Free Trade 
Agreements, Kjöllerström identifies some of the main domestic political reasons for agricultural 
protection in FTAs: 
• Food security: Particular agricultural goods may be a large portion of a people’s diet 
justifying protection. Protection may be used for most “staple crops” under the “better to 
be safe than sorry” principal wherein a country should remain self-sufficient in food 
crops in case the world trading system were to collapse. Furthermore, self-sufficiency is 
necessary in order to have autonomy in security decisions.  
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• Livelihood security: This is particularly important for an agricultural crop which employs 
a great number of people. It is also important for the subsistence farmers who rely on 
farming as a source of nutrition and income for their family. 
• Rural development: The argument here is that agriculture provides some public goods 
which are often not accounted for in the market value of production such as beautiful 
landscapes or the rural way of life.  
In addition to this domestic political rationale for protection, there are also domestic 
political reasons why the agricultural sector should be protected despite its relatively unimportant 
role in many economies and their employment statistics. Hagedorn for example insists that in 
Europe, agricultural policy is more favorable to the farmers because of pressure-groups ability to 
“associate the role of agriculture with social values” and furthermore, that agricultural groups are 
better able to produce “political influence, compared with those groups and voters who might be 
interested in less costly agricultural policies” (Hagedorn 1991, 45). This ability of course is 
associated greatly with the structure of agriculture wherein the costs to enter are high and often 
irreversible, as is often the case with fixed assets and in the presence of entry and exit barriers, 
and there is a high opportunity cost to non-agricultural employment. Furthermore, the atomistic 
structure of agriculture, meaning a high number of producers, makes collusion very difficult. All 
of these things serve “as a reliable political basis for a consensus within agricultural groups to 
employ political coordination mechanisms in an alternative way to pursue their interests” 
(Hagedorn 1991, 46). Indeed, farmers who are able to become organized can work together to 
put collective pressure on the government for protection of the industry although this 
organization may depend greatly on the structure of the producers for a particular crop 
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(Kjöllerström 2006). Indeed, the political pressure that agricultural groups have been able to put 
on their governments has greatly affected the outcomes for agriculture in FTA negotiations.  
A.2.2.2 Economic Rationale for Agricultural Protection 
 Throughout the process of liberalization, markets have become more and more 
integrated. The policies enforced in the U.S. and the EU inherently have an impact on global 
prices and thus the smaller countries with which they trade. This is especially the case in 
agriculture within which the U.S. and the EU share a considerable portion of total trade as large 
importers and exporters. The economic argument holds that “the changes in world market prices 
due to price policy interventions in the considered large country affect different political 
objectives in third countries” (Jechlitschka, Kirschke and Schwarz 2007, 89). Indeed, agricultural 
protection in large countries often has a negative impact on the welfare of producers and foreign 
exchange in smaller third country exporters due to lower prices in the third country. Figure A.2.1 
below shows the negative welfare impacts to a third country exporter. This graph is particularly 
relevant as Chile is a net exporter of many agricultural goods. In order to reduce welfare losses 
Chile is under pressure to instate their own protectionist price policies to protect their producers. 
Additionally, the U.S. or the EU may want to “use its market power on the world market to 
influence the world market price to achieve its own objectives” such as becoming a monopsonist 
on the world market by eliminating third country competition (Jechlitschka, Kirschke and 
Schwarz 2007, 90). Regardless of the intent of the U.S. or the EU, Chile has an incentive to 
protect its agricultural producers if they would like for their producers to remain competitive.  
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Figure A.2.1: Impact of a Protectionist Price Policy on Political Objectives in Third Country 
Exporters 
 
Source: Jechlitschka, Kirschke and Schwarz (2007): Microeconomics using Excel®: Integrating 
Economic Theory, Policy Analysis and Spreadsheet Modeling, p. 90 
 Because of this argument, a country is often said to have gotten a “good deal” when they 
are able to keep protection. Indeed, even a TRQ that has a short reduction time-table can be very 
helpful to protect the third country against lower domestic prices as it gives the third country 
producers time to adjust to lower prices and to become more competitive themselves. Latin 
American FTAs are characterized by backloaded schedules under the auspice of doing just this.  
 Chile of course is not the only country which is concerned about the economic impact of 
tariff reduction and the removal of other protectionist measures. The U.S. and the EU also have 
cause to be wary of particularly competitive imports. Indeed, in the case of high domestic 
protection, the free flow of competitive imports could undermine high prices maintained by the 
income, price and production supports. Furthermore, high domestic protection accompanied by 
internal surpluses means that the domestic governments are already struggling with maintaining 
high prices in the presence of surpluses and thus want to be able to export their goods and not 
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compete against imports (Rudloff and Simons 2004). Indeed, in these cases, the EU and the U.S. 
have the greatest interest in both keeping imports out and securing a bilateral market for the same 
goods.  
A.2.3 Agriculture as a Contentious Issue in Liberalization Debates 
Trade agreements can be particularly difficult to manage especially in agriculture. Davis 
explains how difficult liberalization in agriculture is because “countries stubbornly defend 
domestic programs” and farmers are more motivated to organize thus driving up protection for 
their sector. Furthermore, “nontariff barriers remained common in the agricultural sector long 
after they were eliminated for most industrial goods” (Davis 2004, 153). Even more difficult in 
negotiations for agriculture is that there are big disagreements with regards to how agriculture 
should be treated and where it should be discussed. In the FTAA talks, the divisions with 
MERCOSUR and the U.S. mostly centered on MERCOSUR’s intention to focus on agricultural 
tariff reductions, domestic support, food aid, and SPS whereas the U.S. preferred to use existing 
rules provided by negotiated outcomes in the WTO (IICA/FAO Joint Technical Secretariat 
2001).  
Indeed, since the Uruguay Round and the AOA, not much progress has been made 
regarding agricultural liberalization at the multilateral level despite the attempts in the Doha 
Round. The Cancun ministerial ended in a “framework” which includes the “modalities” on 
agriculture” (Annex A of the “July Package” from Doha). This framework generally called for 
reduction of domestic support with new limits on trade distorting subsidies, the elimination of 
export subsidies, and a new “tiered formula” approach to tariff reduction (Figure A.2.2). 
Nevertheless, this agreement allows for countries to define those goods which are “sensitive” 
which are not necessarily held to the tiered approach but simply a promise of “substantial 
improvement”. Moreover, special and differential treatment is given to developing countries 
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reducing the amount of tariff reduction which must be undertaken by these countries in addition 
to an additional special safeguard mechanism (World Trade Organization 2004).  
Figure A.2.2: The WTO Tiered Approach to Tariff Reduction 
 
Source: Modified from World Trade Organization. 2004. “Visualized: Approaches to Tariff 
Reduction Formulas.” Internet site: 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd26_visualized_e.htm#tiered (Accessed on 
June 23, 2011). 
 
 In addition, there are various groups in the WTO which often have varied beliefs on how 
agriculture should be treated. For example, there are various groups of “small, vulnerable 
economies (SVEs)” who consider agriculture and agricultural market access to be very important 
in liberalization debates. Other groups, such as the G-10 and G-20 call for ambitious reforms in 
agriculture in developed countries with flexibility for developing countries. There are also 
groups which target a specific area in liberalization debates such as the “friends of special 
products”, the West African cotton coalition, or the friends of fish group (World Trade 
Organization 2011). Because of the diversity of priorities, goals, and relative positions in the 
global trading system, negotiating agricultural issues at the multilateral level can be very 
difficult.  
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A.2.4 Agriculture in the Context of Chile 
Just like with any country, there are pressures to protect agriculture. These pressures may 
be for food security and job security like discussed above as agriculture does still contribute a 
greater portion of Chile’s GDP than the U.S. or EU agricultural sectors and employment levels. 
There is also a significant pressure in Chile however to gain access to other markets for their 
goods. Since their external tariff is set at a uniform level of 6%, they do face import competition 
pressures and therefore need to ensure an external market for their own goods in the event of 
fierce competition with imports. They have benefited in the past from GSP and other preferential 
market access provided by developed countries; however their economic progress and entry into 
the OECD signified that it was becoming more and more important for Chile to institutionalize 
this preferential access in order to ensure the sustainability of their export-oriented agriculture 
sector. The following sections will discuss why some goods are more sensitive than others in 
Chile, what this means in terms of the approaches which should be used for different goods and 
the underlying structure of the agricultural industry in general in order to give an idea of the 
environment going into the agricultural market access negotiations with the U.S. and the EU. 
A.2.4.1 Sensitive Agriculture in Chile 
One of the greatest reasons for sensitivities in agriculture is the presence of fiercely 
competitive imports. Chile’s low tariff levels make it a lucrative export destination for neighbors 
despite the less than stellar domestic demand. As such, some goods which are specialties of 
Chile’s neighbors such as beef and oils in Argentina or grains from MERCOSUR neighbors, 
makes domestic production for these goods not as lucrative for producers. This helps to explain 
why some goods such as wheat, sugar and oils in Chile, have been further protected by the price 
band system (PBS). Indeed, Chile has been the subject of disputes with Argentina over this 
system and it was ruled as WTO illegal. This kind of protection was on the way out anyways 
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because of actions on the part of the processing industry in Chile which wanted the cheaper 
imports in order to provide cheaper processed goods.  
Chile’s neighbors provide stiff competition for Chile’s agricultural sector. This does not 
however mean that there were no sensitivities with the U.S. and the EU with regards to 
agricultural goods. Indeed, the counter-seasonal production pattern was not a very useful trade 
barrier for those goods which are not seasonal such as poultry and processed goods. Poultry was 
a fairly large issue with the U.S. because consumption of poultry in the U.S. is opposite to that in 
Chile; Americans like white meat whereas Chileans prefer dark meat. As such, there was fear on 
both ends that their markets would be flooded; i.e. that the Chilean market would be flooded with 
legs whereas the U.S. market would be flooded with breasts. Fish, on the other hand, was a more 
difficult issue to the EU as the EU and Chile competed in some varieties of fish products.  
One of the largest indicators of sensitivities in agricultural production deals with the 
structure of production, imports and exports within each country especially vis a vis the trading 
partner in current negotiations. Chile is not self-sufficient in some agricultural goods including 
meats, grains, oils, dairy products, and sugar. These goods make up the principle agricultural 
imports into Chile from the rest of the world. The number one import into Chile according to 
ODEPA is beef meat with poultry meat also include as the 14th and 15th largest imports. 
Commodities make up the majority of the imports however and include corn, which is ranked as 
the 2nd largest import, animal feed, refined sugar, soybean products, sorghum, rice, wheat and 
meslin. Oils are also imported significantly in animal, vegetable, and sunflower form.  The 
remaining two largest imports are bananas or plantains and malt beer (ODEPA 2010). As 
mentioned before, Chile is a large producer and exporter of fruits, wood products, fish and wine. 
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As such, these are the products that Chile most wants to gain market access for in large 
countries. 
In terms of production, wheat has taken up the most hectares of land since 2001 although 
that number has been generally decreasing since that time with production moving from 436,100 
hectares to 254,281 hectares of land. The production area of oats, maize, barley and potatoes has 
also been very high although the production of those annuals has also been generally decreasing 
with the overall acreage for annual crops declining from 814,406 hectares in 2001 to 596,270 
hectares in 2010. Total fruit production on the other hand has increased since 2002 with more 
hectares being planted in fruits than any other crop in 2009. Table grapes and apples have 
constituted the majority of orchard production. Fruit production constituted a larger percentage 
of the agricultural GDP than did traditional agricultural production. The Chilean food industry 
however constituted a larger percentage of the agroindustry GDP than did actual production from 
2003 to 2008 indicating that this industry has a great deal of importance (ODEPA 2010).  
In terms of domestic economic constraints, Chile does not have farm subsidy programs 
that target producer income although there are programs which help them to become more 
competitive such as insurance programs, market development, subsidies to increase productivity 
and competitiveness through investments in technology, and financing for small producers 
(OECD 2007). Lower priced imports from the U.S. and the EU do not compromise or conflict 
with these domestic programs. Indeed, these domestic programs can help producers adjust to the 
pressures of import competition making their export-oriented model more sustainable. 
A.2.4.2 Structure of Agriculture in Chile 
One of the key characteristics of the agricultural industry in Chile is the existence of 
close policy networks between the producer organizations and the government especially with 
regards to FTA negotiations. According to Benedicte Bull, these policy networks began forming 
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after the economic collapse in the early 1980’s in order to have more influence on the 
government after the return to democracy. Part of the strength of the agricultural sector was the 
presence of two umbrella organizations which essentially helped connect the smaller 
organizations to the government: SNA and SOFOFA (Bull 2008).  
SNA is an agricultural organization which consists of 27 producers groups. In general, 
they are the agricultural group which most represents the interests of the import competing 
producers as they represent APA (the poultry association), the meat producers, the milk 
producers and the grain producers. Despite some sensitive sectors, SNA took a free-trade 
position in the U.S. and EU negotiations seeing the FTAs as an opportunity rather than a threat 
based on the thoughts of the majority of its member groups. Because of SNAs open stance, a 
group of cereal producers actually left SNA at the time of the negotiations although they later re-
joined. They felt that SNAs position was much too open and as such did not represent their 
interests (Bull 2008). One source suggests other vigorous opposition: “the abolition of price 
bands engendered noisy opposition from the conservative Alianza por Chile coalition…and 
though the number of legislators who ultimately voted against ratification was small, prominent 
Alianza leaders launched an energetic campaign denouncing the Concertación for abandoning 
traditional agriculture to the vagaries of the international market” (Leight 2008). 
The other agricultural organization which took a much more export-oriented approach to 
agriculture was the Sociedad de Fometo Fabril34 (SOFOFA) which represented the export 
organizations Chilealimentos and the association of exporters (ASOEX) as well as agricultural 
manufacturing and some producer groups more open to trade such as the fishermen association 
(SONAPESCA). SONAPESCA and the Association for Wineries among other organizations 
                                                 
34Translated as the society of food manufacturers. 
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within SOFOFA were greatly involved in the negotiations on their own accord. Indeed, although 
SOFOFA represented 48 different organizations many of these organizations were active in the 
negotiations aside from SOFOFA’s role as a facilitator in the negotiations (Bull 2008).  
A.2.4.3 Different Approaches for Sensitive Agricultural Goods in Chile 
 In Chile, the food industry and fruit and viticulture sectors were very export-oriented 
whereas the traditional crop production sector was very much import-competing and thus 
sensitive. As such, the food industry and fruit and viticulture sectors were very offensive in terms 
of trade negotiations hoping to secure a market for their goods in the U.S. and the EU. Although 
Chile was a significant player for such a small economy and country, many of the export-
oriented sectors had the potential for more exports as did some of the import-competing sectors. 
Indeed, a few industries including the dairy sector and poultry sector were somewhat defensive 
knowing that they could not immediately compete with U.S. imports, but at the same time, they 
wanted sufficient market access for their goods once their industry became more competitive. 
Other sensitive products such as wheat, oil and sugar required a much more defensive approach 
in order to keep protection after the loss of the PBS in the dispute with Argentina. Although they 
knew that they were likely to lose the PBS, they were reluctant to let it go if they did not have to. 
Indeed, a U.S. negotiator indicated that the possibility of losing the PBS was Chile’s biggest fear 
as they felt they were able to compete in everything else (U.S. Interview). 
Because of the divided nature of agriculture in Chile, side rooms were structured so that 
various groups could be heard. There were side rooms for large producers, labor, and small and 
medium enterprises ensuring that the agriculture producers as well as the agricultural industry 
could be heard in negotiations (Chile Interview). Negotiators generally wanted producer groups 
from each side to work out mutual agreements; however, some goods were particularly difficult 
because Chile had the potential to be a greater exporter of some goods whereas the U.S. wanted 
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to secure access for their more export-oriented goods and thus some tough issues had to be left 
up to the negotiators.    
A.2.5 Agriculture in the Context of the U.S. 
 In the U.S., much of the sensitivities are much more related to the economic argument in 
that subsidies require that supply be somewhat fixed in order to not have to spend even more 
money on subsidies. Other pressures do, however, exist that relate well to the structure of 
existing competition for agricultural imports into the U.S. from trading partners and the 
agriculture industry’s ability to put pressure on the government for support. Furthermore, Chile 
is competitive in many agricultural products, and becoming more competitive in other 
agricultural products due to their diversification strategy, making them more of a “threat” than 
would initially seem justified given their small economy and distance.  
A.2.5.1 Sensitive Agriculture in the U.S. 
 U.S. farm programs are provided by the omnibus farm legislation typically referred to as 
the farm bill. This legislation is revised and implemented every 4 to 6 years. The relevant farm 
bills for the Chile FTA negotiations were the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform Act (FAIR Act) and the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. The 2002 
Farm Bill had a projected budget of $104 billion over the 6 year implementation period (Chite 
2004). The justification given for these farm bills is as such: 
“Its provisions support the production of a reliable, safe, and affordable supply of food 
and fiber; promote stewardship of agricultural land and water resources; facilitate access 
to American farm products at home and abroad; encourage continued economic and 
infrastructure development in rural America; and ensure continued research to maintain 
an efficient and innovative agricultural and foods sector” (ERS 2002, 1). 
 
Indeed, this rationale reflects various domestic political goals: food security, environmental 
protection, and rural development. Further, there is a logic that the U.S. government believes that 
to meet these goals there must be incentives and thus the farm bill provides these incentives. 
  
 
198
The main differences in the 1996 and 2002 farm bill is in the area of commodity 
programs and includes changes made to the farm payment program and the addition of the 
counter cyclical farm income support program. The direct payment program was available for 
wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice in 1996 with the addition of soybeans, other oilseeds 
and peanuts in the 2002 legislation. The direct payment program changed from 7 year 
“production flexibility contracts,” which were based on contract acreage and program yield for 
that commodity, to a yearly completely decoupled enrollment contract wherein contract 
payments were determined by historical acreage and yields and thus considered to be within the 
green box according to the WTOs classification of domestic support that was based on new, 
fixed payment rates for each commodity. The counter cyclical payment program added in 2002 
for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice and oilseeds provided an income support payment to 
farmers if their effective prices fell below a pre-determined target price. This subsidy program is 
considered blue box because it is tied to price but not production (ERS 2002).  
 Other commodity programs provided by the U.S. include the marketing assistance loans 
(MLs) and loan deficiency payments (LDPs). These two programs provide non-recourse loans to 
farmers so that if the prices are lower than the loan, then the farmer is forgiven for not paying the 
full amount of the loan. These are of course tied to an Olympic average price and production of 
wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton; 2002 saw the addition of the peanuts, wool, mohair, 
honey, small chickpeas, lentils and dry peas to the program. Additionally, the farm bills had a 
special upland cotton marketing certificate program which gave incentives to export more cotton 
by basing payment rates on the world prices. Wool and mohair was added to the program 
beginning in 2000 and this addition was retained in the 2002 farm bill (ERS 2002).  
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 The 2002 farm bill also saw the addition of a diary program and changes to the sugar 
program in the commodities section. The dairy program provided milk price support and federal 
milk marketing orders. This program involved the government buying butter, nonfat dry milk 
and cheese from producers. The sugar program included price supports for raw cane sugar and 
refined beet sugar. The 2002 farm bill eliminated one of the loan options for sugar called 
marketing assessments, and more closely tied sugar subsides to the global market by creating 
quota provisions for sugar production, which includes inventory management to balance 
markets, and non-recourse loans tied to global prices and changes in the world export subsidies 
for sugar and other import measures (ERS 2002).  
 The U.S. also has other programs which are not tied to price or income support but that 
still assist the agricultural sector. These programs are classified as green box subsidies as they 
are considered to be minimally or non-trade distorting. These programs include conservation 
programs to set aside land, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Grassland 
Reserve Program (GRP), or the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), or divert land to other 
purposes, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) or the conservation 
security program (CSP). Other programs provide farm credit assistance to farmers, provide 
funding for research programs, or define food safety regulations including animal welfare and 
COOL. A significant portion of the farm bill is the nutrition programs which distribute 
commodities to people in poverty such as the food stamp program or Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC). These programs help to reduce surpluses, and thus increase supply side prices, 
while helping those in poverty by providing a certain value of food for the people for free each 
month (ERS 2002).   
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 In addition to the existence of domestic subsidies, there are other reasons why some 
goods may be more sensitive than others including the fact that the U.S. was already fairly open 
to external trade and thus a major importer of agricultural goods from elsewhere besides Chile. 
Indeed, two of the U.S.’s top trading partners, Mexico and the EU, export avocados and wine 
respectively to the U.S. among other agricultural products presenting top competition for two of 
Chile’s high value export opportunities to the U.S. Moreover, imports of agricultural goods to 
the U.S. have increased greatly since 2002 largely in the area of processed food and beverages 
including wine and beer (FAS, USDA 2007). As a producer of other fruits and vegetables, Chile 
competes with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Peru which are also trading partners 
with the U.S.  
 According to the Foreign Agricultural Service, “compared to the overall economy, U.S. 
agriculture is twice as reliant on overseas markets” (FAS, USDA 2010). Close to or more than 
half of U.S. rice (49%), wheat (50%), almond (64%) and cotton (74%) production are exported 
(FAS, USDA 2010). Furthermore, the majority of U.S. agricultural exports are grains and feeds 
(Figure A.2.3). Within that category, the largest export group is feed grains and products with 
corn. Wheat, wheat products, and rice are the other grains counted in this category. Other 
important U.S. exports include: animals and animal products, vegetables and preparations, and 
oilseeds and products which includes soybeans, soybean meal and vegetable oils and waxes 
(USDA, ERS 2010).  Like overall trade, agricultural trade generally declined from 2008 to 2009 
for the largest exports as a result of slumping world-wide demand (USDA, FAS 2010).  
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Figure A.2.3: Principal U.S. Agricultural Exports, 1998-2009 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2010): Trade, accessed at www.faostat.fao.org 
 Lower value and volume exports such as fruits and preparations (although this value 
experienced quite an increase over the ten year period), nuts and preparations, tobacco, cotton, 
and other agricultural goods are more import-competing (Figure A.2.4). Accordingly, chief U.S. 
imports include fruit juices, wine, malt beverages, coffee, meat, some grains including wheat, 
corn, oats, barley and rice, processed goods, feeds, fruits, nuts, vegetables, oilseeds, oils and 
tobacco (USDA, ERS 2010). In agricultural export markets, the U.S. has seen significant 
changes in importers over the last ten years. In 1998, Indonesia was fourth in terms of 
agricultural imports; by 2009, Indonesia was eighth in terms of agricultural imports. Indeed, the 
fourth largest importer of American agricultural goods changed a lot from 1998 through 2009 
with Chile even holding the position in 2001 (Figure A.2.4). Of these top ten importers, half of 
them have FTAs with the U.S.: Australia, Chile, Mexico, Canada and Columbia. The five 
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without FTAs, have remained significant importers of U.S. agricultural products despite not 
having FTAs (USDA, FAS 2010). That the U.S. had a variety of markets for its goods already 
likely gave them additional bargaining power since the U.S. farmers already had access to 
markets for its exports without an FTA with Chile.  
Figure A.2.4: Major Importers of U.S. Agricultural Goods, Excluding the Top Three Importers, 
1998-2009 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
(FATUS), February 2010 "Global Agricultural Trade System Online (GATS),"July 2010, 
<http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx>. 
 
 Exports are not the only thing of importance to the U.S. Imports can also be quite 
threatening to import-competing sectors and sectors under development. This was especially the 
case in processed agricultural goods which was not only a growing industry in Chile but was an 
industry with considerable potential for export under the direction of SOFOFA. Indeed, although 
agricultural producers are a small amount of total employment in the U.S., the number working 
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in some parts of the value chain are much more impressive with food processing companies 
employing a significant part of the work place in certain geographical areas. Labor was, in fact, 
one of the more sensitive groups to the FTA negotiations and believed that the Chilean 
agreement should not be a model for future FTAs. 
A.2.5.2 Structure of Agriculture in the U.S. 
 Like the Chilean agricultural sector, the U.S. agricultural sector primarily sees the 
U.S./Chile FTA has an opportunity while at the same time recognizing some lingering issues of 
sensitivity. According to an assessment of the political and economic forces that drive FTA’s in 
agriculture by Dale Hathaway, “it is generally asserted that the agricultural sector is supportive 
of trade negotiations, the fact is that at any given time there is a significant opposition to trade 
liberalization in agriculture by a number of commodity groups” (Hathaway 2001, 6). Indeed, he 
insists that some commodity groups actually have a great deal of influence in agricultural policy 
because of their ability to work with other commodity groups to lobby congress. Furthermore, 
because they often appeal to congress people who represent the state where their particular 
commodity is particularly important, congress people tend to do what the commodity groups 
want going as far as to block agreements if their commodity group does not get what they want. 
Furthermore, these groups form the trade policy committees which he argues essentially control 
the resulting policies (Hathaway 2001). The Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC) 
was in favor of the U.S./Chile FTA and gave a universal go-ahead for the FTA. Under APAC, 
there are various Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees (ATAC) which represent various 
commodities. The grains, feed, and oilseeds group was happy with the FTA as it opened up the 
Chilean market and successfully eliminated the PBS.  
Not only do the commodity groups have a significant amount of influence on congress 
people and the resulting trade policy, but other groups have influence and frustrations with trade 
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policy. Labor unions and environmentalists in the early 2000’s were jaded by the NAFTA 
agreement and held the belief that FTAs are bad for domestic workers and for the environment. 
As such, these groups fought against FTAs unless the FTA included provisions regarding labor 
and environment. These issues are important to the democrats in congress but are not favored by 
the republicans. Indeed, the Bush administration would prefer that labor and the environment be 
left out of FTAs but at the same time, the democrats are needed in order to secure TPA 
(Hathaway 2001).  
 Agricultural groups were able to get language in the TPA text which recognized the 
“special status” of agriculture which requires “special consultation procedures that could affect 
U.S. tariff reduction positions taken on some 200 import sensitive agricultural and food 
commodities” (CRS 2002, 4). Some congressmen argued after the fact that there was not enough 
consultation. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published results that many thought 
there was not enough time allowed to give consultations (GAO 2007). Nevertheless, the 
agriculture groups were behind the FTA going into it and hoped to improve the agricultural trade 
deficit which had been accumulating with Chile and to address important issues such as rules of 
origin (ROO), safeguards, transition periods and SPS concerns (CRS 2002).   
A.2.5.3 Different Approaches for Sensitive Agricultural Goods 
 Like Chile, the U.S. had some goods wherein they were on the offense and some where 
they were defensive. It was definitely the case that the import competing goods (such as 
avocados and wines) were somewhat sensitive and as such required a different bargaining 
strategy and an innovative approach for the solution. Moreover, the U.S. was already fairly open 
in terms of agricultural trade and thus had expectations that Chile open up its market especially 
since a few of the goods which the U.S. exports are those goods for which Chile maintains their 
highest protection by way of their PBS. In this case, they took an offensive approach insisting 
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that wheat and oilseeds should be included (and thus eventually completely free) and that the 
price bands should be dropped. Indeed, the elimination of the PBS was an objective of the U.S. 
and although it was never said to be a “deal breaker”, it would have been difficult for the U.S. to 
accept an agreement that did not eliminate the PBS (U.S. Interview). 
A.2.6 Agriculture in the Context of the EU 
 The EU is both a large importer and exporter of agricultural goods, especially from the 
developing world. Their involvement in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations has proven 
that agriculture is a particularly sensitive sector. Because of the sensitivities in this sector, 
Europe has a so-called “Common Agricultural Policy” (CAP) which serves to protect this 
sensitive sector even further. The first sub-section in this section will discuss the CAP and other 
reasons for sensitiveness. A discussion of the approaches taken with sensitive products will be 
followed by a discussion of the structure of agriculture in the EU will provide a framework for 
understanding the EU’s position in FTA negotiations with regards to political, bureaucratic and 
strategic objectives faced by the union.  
A.2.6.1 Sensitive Agriculture in the EU 
 Like the U.S., the EU has rationale for protecting agriculture through the infamous CAP. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments for agricultural policy in the EU is the preservation of a 
“multi-functional” sector. In an explanation of the CAP provided by the Agriculture and Rural 
Development DG, agriculture is described as providing three functions: the food role both in 
Europe and around the world, the sector’s application of safe, clean, and environmentally 
friendly production processes which produce quality products, and the role that the farming 
sector has in rural communities. Furthermore, the purpose of the CAP is: 
“…aimed at supporting farmers’ incomes while also encouraging them to produce high 
quality products demanded by the market and encouraging them to see new development 
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opportunities, such as renewable environmentally friendly energy sources” (European 
Commission: Agriculture and Rural Development 2007, 1). 
 
These objectives are similar to the U.S. objectives but with more focus on the environment and 
the value of rural communities.  
Like the U.S. farm bill, the CAP has remained fairly dynamic over the years with much 
being changed since its inception in Western Europe in the 1950’s. Indeed, the CAP is a 
constantly changing policy with significant changes occurring fairly frequently but particularly 
when the budget is to be reviewed. The relevant CAP budget for the Chilean negotiations was 
from 2000 to 2006. Previous CAPs had focused on competitiveness for European farmers and 
production limits in the 1990s to help reduce surpluses. The “Agenda 2000” reform shifted more 
emphasis towards “a rural development policy encouraging many rural initiatives while also 
helping farmers to re-structure their farms, to diversify and to improve their product marketing” 
(European Commission: Agriculture and Rural Development 2007, 4). This introduced the 
“pillar approach” still in use in the EU today wherein the first pillar provides support for farmer 
competiveness by way of income supports, supply controls, and other programs—although these 
have changed since 200035, which still constituted the majority of CAP expenditures in the 
relevant time period. The second pillar focused on this new rural development emphasis (Europa 
1999). Figure A.2.5 shows the budget over the 2000-2006 time period broken down into the first 
pillar (identified by “of which markets”) and the second pillar (identified by “of which rural 
development”). 
                                                 
35Reforms made in 2003 moved much of the support to decoupled payments. 
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Figure A.2.5: CAP Expenditure from 2000-2006, Billions of Euros in 1999 Prices 
 
Source: European Commission, DG for Agriculture. 1999. “Agenda 2000-A CAP for the 
Future.” Internet site: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/review99/08_09_en.pdf 
 
In terms of the first pillar, the agricultural products covered include: beef and veal, milk 
and milk products, tobacco, olive oil and wine as well as arable crops including cereals, maize, 
and oilseeds, among others. Beef and veal moved from quotas and significant market support to 
storage programs, export subsidies, and direct income payments. For milk and milk products, 
public storage and quotas remained a dominate policy along with intervention prices. In the wine 
sector, regulations on planting vines keep the supply under control and direct the sector to a more 
“demand-oriented approach” to new winery development. Furthermore, marketing programs 
exist for the wine sector as well. Much of the payments for crops and oil changed to more direct 
payment schemes and set-aside programs (Europa 1999). Indeed, direct payments made in this 
area are actually defined as rural development support and constituted 22% of the market access 
pillar (European Commission 2009). Important to these payments is the “cross-compliance” 
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requirement which allows for payments to be reduced or cancelled if producers do not meet 
environmental targets (Europa 1999).  
In terms of rural development policy, much of the funding goes towards structural 
programs. The funding from 2000-2006 was directed to meet objectives in three main areas: less-
favored areas, agri-environment, and investment subsidies. In the actual rural development 
budget, agri-environment was the area most supported by the funds (45%) followed by less 
favored area support (33%) and then investment subsidies (20%) (European Commission 2009, 
1). In terms of rural development subsidies by area, farmers in Austria, Norway, Finland, 
southern Germany and a few areas in France and Portugal received over 100 euros per hectare 
(Figure A.2.6). Other countries receive more support from the first pillar than from the second 
such as Denmark, Spain, Italy and Greece (European Commission 2009, 2). Interestingly, rural 
development recipients “receive on average quite similar ‘first pillar’ direct payments per ha” as 
the rural development payment levels (European Commission 2009, 40).  
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Figure A.2.6: Map of Average Rural Development Support in Europe, 2000-2006, Euros/ha 
 
Source: European Commission (2009), Rural Development (2000-2006) in EU Farms, found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/rd0201_report_final.pdf on July 13, 2011 
 
 In addition to subsidies, there are other factors which make the agricultural sector 
sensitive. For one thing, the majority of EU land is devoted to agriculture and forests even if less 
than 5% of the workforce is in agriculture. While agricultural exports represent 7% of total 
exports, the EU 27 has generally had a negative trade balance in agricultural goods with a deficit 
around 20 billion euros from 1998-2003 (European Commission 2004, Annex 2). The Euro Area 
has had a positive trade balance in agricultural goods. The EU countries which are typically net 
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agricultural exporters include Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, France, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands. Since 1999, the Netherlands has had the highest trade balance in agricultural goods 
(Eurostat 2011).  
 In terms of specific goods, some goods are particularly sensitive because of the structure 
of production, consumption and trade. For example from 1999-2003, raw sugar was neither 
exported nor imported in the EU. Processed sugar on the other hand was both imported and 
exported. This reflects sensitivity in sugar production but an opportunity for sugar processors. 
Around 30% of cereal production was exported in this time period as well with almost 40% of 
total wheat and sorghum production being exported suggesting areas where the EU may prefer to 
pursue market access opening strategies. Rice consumption, on the other hand, outweighed 
production in this time period making it much more import-competing. In terms of oil crops, 
consumption far outweighs production, especially for soybeans where production was less than 
10% of total consumption from 1999-2006. The EU was generally not self-sufficient in vegetable 
oils either (FAOSTAT 2010).  
The EU did produce more vegetables than they consumed, however, they imported 
almost a third of their total production. The EU was not self-sufficient in fruits, however as the 
EU imports much of their citrus fruit consumption (FAOSTAT 2010). Fruits and vegetables as a 
group are often too vague of categories to define them as import-competing or export-oriented; 
rather a particular good such as tomatoes may be sensitive if the EU produces a lot of them as 
does Chile. Indeed, the EU actually excluded a few specific fruits and vegetables in the 
agreement such as mushrooms, sweet corn and beans. Other goods that the EU lists as sensitive 
that Chile produces a great deal of include artichokes, table grapes and apples (Rudloff and 
Simons 2004).   
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In terms of milk and meat, the EU remained self-sufficient over the time period analyzed. 
Exports of bovine meat constituted over 30% of total production whereas poultry exports were 
around 25%. Exports of milk as a percentage of total milk production were around 30% from 
1999-2003 (FAOSTAT 2010). However, much of the sensitivities in this area result from the 
policies for these programs as indicated by the last section which included production limits and 
intervention prices (European Commission: Agriculture and Rural Development 2007).  
The EU produced just under half of their total fish consumption from 1999-2006 
(FAOSTAT 2010). Much of the troubles in fish are dealt with separately from agricultural 
negotiations according to what the WTO defines as agriculture. However, fish can be quite 
sensitive and in the case of the EU, some of that sensitivity deals with fishing rights. Spain does 
not recognize the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which defines a fishing territory as belonging 
to a country out to 200 nautical miles. This is quite a sensitive issue with Chile who has a very 
export-oriented fishing sector combined with problems of over-fishing in their high sea zones. 
Indeed, to prevent fishing of their high seas, Chile will prevent docking at their ports.  
Although the EU is a large producer, exporter and consumer of wines and beers, much of 
the sensitivities in this area come from issues of geographical indicators (GI). Indeed intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and GI’s are important to the EU as it threatens the competitiveness of 
European goods in foreign markets (European Commission 2004). This is especially true for 
GI’s for wines and cheeses that originate in a particular area or that utilize a particular production 
process. Chile particularly has the ability to be competitive with the EU in wines because most of 
the grapes used in Chilean wine production come from Europe (EU interview). As such a 
protection for GIs ensures that the EU may still get a premium for their products in Chile and 
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that Chile cannot export cheaper wines to the EU under a name that reflects the quality of typical 
European wines.       
A.2.6.2 Structure of Agriculture in the EU 
 Agriculture is difficult worldwide both in terms of domestic and international policy. The 
EU is no different in this respect. Indeed, frustrations over the inability to reform agricultural 
policy in the EU are similar to those in the U.S. Further like the U.S., trade agreements are not 
pursued because of agricultural reasons but rather for other political reasons (EU Interview). 
Nevertheless, once negotiations are initiated, agricultural groups, businesses, and industry begin 
the process of lobbying in order to capitalize on the opportunities and to mitigate the possible 
threats posed by FTA negotiations. Each country in the EU must deal with agricultural groups on 
the country level and then the countries must express their conditions and concerns to the EU.  
 In terms of the actual procedure of FTA negotiations, the Commission is the negotiator 
(particularly the Trade directorate general (DG) with the help of a few other DGS such as 
industry and agriculture) but they must work closely with member states and the parliament. The 
Council, which is composed of ministers from each of the countries in relevant areas such as 
foreign relations or agriculture, provides “negotiating directives” laying out specific objectives 
and guidelines of the negotiations. Once an agreement is reached, the Council and the Parliament 
formally agree on the outcome if it has met the negotiating directives. An agreement is 
implemented once it is fully ratified by each member state (European Commission: Trade 2011).  
 Because of the structure of EU FTA negotiations, much of the pressure from agricultural 
groups is applied at the national level rather than the EU level and helps to provide information 
regarding the “negotiating directives”. This is not to say that the EU is unaware of the desire of 
their constituents without direct consultation with the countries. According to one study 
regarding globalization, two thirds of Europeans are favorable towards globalization although 
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they contend that more rules should be in place to make the effects of globalization more 
favorable to everyone (European Commission 2004, Annex 1). Aside from this, the EU requests 
public consultations on EU policy by way of the commission website. At the time of the 
agreement, there was actually much more involvement from the states and industries than exists 
today (EU Interview).  
One of the more important influences in the negotiations is the trade Sustainability 
Impact Assessment (SIA). The SIA includes impacts in terms of macroeconomics, 
implementation, and specific sectoral impacts. For the Chilean agreement, there were sections 
for Grains, other Agriculture and Forestry, processed foods, mining, fisheries and transport, 
electricity and tourism, services, FDI and intellectual property. It includes environmental, 
economic and social impacts both in the EU and the partner country. One criticism of using such 
a report is that the impacts will always be much greater for a smaller country than the EU due to 
relative size (EU Interview).   
A.2.6.3 Different Approaches for Sensitive Agricultural Goods in the EU 
 Like the U.S. and Chile, the EU does have different approaches for agricultural goods. At 
the Institute of Agricultural Policy, researchers determined that there are three main rules for 
FTA negotiations in the EU: 1) high domestic protection is indicative of a lower willingness to 
reduce tariffs, 2) high domestic protection combined with high internal surpluses is indicative of 
maintenance of TRQ’s without additional extensions, and 3) remarkable surpluses motivate the 
EU to improve its access to other markets wherein they want fewer restrictions for these goods in 
the partner countries (Rudloff and Simons 2004, 3). Furthermore, the statement made by these 
researchers that “the agricultural parts of the EU FTAs contend with the conflict of trade 
liberalization on the one hand and national interests to limit market access on the other hand” are 
struggles that are similar in the U.S., Chile, and other countries all over the world (Rudloff and 
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Simons 2004, 8). As such the process in FTA negotiations always involves determining which 
goods could benefit from preferential market access and defining timetables for tariff reductions.   
 The difficulties faced in wines and other special products call for more extensive and 
variable solutions. It is often the case that the EU would prefer to simply exclude such issues in 
an FTA with preference to make progress on these topics at the multilateral level. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of progress at the multilateral level, some issues may be addressed in an FTA. For 
wine and other products requiring GI protection, institutional arrangement can be included in an 
FTA to deal with this, such as the resulting agreement on trade in wines and spirits. These 
agreements can simply be an agreement on rules or can specifically relate to tariff lines, ROO, 
and other issues of trade in these products.  
A.2.7 Conclusions on Agriculture in FTAs 
 In general, the U.S., the EU and Chile are all subject to pressures when it comes to 
negotiating FTAs particularly in agriculture. Often these pressures are internal: political reasons 
for protection, agricultural protection groups are particularly powerful, and the climate leads to a 
certain bundle of goods which are produced easily and a much smaller bundle of goods which 
are only produced in certain areas. Nevertheless many pressures are external: motivations may be 
based on foreign policy objectives, trade diversion costs, or opportunities to pursue another 
market. These pressures, while similar in some ways and different in others, lead to certain 
negotiating environments and behaviors in FTA negotiations.  
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